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The purpose of this research is to explore how learning moves through an organisation as a 
cognitive, behavioural and social process (Argote, 2011; Crossan, Lane and White, 1999; Huber, 
1991; Easterby-Smith,1997; Easterby-Smith and Crossan, 2000) from the perspective of the 
employee.  As a cognitive process, information is acquired by an individual and becomes part of their 
body of knowledge (Huber 1991) This knowledge eventually becomes part of the overall 
organisation’s learning (Huber 1991 and March, 1991). The social processes pertain to how learning 
and knowledge is passed between individuals and an organisations (Elkjaer, 2003).  The behavioural 
perspective of organisational learning focusses on how a person has changed their daily routine 
(Levitt and March, 1988).  
The research focuses on individuals learning about their own work procedures and developing them 
into new routines (Fiol & Lyles, 1983; Feldman and Pentland, 2003).  Two case study organisations in 
the early stage of introducing lean methodology to improve medical practice are used to illustrate 
how employees experience learning the lean method and learning new routines.  Lean Methodology 
is a business process reengineering method that helps to reduce waste (Womack & Jones, 1997).  
Although Lean has been applied in many business manufacturing settings, recently Lean has become 
popular among healthcare organisations (Radnor Holweg & Waring, 2012; McCann, Hassard and 
Granter, 2015) to gain efficiencies and produce better patient outcomes with fewer members of 
staff.  
The empirical part of this thesis presents fieldwork from two case studies in large multi faceted 
healthcare organisations, one in the US and one in the UK. The research includes: participant 
observation, document reviews, and semi structured interviews. Field notes and interviews notes 
were relied on to capture much of the data. Other forms of data include pictures of bulletin boards 
and other corporate items, PowerPoint presentations and other corporate archival documents from 
the two host institutions. The sheer volume of data from participant observation may elucidate how 
to approach this type of field work for future researchers.  
The research contributes to scholarship pertaining to Organisational learning and Lean 
Methodology.  Several notable insights have emerged: how individual perceive feedback they are 
given and that they give; knowledge sharing and communities of practice; the role consultants might 
play in influencing what is learned; narrative creation by both the employees and the organisation 
that influence what is embedded in the organisation and finally the dichotomy of what does get 
embedded in organisation from what was intended.  
The key contribution of this thesis is a new construct: Aimless Learning. Aimless learning is different 
from no learning in that it is kind of surface learning that appears to have changed behaviours or 
cognition but in an ‘outward display’ of learning without ever having changed daily practice. Lean 
methods are a way of changing processes within an organisation to make it more efficient. Aimless 
learning makes it appear as though individuals are engaged in this new process but in fact they have 
not embraced any of the cognitive or behavioural ideas. The research offers an opportunity to 
review how individuals in Healthcare organisations approach learning and embrace Lean as a new 
way of working.  
No patient data is included in this thesis. Although medical practices were discussed, NHS 
professionals were interviewed for their professional role and not to elicit any patient records or 
data. For this reason, NHS approval was not necessary, but the thesis received approval from the 




1. Introduction and Overview of the Thesis 
 
My original contribution to knowledge is the notion of Aimless Learning in Organisational Learning. 
Many researchers have described barriers to learning (Rashman, Withers and Hartley, 2009; Wang 
and Ahmed, 2003) or the idea of unlearning (Tsang and Zahra, 2008) as a multilevel construct at 
individual, group and organisational levels.  Researchers in the field of education have noted 
concepts such as surface and deep learning (Hay, 2007; Harrison, Price and Gavin, 2003) at the 
individual level.  However, the phenomenon uncovered in this study doesn’t quite fit into those 
definitions or concepts.  The study will explain through the perceptions of individuals learning under 
lean conditions perceived their own progress in learning. Aimless learning describes an effort to 
maintain the façade of learning on a cognitive level but preserve previously known behaviours.   
Organisational learning has been described as social, cognitive and behavioural process (Argyris and 
Schon, 1978; Crossan, Lane and White, 1999; Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Huber, 1991). The research has 
explored both individuals learning within organisations (Huber, 1991) and how the Organisation 
learns (Easterby-Smith and Lyles 2011). It is further argued that there are significant feedback loops 
to learning (Argyris, 1976) that have a close association with problem-solving. Single and double loop 
learning, levels of learning, interactions between individuals, groups and organisation have 
undergone scrutiny. It has been further argued that power and politics affect learning (Lawrence, 
Mauws, Dyck, Kleysen, 2005) . Any of these aspects might also represent barriers to learning. This 
research goes further, to say that there is the possibility that beyond rote learning, individuals might 
achieve only a superficial learning that does not embed the ideals and changes envisioned by the 
organisation. 
The healthcare industry is under extreme pressure to deliver more at lower cost whilst maintaining 
quality. Many hospitals have turned to other industries for inspiration on how to become more 
efficient. In recent years, Lean methodology has become a source of fascination for medical 
professionals. The Institute for Health Improvement in the USA began publishing white papers on 
standardisation in healthcare almost 30 years ago with Don Berwick’s Cost and Quality Movement 
(1989) and Atul Gawande’s Checklist Manifesto (2009),  The Triple aim: Cost, Health and Quality 
became the buzzwords of the American health system (Berwick, Nolan and Whittington, 2008). Lean 
Methodology was adopted as a learning process to achieve these aims (IHI 2005). The two host 
institutions, in which I was a participant observer, were instituting lean methodology as part of a 
learning and change programme. This provided an ideal opportunity not only to observe lean 
implementation but also to observe learning in situ. 
 
Research Questions 
In healthcare, particularly, learning is assumed to be highly structured and linear. Equally, Lean 
represents an ordered process to embed new ways of working.  There is still a great that is unknown 
about learning in general and learning in a healthcare environment.  The object of this research 
study was to explore learning both in general within a healthcare setting and in particular under the 
condition of introducing Lean methodology in a healthcare environment. Therefore, the main 





How do individuals, in general, experience learning in a healthcare organisation that is introducing 
Lean processes and methodology? 
 
RQ 2 
How do employees experiencing Lean Implementation perceive the process of learning as it gets 
embedded into the organisation and into the individual work routines in this type of organisation? 
 
RQ3 
How is learning perceived to move across the healthcare organisation from individual to the group 
and then embedded into the organisation especially during the implementation of Lean?  
 
RQ4 
How do employees experiencing Lean Implementation describe the aspects of influences of the 
organisation that affect learning which will eventually be embedded into practices? 
 
Overview of Theory 
An organisation’s capacity to successfully learn new behaviours and routines within its groups and 
individuals is of considerable theoretical and practical importance (Argote and Ingram, 2000, 
Edmondson and Moingeon, 1998, Marquardt 2011).  Understanding how that learning moves 
through the organisation is a continuing complex issue that requires further investigation (Argote, 
2011; Radnor, Waring and Holweg, 2012). Organisational learning (OL) The literature has been 
fragmented by different perspectives on learning and levels of analysis (Argote, 2011; Easterby-
Smith and Lyles, 2011, Dierkes, Antal, Child and Nonaka, 2001).  
 
There are a number of different strands to OL research; behavioural, cognitive, psychodynamic and 
social. Each strand has developed its own nomenclature and operationalised constructs. Huber 
(1991) for example, established constructs such as ‘information distribution’ and ‘information 
processing’. Huber uses these constructs as cognitive antecedents to Individual learning (IL). These 
are useful in their capacity to study individual action. This current study is focussed on the end-to-
end movement of learning.  
 
Thus, use of an alternative wording offered by Easterby-Smith and Araujo (1999) is more relevant to 
place two separate streams of OL research into a technical view or social view of OL. The technical 
view considers the processes involved in interpretation and response to information from both 
internal and external organisational sources. The social view focusses on how people make sense of 
their learning. This research is concerned both the social view and the ‘technical’ processes as 
defined by Easterby-Smith and Araujo (1999). Within the technical aspect of learning there are a 
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‘number of dilemmas’ (Crossan, Lane, Maurer and White, 1999; Easterby –Smith, Burgoyne and 
Aruajo, 1999; Levinthal and March 1993). A friction between developing new ideas (exploration) and 
the operationalising efficiency of existing methods (exploitation) influences organisational learning 
and how it is embedded into routines and work practices is not well understood (Cyert and March, 
1963; Crossan et al, 1999; Crossan and Berdrow, 2003; Leavitt and March, 1988). Individuals in 
organisations need to sift through mounds of information to make sense of whether an exploratory 
or exploitative strategy is necessary. A number of scholars; Huber (1991), Fiol and Lyles (1985), 
Crossan, Lane and White, 1999) have attempted to collate the concepts of Organisational Learning 
into unified theory. 
More recent organisational literature suggest that Crossan’s work (1999) is a useful pragmatic 
framework for understanding individual and organisational learning (Van de Ven as quoted in 
Crossan, Maurer and White, 2011, p 447.) The 4I framework helps us to analyse organisational 
learning as a multi-level process across four stages: intuiting, interpreting, integrating and 
institutionalising. There is little empirical evidence relating directly to the 4I framework for the way 
in which the feedback and feed-forward loops operate within organisations and how employees 
experience the four stages (Crossan and Berdrow, 2003; Dutta and Crossan, 2005; Bontis, Crossan, 
and Hulland, 2002). 
 
The study expands on previous work of organisational learning and in particular learning in 
healthcare teams (Cannon and Edmondson, 2001; Crossan et al, 1999; Crossan and Berdrow, 2003, 
Tucker and Edmondson, 2003). Lean methodology has gain popularity with healthcare organisations 
to provide efficiencies. Learning to embed new lean practices into healthcare organisations has 
implications for both academic and practical research (Radnor, Holweg and Waring, 2012; 
Proudlove, Moxham and Boaden, 2008; Flinchbaugh, 2008). 
 
Lean methodology is a way of reducing waste and redundant practices. It is has been widely used in 
the manufacturing sectors such as the car industry (Womack and Jones, 2010). Lean is based on the 
philosophy that Organisational leaders will create a culture of learning and critical reflection. Lean 
also stresses the idea of standardisation and this is the concept that appeals to many Healthcare 
organisations. There is a delicate balance between standardisation and variation in healthcare. 
 
Routines and protocols are needed to provide a base level of treatment to patient to guarantee 
safety and efficiency (Berwick, 1989; Berwick, Nolan and Whittington, 2008).  Medical routines 
represent an opportunity to observe learning in the workplace (Feldman and Pentland, 2003). Using 
routines as an example of learning, one is able to ‘map’ learning (Feldman and Pentland, 2003; 
Feldman, 2000; Schulz, 2002). While routines can form the backbone of an organisation’s strength, 
changing these embedded ideas can be difficult. This aspect of study will build on previous research 
that has linked learning Lean methods with individual and organisational level learning (Flinchbaugh, 
2008; Feldman, 2000; Feldman and Pentland, 2003) and in particular learning a lean process routine 






This study uses an interpretivist/ constructivist approach as there are ‘multiple realities’ (Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985) to the way learning is perceived to move across an organisation. The study has its 
ontological home in social constructionism (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Each organisational 
member ascribes meaning to their perception of how they believe they’ve been introduced to an 
idea and how their learning has been embedded into their everyday work practices. Therefore, I use 
research methods that are able to elicit different perspectives. 
 
A limitation of the interpretivist perspective is that the researcher brings their own biases to the 
interpretation of the data. The data itself is fraught with ‘biased texts’ from the influences of gender, 
race and culture (Denzin and Lincoln, 2002). To counteract the limitation of interpretivism, the 
explanation must not be a simple analysis of the facts or data, instead one must be aware of 
assumptions and biases on the part of the researcher (Symons and Casell, 2012). One must be aware 
of these limitations and address them with a degree of reflexivity in analysing the data (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2002). 
 
The study is divided into two parts: the first is a general consideration of organisational learning 
theories and in particular the 4I framework; the second part of the thesis is devoted to uncovering a 
deeper understanding of how learning is perceived among medical professionals when introduced to 
lean methodology as part of their medical routines. There are two distinct case studies both focusing 
on organisational learning and lean but providing different insights into the way in which individuals 
perceive their learning.   Acknowledging the constraints of qualitative research, this study gives rich 
detail  in the variety of data that has been collected and presented here.  
 
Case Study Design in Qualitative Research  
Within the adopted methodological approach, Case study (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2002) can be 
appropriate research strategy.  A Case Study approach aims at understanding a particular case 
deeply, with regard to its context.  Case Study helps examine the role of contextual factors on the 
learning process (Stake, 2005). Thus, it allows for focus on specific characteristics and phenomenon 
of the cases (Stake, 2005; Yin, 2002) to capture the specificities of learning practices within Lean 
Methodology.   
Case Study design also suits studying the process of organisational learning (Stake 2005).  The 
researcher has the ability to collect data in a chain of events, actions and interactions with particular 
attention to beliefs, attitudes and perception of the participants.  Collecting rich data about all 
aspects is critical to outline the details of organisational learning.  
There are several options in designing case study research (Yin, 2002).  Case Studies can be 
exploratory (to openly explore a phenomenon) or explanatory (to look for the causes of a previously 
identified phenomenon). I the greater portion of emphasis in the current research study is an 
exploratory approach since the aim is to openly examine how OL unfolds within the context of a 
healthcare organisation undergoing lean implementation.  However, there are also elements of 
explanatory approach in uncovering how individual in the process of learning lean develop their 




I rely on a multiple case study design because it allowed for exploring different aspects of 
organisational learning.  I am not going to compare the two case studies in a comparative analysis.  
Instead the two different case studies will help in finding various patterns and perception in the OL 
process.  In addition, the multiple case study design provided a wide variety of data points and types 
of data.  Through the two case studies, I reach a deeper understanding of the influences of Lean on 
the leaning process and on the perceptions of the individuals in those circumstances by paying 
attention to the experiences in those two cases (Eisenhardt, 1991; Yin, 2002). 
 
Regarding the Unit of analysis (learning process), the level of analysis (individual), the aggregate level 
of the study is the individual level.  Hence, through an embedded-multiple case study design (Yin, 
2002) I study multiple experiences of learning under lean implementation.  
I was fortunate to have prolonged access to the Case Study Organisations.  Therefore, it was possible 
to take longitudinal view of the cases and capture the dynamic nature of the learning process 
(Leonard-Barton, 1990).  It means that I have been able to build a story around the experiences of 
individuals in their learning process, consisting of sequences of actions, interactions, events and 
consequences.  This longitudinal view helps to build an impression of the process of learning under 
Lean (Langley et al, 2013; Langley, 1999) through which I can make sense of the learning process.  
 
Case Study One  
The first case study focused on understanding how learning is embedded in an organization, using 
the 4I framework as a guide to understand OL. While this study is not suggesting to complete theory 
of the 4I framework, Case Study One uses the framework as a way to illustrate the underlying 
intricacies of learning within a healthcare organisation. In Case Study One , I uncover insights from 
organisation members on their accounts of ‘missing steps’ or the ‘entering and exiting’ of learning in 
the 4I framework (Crossan et al, 2011) as proposed in my pilot study. Existing research shows the 
four stages of learning and their complementing feedback loops can be overlaid into an organisation 
to describe the learning (Bontis, Crossan and Hulland, 2002; Berdrow and Crossan, 2003, Crossan 
and Apaydin, 2010; Dutta and Crossan, 2005). However, critics of existing research claim that it is 
largely conceptual, and that there is a need for more empirical work to establish how learning moves 
across the organisation (Shilling and Kluge , 2009; Argote 2011). 
 
Case Study Two 
Case Study Two broadens the comparison to other theories of learning and introduces theoretical 
concepts such as communities of practice, narratives and storytelling in organisations.  In Case Study 
Two, I uncover perceptions around learning lean practices, as well as implementing them into new 
routines. This offers insights into how individuals interpreted new ways of doing things, integrated 
them amongst their peers and practice groups, and finally embedded them into institution’s 
routines.  It also provides some insight to how feedback within learning lean is perceived by 




 These two case studies add to the body of empirical knowledge relating to OL and lean 
methodology as it allows us to explore the ‘entrances’ and ‘exits’ of learning in the implementation 
of new ways of working. This study also helps us to understand how learning, knowledge ownership 
and managerial control are perceived by employees. Building on the first study, Case Study Two 
delves deeper into how the organisations members distinguish interruptions, influences and the 
organisation’s information in their learning. The themes and dimensions described as part of this 
PHD study align with the work on lean methodology by Radnor Holweg and Waring (2012); 





There are two set of themes that emerged from the data with seven aggregate dimensions.  The 
dimensions are: ‘Triggers of Non-engagement’, ‘Arrested Learning’, ‘Role conflict’, ‘Discipline and 
domination’, ‘Barriers (1) Organisational’, ‘Barriers (2) Employees Expectations’, ‘Integration of the 
Myth’. . Case Study One and Case Study Two have their own set of themes, concepts and aggregate 
dimensions. Whilst related to each other, there aren’t identical. Differences emerged as further 
detail was uncovered about employee perceptions. Case Study One used the Crossan 4I matrix as a 
frame or reference to explain interdependencies. The themes in Case Study 1 are: Policy fatigue, 
discrepancy in application, conflicting managerial agenda, distancing, and disconnectedness.  The 
final dimensions in case study one are: Triggers of non-engagement, arrested learning and role 
conflict.   In exploring further the ideas of arrested learning and triggers for non-engagement, Case 
Study 2 widened the scope of data collection and data analysis to compare the empirical evidence 
with a broader range of literature.  In Case Study Two the concepts and themes discussed are: 
organisation dysfluency, silenced, Role of management consultant, managerial control, knowledge 
ownership, waning interest, application discrepancy, public belief in data, myths stories and lies, 
consultant omniscient, fads & fashions, casting the lean spell  time counting.  The inductive method 
of analysis (Corley and Gioia, 2004) generated four main dimensions. In case study 2 these are: 
Discipline and Domination, Barriers (1) Organisational, Barriers (2) Employee expectations, 
Integration of the Myth.  
 
Format of the thesis  
The remaining part of the thesis comprises five Chapters. In Chapter Two, the relevant literature and 
models that inform our understanding of organisational learning perspectives, the contemporary 4I 
learning framework, Lean Methodology and routines are presented.   In addition, the current 
debates of Lean Methodology and Learning in Healthcare are discussed for their particular 
challenges (Radnor, Holweg and Waring, 2012; Stan and Vermuelen, 2012).  
The focus of Chapter Three is the methodological approach and the philosophical underpinning of 
the research design. I explain my philosophical choices and justify the methodological approach. The 
background and organisational context of both Case Study organisations is explained.  A detailed 
description of data collection and data analysis methods deemed suitable for this research are given. 
Special consideration is given to the variety of data collected for this study and how I collated the 
data in preparation for the coding of the material.  A further discussion of the coding and the 
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analysis is illustrated culminating in the first two data structures of the studies. In Chapter Four, Case 
Study One is presented in its own context and its relationship to the 4I framework is reviewed. The 
content of Chapter Four was presented as part of an OLKC conference paper on the findings of Case 
Study One.  These findings formed the basis of the initial investigation into Organisation Learning 
and the 4I framework.  Therefore, Chapter Four reads as a distinct text within the thesis. Chapter 
Five presents the findings from Case Study Two.  This forms the largest portion of the research with 
a very in depth discussion of the twenty-five first order concepts, thirteen second order themes and 
the final four aggregate dimensions of 1) Discipline and domination, 2) Barriers [1] Organisational, 3) 
Barriers [2] Employee Expectations, and 4) Integration of the Myth.  The concepts and themes are 
described and accompanied by data examples. Chapter Six explains and discusses the findings in 
relation to the four research questions.  Chapter Seven puts forward the theoretical and practical 
contribution of this thesis to existing literature and concludes with the limitations of the present 
study and a look to the future research using the new theoretical construct of aimless Learning.  
Some final words on the unique challenges of this type of research and personal challenges during 







CHAPTER 2  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
 2.1. Introduction 
 
 
This chapter sets out the landscape of organisational learning literature and lean methodology that 
is pertinent to the subject of this thesis which is learning in the context of a healthcare organisation.  
A comparison of the main theoretical viewpoints of organisational learning, the current popular 
theoretical framework of the ‘4I framework’ together with the literature on routines in healthcare as 
they relate to organisational learning, and a section on the idea of tension in learning are presented 
in the following chapter.  Next, a brief discussion of tension is given because healthcare contains a 
peculiar mix of rigid adherence to conventional learning wisdom and the need to change with new 
discoveries. The empirical work for this study was conducted in two separate healthcare 
organisations; therefore, I have also included section on Lean in Healthcare and a section on 
Learning in Healthcare. 
 
 
2.2. Organisational Learning Perspectives  
 
Organisational learning continues to be an important theoretical perspective for improving what 
organisations do, challenging stuck assumptions, encouraging innovation and embedding change. It 
encompasses many different levels from individual, group and organisational as well as different 
disciplines and ontologies (Easterby-Smith, 1997). There is still some debate whether it is a collective 
process of individuals or whether the organisation itself holds memory and information (Huber, 
1991; Kim, 1993; Dodgson, 1999; Maier, Prange and Rosenthal, 2001).  
In the earliest writings on behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963; Cangelosi and Dill, 
1965), organisations are said to ‘learn’ from their past experiences and adapt to their environments. 
Organisations develop rules, guidelines, standards and policies as part of their learning (Cyert & 
March, 1963; Leavitt and March 1988). As an organisation adapts to its environment, it learns to 
adjust those routines and policies.  Cyert and March (1963) argued that organisations must adapt to 
their situations and problems or become extinct. Individuals were the tools for learning but the 
organisation itself could still ‘learn’ through the cumulative and aggregate knowledge of the 
individuals within it. These ideas were the catalyst for organisational level investigations of learning 
in addition to those that focus on individual learning. 
Organisational learning is founded in premise that organisations continual renew and alter 
knowledge through influence of individual knowledge learning on the group.  Changes in practice 
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may lead to new premises of fact and the development of new knowledge (Fiol and Lyles, 19085).  
Knowledge is developed in a number of ways. Different disciplines have explored the foundations of 
organisational learning from various perspectives.  
There are four lenses through which scholars have approached OL: cognitive (Akgun, Lynn and 
Byrne, 2003; Cook and Yanow, 1993; Dodgson, 1993; Huber, 1991); behavioural (Leavitt and March, 
1988; Zollo and Winter, 2002; Miner and Mezias, 1996); experiential (Brown and Duguid, 1991; Kim 
1993; Kolb, 1984; Nicolini , Gherardi and Yanow, 2003); and psycho-dynamic (Vince, 2002; Sturdy, 
2004).  
Cognitive Perspective of organisational learning is characterised by how individuals change their 
causal mental maps by absorbing, processing and retaining knowledge (Akgun, Lynn & Byrne, 2003). 
The acquired knowledge is then used to develop mental models for use in future decision making 
and taking action.  This is particular important in organisations so that individuals may be called 
upon to act in situations outside their normal work routine. ‘Cognitive structures’ are developed 
through assimilation of facts but also beliefs and attitudes that will ultimately guide an individual 
through actions and behaviour (Lave, 1988; Nicolini and Meznar, 1995).  The cognitive structures 
help to support the idea of ‘systems thinking’ in organisations (Senge, 1990). Systems thinking 
provides a focal point for acquired knowledge to be embedded into routines in organisations. 
Learning is conceptualised by acquisition of new insights which can then be used to form new maps 
or systems. In organisations, this is accomplished through continuous change and hared of new 
schematic maps among individuals within the organisation.   
The Behavioural perspective on learning in organisations is primarily occupied by how individuals 
interact with their environment (Shipton and DeFillipi, 2011). In this perspective, learning results in a 
change in behaviour.  The change may be attained through experience, practice or training.  
Appropriate reinforcement can produce d a desired behaviour.  In this perspective there are some 
key factors to consider such as: individual motivation, repetitive practice, individuals’ surroundings 
and their social group. “Learning and progression may not be necessarily conscious, but rather a 
necessary part of the human condition.” (Shipton and Defillipini, 2011, p 87).  In this perspective, 
learning is largely measured by observable change in behaviour.  When an individual reacts 
differently to stimuli with a desired organisational behaviour, the learning is deemed to have taken 
place. Behavioural patterns can be repeated so that they become automatic and can be embedded 
into organisational routines.  
Experiential Learning perspective is favoured by organisational development practitioners and 
theorists.  It provides a basis on which to explore the learning that occurs through reflecting on 
experiences in the workplace. The popular practitioner explanation of experiential learning is Kolb’s 
(1984) learning cycle. Kolb’s cycle has four stages; concrete experience, abstract conceptualisations, 
reflective observation and active experimentation.  The learner proceeds through a sequence of 
experience, reflecting, thinking and acting in a similar way that medical profession describes the 
Plan-do-study-act cycles of continuous improvement.  Experiential learning strives to capture the 
process of human adaptation through the reflection of experience.  For Kolb “ learning is the process 
whereby knowledge is created through the transformation of experience” (1984, p 38).  
Organisation members gather and create knowledge through their every day experiences in the 
workplace.   In his way, organisations have distinctive ways in which their members learn.  
Organisational learning has distinctive characteristics of what is learned, how it is learned and the 
adjustments called for to enhance the learning.  An organisation is a collective of individuals who 
have different perspectives and values and apply newly acquired information through different 
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filters.  Experiential learning aims to capture new knowledge and develop new ways of working 
through reflection and feedback.  
Psychodynamic perspective of learning adds the elements of emotion (Sturdy, 2004; Vince and 
Gabriel, 2011; Vince, 2002). The emotional component of learning can manifest as anxiety or 
projections of fantasies about the content of the learning.  In organisations this may translate in to 
assumptions about managerial agendas for the justification of the learning.  The key component in 
this perspective of learning is the role of emotion.  Emotion can drive the beliefs and actions of 
organisational members as they learn or indeed what they decide to learn. Emotion may be the ‘by-
product’ or an inhibitor to learning (Antonacoupoulou & Gabriel, 2011).  The psychological influence 
on organisational members must be taken into account when trying to understand what has been 
learned and what can be learned. Anxiety over organisational change or disruption may impact how 
or what is learned (Clancy, Vince and Gabriel, 2011).  
Other perspectives have denoted learning as having strong social and shared components (Brown 
and Duguid, 1991; Kim, 1993). In these perspectives, organisational learning is viewed as a social 
process with multiple actors (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011). Sharing, interpreting and combining 
each other’s knowledge creates greater understanding and moves the learning to a group level, e.g. 
echocardiogram specialist their knowledge with each other in social conversation. In order for the 
group to assimilate the ‘shared knowledge’, there must be a transfer of individual knowledge to the 
broader setting of the group.  The socialisation of individual practices leads to learning and 
embedding the learning routines in the organisation (Nonaka & Takechuchi, 1995, Nonaka, 1994).  
Yet another view of learning is ‘situated learning’ moves OL which moves away from the individual 
mind to a sphere of social interactions becoming something active that also needs practice and 
repetition (Brandi & Elkjaer, 2011).  Learning in situated in authentic activities, e.g. nurses learn from 
working at the bedside with colleagues. The learning is accomplished almost unintentionally by 
natural sharing form one nurse to another.  Lave and Wenger (1991) called this legitimate peripheral 
participation.  It is part of the shared experience that individuals enhance both their tacit and explicit 
knowledge. For the shared experience to occur, Lave and Wenger (1991) postulated the idea of a 
community of practice, i.e. a group of people who shared a common interest and interact on a 
regular basis.  For shared learning to take place; there had to be three things, a domain, a 
community and a practice.  The ‘domain’  of learning is the shared interest such as caring for 
patients.  The ‘community’ might be the status of belonging to a group, e.g. healthcare workers. The 
community is held together by some legitimate form, for instance nurses in a healthcare setting.   
Finally, individual learning is transferred to the organisation through mental models (Senge, 2006).  
Each individual holds a model of how they perceive the world works. This of course influences how a 
person behaves and the ways in which new information and knowledge can be shared or assimilated 
into a group. Huber (1991) and Kim (1993) supported this notion in their earlier works proposing 
that organisational learning was a product of shared interpretation of both the know-how and the 
know-why of the organisation’s ‘ways of working’.  
Crossan, Lane and White (1999) consider how the learning moves from an individual to a group level.  
The 4 I framework (Crossan et al, 1999) consists of four psycho-dynamic processes which connect 
learning from an individual processes such as intuiting and interpreting to group and organisational 
level processes such as integrating and institutionalising. Learning is conceived as a dynamic flow, 
which starts at the individual level, and flows naturally to the group and organisational level through 
the interactions of individuals.   Crossan expresses how the social processes of interpreting and 
integrating knowledge into shared mental models moved knowledge from something that happens 
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at the individual level to something that could ultimately be used at organisational level.  The 4I 
framework has elements from both the behavioural and cognitive perspectives. The first part of this 
research in Case Study Organisation One, HealthCo, considers the how learning is perceived across 
the social cognitive and psychological perspectives across the four stages of the 4I framework as a 
guide described (Crossan et al, 1999; Crossan and Berdrow, 2003). 
Figure 1 is a schematic depiction of the overlap between the four main perspectives and the 
placement of the 4I framework. In Figure One below, the Venn diagram depicts the overlaps 
between the cognitive and behavioural perspectives of organisational learning.  I want to highlight 
the difficulty in separating each of the perspectives completely on their own.  Discussion of Learning 
often embrace components form each of the perspectives.   
 
Figure 1. Organisational learning Perspectives 
 
 
In the studies of learning within organisations at the individual and group level, there are further 
delineations: types of learning, contextual factors, concepts of learning, content of learning, 
knowledge and understanding a process of improvement and levels of learning (Argyris and Schon, 
1978; Argote, 1999; Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Huber, 1991). Contextual factors have been examined 
within the organisation such as: culture, strategy, structure and environment (Antonacoupolou, 
2006; Crossan and Berdrow, 2003). The scope of this study is specifically narrowed to healthcare 
context because this context provides an opportunity to generate insights into organisations with 
large bureaucratic structures and systems. At the same time, Healthcare strives to be innovative and 
agile within in its team structure. Unique and complex relationships between manager and managed 
exist within this highly status driven and hierarchical industry culture, providing rich ground for 
organisational research (Carroll and Edmondson, 2002; Nutley and Davies, 2011). 
The conceptual definitions of individual learning have focussed mostly on acquiring knowledge 
through experience and then exhibiting a change in behaviour (Argote, 1999; Skinner, 1950; 
Thorndike, 1908). For example, if I touch a hot stove and burn my fingers, at the next encounter, I 
am unlikely to touch the hot stove. Learning can be seen as an individual activity that leads to 
learning on behalf of an organisation (Kim, 1993; Dixon, 1999). An individual acquires new skills, 
values and norms. As these skills are passed from person to person, they become part of group 
learning or organisational learning (Argote, 1999). For this research it is important to highlight that 








acquisition of a skill) and know –why (conceptual understanding of the experiential learning). This 
mirrors the use of the tension between exploitation and exploration (Crossan et al 1999, Cyert and 
March 1963). It’s important to reflect on this because the arguments about ‘tension’ help to explain 
why some learning passes through the organisation and some is discarded. The adoption of new 
routines is seen as the endpoint of the learning at either an individual or organisational level (Argyris 
and Schon, 1978; Miner and Mezias, 1996). This research is interested in the individual component 
of learning as it affects organisational level learning. 
Learning in organisations is something done by individuals that encompasses information processing 
and decisions making (Brandi and Elkjaer 2011; Miner and Mezias, 1996) but it ultimately affects the 
whole of the organisation (Kim 1993, Dodgson 1999). “Individual learning outcomes can, by way of 
the individual acting on behalf of the organisation, be crystallised in organisational routines and 
values and become organisational learning” (Brandi and Elkjaer, 2011, p.41). “Organisational 
Learning is enhanced by individual learning but it goes way beyond that to systems in place for 
scanning the environment and using information to make better decisions, regardless of its source. 
What if this learning impacts the organizations as a whole? It is embedded in the way the 
organisation does its business and is shared throughout the organisation, even though this may not 
always be highly conscious. Such learning is not person dependent” (Watkins & Marsick, 1993, p. 
156). Therefore, organisational learning encompasses all levels of learning; individual, group and 
organisation. 
I have relied a number of sources for the definitions commonly used in Organisational Learning 
literature.  These definitions draw out the ideas of learning as partly behavioural and partly cognitive 
and partly a shared mental model.  Scholars use learning definitions to emphasis an aspect of 
learning to a particular set of circumstances in an organisation that they are studying.  The rationale 
for including these definitions is that this study relies on more than one definition.  In the course of 
the research, it became clear that the phenomenon I uncovered, embraced more than one 
theoretical framework.  Thus, I have included these definitions to illustrate this point.   
Table 1 represents the definitions that I have relied to interpret the learning taking place when 
analysing the empirical data.  The definitions in Table 1 are taken from seminal works such Argyris 
and Schon (1978) to the very current framework (Crossan et al, 1999; 2011) and review articles 
(Schilling and Kluge, 2009).  The wide range of these articles helps us to understand that learning is a 
complicated phenomenon that can be studied in different ways and that it is linked to systems 
(Bontis, Crossan and Hulland, 2002) in a similar way that Lean methodology and routines are linked 
with learning.  
 
Table 1. Definitions of Organisational Learning  
 
Author Definitions 
Argyris and Schon (1978 and 1996) Organisational learning occurs when facts, 
procedures, myths of the organisation are 
embedded in members’ minds and in the 
organisation’s environment 
Bontis, Crossan and Hulland (2002) Organisational learning pertains to its 
systems, structures and procedures that 
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 are embedded in individual and group 
learning 
Cangelosi and Dill ( 1965) Adaption based upon the interaction of 
individual, group and organisation 
Choo (1998) Organisations have a continuous cycle of 
learning and adaptation. 
Cook and Yanow (1993) At the group level, learning is established 
with ‘know-how’ is cultivated and used 
for collective activities. 
Crossan et al (1999) Organisational learning is a means of 
strategic renewal. Renewal requires that 
organisations explore and learn in new 
ways whilst also exploiting what they 
already know and do. 
Cyert and March (1963) Adaption and adoption of new behaviours 
Easterby-Smith (2011) The process whereby the organisation 
acquires knowledge content 
Fiol and Lyles (1985) OL means the process of improving 
action through better knowledge and 
understanding 
Garvin (2000) Learning is a collective process that takes 
place in and through interaction with and 
between a number of people 
Huber (1991) Learning has taken place in an entity if a 
change in behaviour has occurred by 
processing available information 
Leavitt and March (1988) Organisations learn by encoding 
inferences from history into routines that 
guide behaviour 
Nelson and Winter (1982) Evolution of routines in an organisations 
Senge (1990) Learning is process of continual change 
and renewal, a way of reinventing oneself 
and the organisation 
Simon (1991) Organisations learn from their members 
and from integrating new members and 
their way of doing things into its structure 
Shilling and Kluge (2009) Organisationally collective learning is a 
process in which individual and group 
based experiences concerning the 
improvement of organisation 
performance and/or goals are transferred 
into organisational routines, processes 







2.2.1. Current Framework of Organisational learning  
Although this research study is not specifically modelled on the 4I framework, a large number of 
current research articles are based on this view of organisational learning.  Therefore, I make note of 
the framework as a sub topic to the main part of research on the perception of how learning moves 
across an organisation.   
The ‘4I Framework’ (Crossan, Lane and White, 1999) proposes that learning moves across an 
organisation in an orderly and systematic way. This framework helps us in understanding the 
dichotomy of organisational learning between exploitative and explorative learning (Easterby-Smith 
and Armour 2003). At the same time, organizational routines have been an prominent component of 
Lean Methodology (Womack and Jones, 2010). Leavitt and March (1988) and March (1991) put 
forward the idea that learning was ‘history dependent’ or ‘routine based’. Becker (2005) linked this 
use of routine to effectiveness and the ‘means to accomplish work tasks’. Routines can help 
members to hold information about past decisions and thereby to use their [tacit] knowledge to 
perform new tasks (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004). Thus routines can be a source of learning, akin to 
a ‘stock’ of learning (Bontis, Crossan and Hulland, 2002). Organisational learning is understood to 
take place in cycles with feedback loops from the individual levels to group levels and then 
institutionalised at the organisational level. 
 
The following are definitions that have arisen from the development of the 4I framework in the last 
decade (Crossan and Berdrow, 2003, Crossan and Bapuji, 2004), Crossan and Apaydin, 2010). These 
definitions are used in Case Study One.  
• Intuiting is “changing the way he or she thinks and is able to perceive new possibilities” 
• Interpreting is “sharing and stabilising such insights through words and interactions with 
members of a group”  
• Integrating happens when “members of the group confront structures that present the old 
order, adjusting to new structure” 
• Institutionalising is the learning embedded in the organisation (Crossan et al, 2011, p 455). 
 
Crossan et al (2011), describe OL as a multilevel phenomenon that needs to have a theory which “ 
answers what, where, when, why and why not” (p 456). There has been limited empirical research 
showing how the learning is processed in an organisation (e.g. Crossan and Berdrow, 2003; Schilling 
and Kluge, 2009). Previous research has covered the integration of knowledge by focussing on 
knowledge transfer or embedding knowledge within the organisation (Argote and Ingram 2000; 
Hargadon & Fanelli, 2002; Lam, 2004, Lam & Lambermont–Ford, 2010). Other research has focused 
on institutionalisation as the end goal of learning that once achieved the cycle is complete. However, 
Crossan’s problematic areas (1999, p 533) point out that without feedback the assimilation of new 
learning is made more difficult. Institutionalisation should be part of the cycle of feedback. People 
transfer their learning to the organisation through routines and accepted procedures of the 





2.2.2. Natural Tensions in Organisational Learning 
Organisational learning has many different forms and definition as previously discussed in section 
2.2.  ‘Tension’ is a concept that appears frequently in the literature because there is a natural ‘tug of 
war’ between what we know in the status quo and what we need to change.  Organisations and 
Individuals have a tendency towards incremental change (Nevis, Dibella and Gould, 1997) instead of 
drastic change.  Across different perspectives on OL, authors have described the ‘tension’ between 
explorative learning and exploitative learning (Cyert and March, 1963; Leavitt and March, 1988; 
Cangelosi and Dill, 1965). March (1991) pointed out that there was a ‘trade off’ in organisations in 
learning new routines.  Organisations could ‘exploit’ exitisng ways of thinking and perhps change 
only incrementally or organisations could explore completely new ways of doing things. The gains in 
learning differ in each of the modes.  ‘Explorative’ learning creates greater upheaval and may take 
longer to realise positive outcomes form this kind of learning.  ‘Exploitative’ learning makes 
adjustments and to a familiar way of doing things.  Both categories of leaning have their uses to 
organisations.  The dilemma for many organisations is that the disruptive and perhaps unpredictable 
explorative learning tends to provide a steeper positive ‘trajectory’ of outcomes (Su, Li, Yang, Li, 
2011).   
In parallel, other authors have used different words to describe the tensions of learning completely 
new ideas (explorative) or incrementally changing older ideas (exploitative). For instance, Argyris 
and Schön (1978) described the single versus double loop learning while Fiol and Lyles (1985) used 
the words ‘lower and higher order’ learning. Following is a table that places the relevant terminology 
in comparison to each other.  
Table 2 juxtaposes the definitions of ‘exploration’ and ‘exploitation’ in learning. I highlight this point 
because researchers describe learning as happening at different levels and intensities. In other 
words, some learning is considered to be incremental with smaller changes and other learning is 
deeper with exponential changes.  Learning in healthcare is particular interested in both exploration 
of learning, i.e. bringing completely new protocols to treat diseases and the exploitation of learning, 
i.e. tweaking protocols to best fit the particular institution or situation.   
Table 2 below shows side by side the parts of the defintiions that highlight the emphasis on the type 
of learning that is occurring. The exploration of learning is a ‘higher order’ type of learning.  
Individuals within organisations are challenging the assumptions and striving to change what is 
known about the procedures in their organisation (Edmondson & Bohmer, 2001).  Double loop 
learning suggests that individuals within organisations continue ask questions about why an 
organisation is performing tasks in a particular way (Argyris and Schon, 1978).  Perhaps Nutley and 
Davies (2011) have expressed the most salient pint of the difference between the adaptive nature of 
exploitation learning and the generative type of learning in exploration.  The adaptive learning 
makes changes within systems of the type we generally see in medical care and explorative learning 
makes changes based in research and development.  The explorative learning is generally scene as a 
major change to what individuals within organisations do.   
Table 2 Comparison of learning ‘tension’ between exploration and exploitation 
Expression of Definitions for ‘tension’ in learning 
Exploration Exploitation Authors 




Double loop Single loop Argyris and Schön 
(1978, 1997) 
Higher order Lower level Fiol & Lyles (1985) 
Edmondson and Bohmer 
(2001) 






Know why Know how Kim (1993) 
Action orientation Rules for task performance Salancik and Pfeffer (1978) 
Stimulus to action Exercising skills Nelson and Winter (1982) 




In the table above, the authors draw out the differences between exploring new learning and 
exploiting existing learning.  This dichotomy relates to the ‘pressure’ or ‘strain’ between adopting a 
new idea/routine or rejecting it.  Previous research groups (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Weick and Wesltey, 
1999; Crossan et al, 1999; Crossan and Berdrow, 2003) has attempted to explain how the learning 
tension is resolved in the organisation. This research focusses on uncovering the ‘problematic areas’ 
of organisational learning of what is being learned and implemented within the organisation.  
This research study considers both the exploitative and explorative types of learning explanations to 
uncover the phenomenon of how learning is perceived in the two case study organisations (Argote, 
2012; Argyris and Schon, 1997; Levitt and March 1988, Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Huber, 1991; March, 
1991; Senge, 1991).  
 
2.3 Lean Methodology Overview 
 
Lean is both a method and a philosophy. It is driven by the idea that one can create an environment 
of customer/client value and eliminate nearly all waste (Womack and Jones, 2003). In healthcare, 
this idea translates into maximising value for the patient by reducing unnecessary procedures, 
waiting times, follow ups, and hospital visits (Ferlie, 2010). This aims to create a healthcare 
organisation that is efficient, low cost and achieves increased patient satisfaction as well as 
successful medical outcomes. A recent review of healthcare organisations in Canada using lean 
methodologies revealed a mixed results for reducing waste and certainly no conclusive evidence in 
26 
 
relation to increasing patient satisfaction (Lawal, Rotter, Kinsman, Sari, Harrison, Jeffrey, Kutz, Khan 
and Flynn, 2014). 
 
At an operational level, lean limits exploration because it encourages the exploitation of routine for 
use in work reduction (Friel 2005). “Lean production should enable firms to boost their 
competitiveness by enabling them to substantively reduce production and development times, 
thereby increasing the speed at which firms react” Friel, 2005, p 51) Lean proponents believe that 
the methodology helps tap into employee empowerment. Lean gives the customer a ‘voice’ and 
employees can be self correcting gurus and build consensus around change from the individual and 
team level by defining and solving daily problems in the production process (Kim, et al 2006, 
Womack and Jones, 2010). Hospitals and Medical care traditionally depend on best practice. 
However, best medical practice depends heavily on good management practices and institutional 
norms. Under the crushing weight on sheer patient volume, hospitals find that best practice does 
not provide best care (Gawande 2009). Some Hospitals seem to be able to buck the trend and 
pursue programs that are not in accord with the particular institutional framework in which they are 
operating such as Virginia Mason or Intermountain Healthcare (Spear 2005). 
 
Lean approaches ask organizations to learn that “there is an on-going continuous loop between the 
current state and future state maps through implementation and testing to develop the ideal way in 
which the process should flow toward the final product or service.” (Kim, Spahlinger, Kin, Billi 2006). 
Lean and organisational learning share parallel assumptions in their descriptions of how learning or 
change takes place (Flinchbaugh 2008). The evolution of the lean concept can be likened to OL. In 
general and for firms who are progressing across the four stage lean maturity (not to be confused 
with Crossan’s four stages) Stages of lean progression: Preparation (intuition), current state 
(interpretation), further state ( integration), Implementation (institutionalisation). For this purpose, 
OL can be defined as “the processes for improving action through better knowledge and 
understanding” (Fiol and Lyles 1985, p 803).  
 
Table 3 is a schematic of the Stages of the 4I framework compared to the stages of Lean 
Methodology. In the initial phase of this research study, the 4I framework seemed to be a 
comfortable fit in explaining how learning moved across an organisation. The ideas and concepts 
within the 4I framework are shared across the stages of Lean Methodology as shown in the table 
below.    
Table 3. 4I Framework and Lean Methodology: a Comparison of Concepts 
 
4I Framework Lean Methodology 
Intuit - preparing for change by deciphering 
information for oneself 
Prep – laying the groundwork for lean to 
be used in an organisation (winning hearts and 
minds based on staff perceptions) 
Interpret - shared understanding Current state – shared conceptualisation 
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of the organisation’s current practices 
Integrate – assimilating shared 
understanding into the group’s perspective 
Future state – an agreement amongst 
group members about how practices could be 
achieved 
Institutionalise Embedding leaning Implementation – embedding new practices 
 
Lean as a philosophy within Healthcare has the same goal as Organisational learning. In a clinical 
setting, lean strives to promote continuous learning surrounding medical procedures and routines. 
“Clinical practice in the hospital setting is process rich and provides abundant opportunities for 
improvement of the delivery of patient care” using lean methodology (Kim, et al 2006, p 96). OL is 
concerned with adaption and change to meet the demands of production, innovation, efficiency. 
Learning cuts across all levels of the organisation down to individual and group level so that people 
have to learn new concepts, procedures and techniques. Organisations often look for methods that 
will help to uncover inefficiencies and to ‘shortcut’ their way to a productive workforce. Lean 
Methodology has been popular within manufacturing (Womack and Jones, 2010) to cut out waste 
and streamline work arrangements. It is seen as a key component to change in Healthcare (McCann 
et al 2012, Radnor et al, 2012).   Supporters of lean see it as an opportunity to “create conditions for 
learning by allowing managers to evaluate the impact of improvements” (Lanteleme and Formoso, 
2000, p 4). The interweaving of Lean and OL create conditions that enable systemic change and 
make learning possible (Flinchbaugh 2008). “The conditions” that enable learning are concerned 
with “procedures, rules, routines as well as abilities and attitudes” (Lantelme and Formoso, 2000 p 
8). Learning is inherent in the description of Lean method and philosophy. Furthermore, “the way 
firms build, supplement and organise knowledge and routines around their activities and within their 
cultures and adapt and develop organisational efficiency by improving the use of the broad skills of 
the workforce” (Dodgson 1993, p 377).  Lean focuses on empowering the individual to learn how to 
do each task as efficiently as possible and recognise when something needs to change. Lean 
principles have been embraced by some NHS facilities as embodying ‘customer value’, ‘insights into 
flow’, ‘learning to see’, i.e  identifying waste and flaws, instil a lean culture (Proudlove et al 2008, p 
29). Applying a methodology like lean in the ‘messy, complex environment of the NHS” (p36) 
requires the organisation to be very structured in its approach especially in the roll out of the 
process and its guidance to individual employees. 
 
In order for any particular organisational behaviour to become a routine, stability in the ‘moulding 
practices’ have to exist. The routines need to be consistent with the organisational goals and 
strategies either explicitly or implicitly (Becker et al, 2005). As a repository of organisational 
capabilities, “they pave the way for deliberate learning inside firms, thereby shaping the future 
development of the firm” (Becker et al, 2008; Winter, 2000; Zollo and Winter, 2002). “Even when 
there is considerable high level managerial control, there generally is a range of flexibility through 
which the routine can evolve without management being involved” (Becker et al 2005, p 776) This is 
the aspect of organisational learning that interests us. The evolution of the ‘templates’ and ‘best 
practices’ or canonical practices’ that end up encouraging the preciseness of a roll out of new forms 
and procedures.  Or perhaps the canonical practices are replicated time and again from one senior 
clinicians to more junior clinicians in their process of learning medical care. . The range of flexibility” 
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in applying routines “provides feedback to other organisation members indicating whether their 
efforts are, or are not, satisficing with respect to managerial objectives.” (Becker et al 2005, p 779). 
In studying how lean is implemented it gives us insight into how individual learn new practices. 
Clinical practices are well documented and substantiated by external agencies such as NICE (National 
Institute for Health and care Excellence) and therefore provide a basis to observe change within the 
practices. 
 
2.3.1. Lean as a Multilevel Learning Process 
 
Lean methods emphasize the ‘value added’ functions within an organization whilst also reducing 
unnecessary procedures and waste. While many industries use Japanese Lean methods, such as in 
manufacturing and production, Healthcare aligns itself with a more basic set of lean principles and 
assumptions (Pettersen, 2009; see Womack and Jones, 2003). Lean implementation strategies have 
various terms or ‘toolkits’ that organizations choose to apply (Hines and Taylor, 2000) in order to 
affect change in worker routines. Generally, it is applied as a learning process and behavioral change 
(Ferlie and McNulty, 2002; Flinchbaugh, 2008). Lean has been used as an entire system process 
change (Naylor, Naim & Berry, 1999; Fleury and Fleury, 2001; Jones and Womack, 2002); and as part 
of a total quality improvement or best practice approach (Womack and Jones, 2003, Pettersen 2009; 
Hines, Holweg and Rich, 2004; Jones and Womack, 2002). 
Lean is understood as a multilevel learning process that provides a foundation for change (Hines, 
Holweg and Rich, 2004). Lean also has similarities with organizational learning as a systematic 
process to embed new ways of working (Waring and Bishop 2010). Proponents of Lean see it as an 
opportunity to ‘create conditions for learning by allowing managers to evaluate the impact of 
improvements’ (Lanteleme and Formoso, 2000, p 4). However, Lean has been criticized for not 
engaging with employees and patients (Lawal et al 2014; Pettersen 2009; Tortella and Fogliatto 
2014). 
 
2.4. Lean Methodology in Healthcare 
 
Healthcare organizations are continuously under pressure to reduce costs and increase patient 
throughput whilst also increasing patient satisfaction. Many different Lean interventions have been 
attempted by organizations; root cause- analysis, process efficiency, improvement in error 
detection, managing problem solving by standardization (Gawande, 2009; Pentland, et al 2012; 
Edmondson and Bohmer, 2001, Pisano, et al, 2001; Radnor, Holweg and Waring, 2012; Stan and 
Vermeulen, 2012;Ferlie, 2010). However, lean has not been as successful as the industry would have 
hoped. Learning Lean methods is sometimes seen as counter to the ethos of healthcare and bedside 
medicine.   Recent reviews have criticized Lean implementation and the reported success stories 
(Mazzocato, Savage, Brommels, Aronnson and Thor, 2010; Proudlove, et al 2008).  
The embedding of continuous improvement principles has proved difficult within a clinical setting 
(Mazzocatto et al 2010; Gawande, 2009; Edmondson, 2004; Berwick and Hackbarth, 2012; Waring 
and Bishop 2010). In part, this is because there are many competing interests and views within 
healthcare settings. For example, a radiology department and a surgical unit have different needs for 
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improvement that aren’t necessarily solved by Lean implementation (Burgess and Radnor, 2013; 
Mazzocato et al 2010). Processes within patient care are more complex than in other industries and 
therefore Lean may not always be appropriate (Radnor, Holweg and Waring, 2012). 
Hospitals are attracted to Lean principles for the promise of maximising value of activities and 
processes for the patient while also removing waste and improving quality and safety (Jones et al, 
2006).  Lean has gained some notoriety in the field of management research (Brandao de Souza, 
2009, Taylor and Taylor, 2009, but it is still in its infancy in it application to the medical field (Radnor, 
Holweg and Waring, 2012).  To date, a focus on the social aspects of Lean has lagged behind the 
exploration of implementation of lean methodology and the quantitative change in patient 
outcomes (Taylor et al, 2013). Challenges to the healthcare environment mean that more hospitals 
and health care organisations are turning to Lean methodologies to help improve their processes 
and realise operational benefits (Ben-Tovim et al, 2007; Dickson et al, 2009).  
 
2.4.1. Routines and Healthcare  
 
Routines can reflect the cumulative effect of individual learning but not necessarily a traceable route 
back to any one person (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  Yet, the complex relationship between individual 
learning and organisational learning has been largely ignored in favour of large conceptual models 
and descriptive reviews (Dixon, 1999; Kim, 1993). There are times when the ideas and routines are 
adopted but the original reasons for it are lost to the organisation overall. In this way, individuals 
have influenced organisational routines and OL, but it is difficult to say exactly how this has 
happened (Leavitt and March, 1988). Routines represent a store of knowledge within an 
organisation and as such can be used as a basic unit of analysis (Feldman, 2000, Feldman and 
Pentland, 2003; Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
 
Organisational learning occurs when routines are transformed through adaptation of behaviour or 
replacement of an old routine for a newer one (Cyert and March, 1963, Schulz, 2002; Leavitt and 
March, 1988). “Learning in routine occurs because people who engage in routines adjust their 
actions as they develop new understandings of what they can do and of the consequences of their 
actions” (Feldman, 2000, p 613). This exploitative aspect of learning is complemented by explorative 
learning process (Easterby-Smith & Lyles, 2011). 
Routines help to develop organisations by forming rules, procedures and strategies through which 
they operate (Leavitt and March, 1988), at the same time employee’s beliefs and cultural schemas 
contradict the formal routines and help to develop informal local processes. 
The theoretical work on organisational routines arises from a diverse background of sociology, 
economics and psychology (references?). This may account for the differences in definition and 
research approach. Organisational routines, just as in organisational learning literature, have also 
been studied on different levels: organisational, group and individual level. 
Increasingly organisations move to adopt new routines to increase efficiency especially in healthcare 
(Radnor et al, 2012; Nutley and Davies, 2011; Carroll and Edmondson, 2003). Routines form part of 
the fabric of the organisation’s daily activities and the many interwoven activities create its overall 
operational strategies and performance measures. Routines help to hold the organisation ‘together’ 
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and hold the organisational actions in place even when there is labour turnover or loss of labour due 
to redundancy or attrition. Long after any one individual has left, the routine can ‘hold’ the learning 
for the next person or group that is hired. 
One of the earliest definitions of routine was proposed by Stene (1940) “Organisational routine is 
that part of any organisation’s activities which have become habitual because of repetition and 
which is regularly followed without specific directions or detailed supervision by any member of the 
organisation” (Stene, 1940, p 1129). The idea of repetition is important to learning and also to the 
healthcare context. “Repetition generally increases expertise” (Carroll and Edmondson, 2003, p 52). 
Yet repetition can also have undesirable and unintended results. “For example, doctors and nurses 
become like bored factory workers and newcomers can be disparaged for their lack of experience. If 
the experienced practitioner gets demotivated, reduces their interest in learning… organisations 
may fail to learn, and performance may suffer” (Carroll and Edmondson, 2003, p53). 
Cyert and March (1963) used the underlying principles of standard operating procedure to develop 
the overall organisational routines. ‘Organisational routines’ are defined as repetitive activities or 
‘recognisable patterns of interdependent actions, carried out by multiple actors’ (Feldman and 
Pentland, 2003, p 95). Such routines can guide organisational activities such as learning. 
“Organisational routines depend on connections, the stitching together of multiple participants and 
their actions to form a pattern that people recognise and talk about as a routine” (Feldman and 
Pentland, 2003, p 95) 
 
The significance of routines is twofold both for the organisation’s ability to change and to have some 
stability to increase efficiency and performance (Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Miner, 1991). In 
reviewing routines, we are able to uncover how organisations are able to accomplish their goals and 
improve their performance. It also allows us to begin to understand how knowledge or learning is 
transferred from the individual to the collective. 
 
Indeed, some researchers (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Feldman 2000; Feldman and Pentland, 2003) 
have studied routines as part of the link between individual behaviour and the group. Routines help 
the members of an organisation to make sense of all the bombardment of information just as 
individuals use availability heuristics to shortcut information. Individually, heuristics allows us to 
make categories of information so that we don’t have to learn things over and over again. Routines 
work in a similar way in that they help to save time and become more efficient. Problem solving 
becomes easier because members do not have to search for a new solution each time they face a 
difficulty. Becker (2005) linked this use of routine to effectiveness and the “means to accomplish 
work tasks”. ‘Habit is to the individual as routine is to the organisation’ (Hodgson and Knudsen, 
2004). Routines help members to hold information about past decisions thereby using their tacit 
knowledge to perform new tasks: “The idea that organisations remember a routine largely by 
exercising it is much like the idea that an individual remembers skills by exercising them” (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982, p 99). Routines are executed by some stimulus that triggers them into action. 
 
Members of the organisation can call upon their repertoire of skills and routines to respond to 
stimuli. There are instances when the routine is established but does not take into account new 
stimuli or lack of old stimuli. As technology changes for many organisations, the old routines may 
31 
 
remain when they are no longer needed having become obsolete by technology. Yet the 
organisations ’hangs’ onto them because of ‘routine’. This has a great deal of importance for 
organisational learning. Routines can also help an organisation to maintain control over 
performance, the members and the strategy of an organisation (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
Standards and procedures make member’s behaviour more predictable. While Nelson and Winter 
(1982) refer to ‘replication, Carroll and Edmondson (2003) refer to repetition, Nutley and Davies 
(2011) refer to structure.  
 
Members of the organisations have a ‘way of doing things’ that suits the organisation’s 
circumstance. These tacit routines become embedded in the organisation over time. When the 
routines are successful they tend to be replicated more frequently (Nelson and Winter 1982). 
 
Medical education and medical duties rely on routines and the learning of routines. Routines are the 
“mechanisms that allow deployment of organisational knowledge in pursuit of organisational goals 
are learning routines” Nutley and Davies 2011, p37.) A member’s behaviour can gain legitimacy 
through an organisational routine (Feldman and Pentland, 2003). This is a double-edged sword 
because such behaviours can also be destructive to the organisation as a whole.  This parallels 
Crossan’s explanation of the tension between exploration and exploitation in OL. 
 
Table 4 contains select definitions that help to frame the importance of using a routine as an 
example of learning that one is able to map across the organisation. In the definitions below, 
routines are described as ‘repetition’ and a ‘pattern of behaviour’.  These repetitions are often 
learned from one individual to another within an organisation.  Shared learning is a crucial concept 
to organisational learning and to understanding how routines might be changed by the sharing of 
knowledge from one person to another a done department to another.  The definitions in Table 4 
are a reminder that for the new behaviour or knowledge to be fully embedded within an 
organisations it needs to become part of the fabric of the routine work in the organisations. 
 
Table 4. Definitions of Routine in the Literature 
 
 
Author Definition of Routine 
Feldman and Pentland (2003) An organisational routine is a repetitive 
pattern of interdependent actions involving 
multiple actors 
Gersick and Hackman (1990) Routines help actors to choose between 
alternate patterns of behaviour based on the 
stimulus of a situation 
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Gilbert (2005) Routines are actions repeated so often that 
they have become embedded in the 
organisational structure 
Leavitt and March (1988) The generic term routines include the forms, 
rules, procedures, conventions strategies and 
technologies around which organisations are 
constructed and through which they operate 
Nelson and Winter (1982) A repetitive pattern of an activity in an entity, 
organisations or an individual skill or as an 
adjective to the smooth uneventful 
effectiveness of such an organisational or 
individual performance 
Pentland and Feldman (2005) Routines are repeated patterns of behaviour 
that are bound by rules and customs and that 




2.5. Learning in Healthcare 
 
This section calls attention to some of the challenges of learning in a healthcare environment. As 
noted in previous research (Carroll and Edmondson, 2002), healthcare can be viewed by individual 
workers as stringent and unforgiving.  There are many issues surrounding the challenge to speak up 
(Nembhard and Edmondson, 2006), the fear of failure,  the pressure to conform.  The pedagogical 
framework for teaching medical professionals is much the same as it was 150 years ago (Berwick et 
al, 2008)   
Several different threads of study comprise learning in healthcare. Some are concerned with 
learning curves (Pentland et al, 2012) or transfer of knowledge (Bohmer and Edmondson, 2001; 
Pisano et al, 2001). Others have been concerned with procedures and streamlining efficiency like 
lean processes (Radnor, Holweg and Waring, 2012; Stan and Vermeulen, 2012). Predominantly, 
medical education has been characterised by a one-way transfer of information embodied in ‘best 
practices’ that are outlined in standard medical texts or clinical practice guidelines. ‘To achieve 
competence in this one-way transfer, physicians rely on repetition; indeed, learning is viewed as an 
inevitable consequence of repetition – as is implicit outcome hypothesis’ (Bohmer and Edmondson, 
2001, p 31). ‘Rules of thumb’ or norms are used for problem solving that place limitations on action 
outside of such norms (‘Do what it takes to address the patient’s needs, no more no less’ quoted in 
Tucker and Edmondson, 2003). Individuals use routines to hide their problems (Carroll and 
Edmondson, 2002; Tucker and Edmondson, 2003).  
Recent research has shown that although repetition is important, some learning leaps are made 
when there is a departure from the standard. “Learning was enhanced by departing from routine 
processes” (Stan and Vermuelen, 2012, p 13). When a medical practice engages in a high number of 
unusual or difficult cases, its subsequent performance rate was higher than those firms that did not 
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have unusual cases. (Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002; Stan and Vermuelen, 2012). Nutley and Davies 
(2011) stress the importance of looking beyond the ‘adaptive’ knowledge to more challenging 
scenarios to create generative learning in new paths of learning. “Healthcare organisations 
committed to organisational learning need to identify, understand and improve learning routines” 
(Nutley and Davies, 2011, p 37). 
 
Thus, feedback and feed forward loops should be a top priority in healthcare so that subsequent 
cases are dealt with more comprehensively. Furthermore, “Experience in dealing only with standard 
cases, in contrast, will not lead to richer understanding and might even be a disincentive to trying 
out new solutions” (Stan and Vermuelen, 2012). Insights from disrupted routines need to be 
developed into processes that help with future cases (Pisano et al, 2001; Stan and Vermuelen, 2012). 
Radnor, Holweg and Waring (2012) underscore how difficult it is for underlying lessons to be learned 
in order to make system wide improvement. Small incremental changes are made and then often 
‘re-made’; “those undertaking lean tasks seemed to be trapped in a continual repeating cycle of 
improvement, with the work returning to the status quo in between” (Radnor et al 2012, p369). 
There are instances when adopting ISO 9000 or other similar standard processes with the intent of 
boosting quality actually lead to decline in innovation, offsetting any potential short-term benefits 
(Benner and Tushman, 2002, 2003). 
 
Innovation, change or intuition can be supressed for a number of reasons; psychology safety 
(Edmondson 2002), politicised environments (Lawrence et al, 2005), emotion (Vince and Saleem, 
2004), and managerial attitudes (Antonacoupoulou, 2006).  Some research within the healthcare 
context has focussed on the feedback as an integral part of learning and change. When errors are 
made and corrected, learning takes place first at the individual level and then sharing such 
knowledge at group and organisational levels. In a similar fashion to Crossan’s work, Edmondson 
(2002) demonstrates the ‘flows’ of learning from different types of circumstances. ‘Errors’ were an 
easily solvable situation that could be avoided by proper information. A ‘problem’ was a more in-
depth situation that might take a system wide change to solve. 
 
Using the language of the major OL theorists, an error can be fixed immediately with single loop 
learning (Argyris and Schön, 1978), lower order learning (Fiol and Lyles, 1985), intuition to 
interpretation (Crossan et al 1999) but solutions could be improved upon if escalated to double loop 
learning (Argyris and Schön, 1978), higher order learning (Fiol & Lyles, 1985), integration to 
institutionalisation (Crossan et al, 1999). Complex problems involve a change to a routine or 
standard to be corrected (Stan and Vermuelen, 2012; tuck and Edmondson, 2003; Crossan and 
Berdrow, 2003). 
 
Tucker and Edmondson (2003) give some concrete examples: a nurse who finds that she has no 
clean bed sheets on her ward simply takes them from another ward to solve her own problem. 
Other examples include more serious ones such as an error in medication delivery. In each case, the 
nurse engages a simple solution to solve the problem quickly. She does not move from 
interpretation to ‘integrate’ or ‘institutionalise’ the solution. “Effective action on such problems 
(solving first order but not second order problems) requires an understanding of systemic 
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interdependencies and leverage points, surfacing and challenging assumptions, communicating 
across groups and mobilising change” (Carroll and Edmondson, 2002, p52). Carroll and Edmondson 
believe that the routine can create an opportunity for people to disengage from problems. The 
solution to such learning stalemates is to confront the repetitiveness and routine: “Standardisation 
can also drive out innovation” (Carroll and Edmondson, 2002, p55). This links with the idea that 
institutionalisation can make it difficult to embrace new ideas (Crossan et al, 1999). 
 
A key idea is to identify the precise moments when institutional routine conflicts with learning and 
break the cycle. “Healthcare organisations face particular barriers to systemic organisational learning 
from powerful status differences that inhibit open inquiry and collaborative learning” (Carroll and 
Edmondson, 2002, p 55). Routines influences employee behaviour such that they resist second order 
problem solving and rely on first order problem solving and theories in use. 
 
Although organisational learning and routines have both been studied extensively, those studies 
have been achieved in isolation to each other. The present study’s emphasis is on understanding 
“how” people view the processes of learning and change. For this reason, an inductive, 
interpretative method relying qualitative approach to data is appropriate (Yin, 2003).. Emerging 
theory often relies on an interpretive approach to elucidate the meaning of a phenomenon within an 
organisation (Corley and Gioia, 2004: Mento, Jones and Dirndorfer, 2002; Eisenhardt, 1989 ). 
 
   2.6. Chapter summary 
The chapter provides an overview of the literature on organisational learning, the 4I framework, lean 
methodology, routines and learning in healthcare. Additionally, the concepts of ‘tension’ in learning 
between explorative and exploitative types of learning was discussed to underscore the struggle fo 
organisation to change their ways of working. Furthermore, The four lenses of organisational 
learning have been discussed for the importance and for understanding the overlap of their ideas.  A 
central tenant underlying the theory of this thesis that learning is not just one thing.  Researchers 
have highlighted different but symbiotic aspects to organisational learning describing it as social, 
cognitive and behavioural process (Argyris and Schon, 1978; Crossan, Lane and White, 1999; Fiol and 
Lyles, 1985; Huber, 1991). This chapter also provided a link between Lean principles, routines, the 4I 











     3.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter will detail the research philosophy and the methods deployed in this research project.  
That chapter begins with a brief introduction to the philosophical assumption that guide this 
research in terms of it ontological and epistemological foundations.  Then follows a short description 
of the research sites and the data collection methods that were used namely; participant 
observation including field notes and diaries, semi structured interviews, corporate archival 
documents including some photographic documentation of organisational artefacts.  A systemic 
inductive approach is used to analyse the collected data (Gioia et al, 2013; Langley, 1999). Finally, 
the steps taken regarding coding, interpreting and analysing the collected material are discussed. 
The chapter aconcludes with a statement on ethics.   
 
The research approach to this study links closely with the type and nature of questions informed by 
the writings on qualitative inductive approaches (Ladge, Clair and Greenberg, 2012; Gioia, Corley and 
Hamilton 2013).  The project explores individual perceptions and meaning of beliefs, attitudes & 
corporate documents as part of organisational life.  Therefore, questions will be answered using a 
qualitative approach to the research.   
An interpretivist view fits with the purpose of the study as I rely on comments and reflections on the 
actions of my ‘co-workers’. One-to-one interviews, corporate archival documentation and 
correspondence between individuals such as emails, presentation, meeting discussions are used as 
data. The primary value of being a participant observer in a complex organizational context is that it 
reveals a great deal about the research setting and the people within it.  
Because the study wanted to uncover how people learn, it seemed the natural way of collecting data 
and being to interpret the data in a meaningful way. The data was collected first from a US based 
healthcare organisation in which I was the Lead Training Consultant for a Leadership Academy. A 
participant cohort consisted of physicians and administrative managers gaining an internal 
leadership and lean certification. These individuals were on a ‘learning journey’ (as named by their 
organisation) so it was ideal for reporting how they felt about learning and what they were learning. 
The second study was conducted in a large urban hospital in the UK. Initially, I was given access as an 
external student; attending meetings and conducting interviews. After informally assisting their 
Project Management Team with some statistical clinical data analysis, I was given full access and an 
honorary contract. This meant I had the same access to databases, email systems, shared drives, and 
corporate material as any other staff member. This was a unique opportunity to observe from 
within. I immersed myself within this group by providing data analysis on internal projects as a 
professional courtesy. It is important to note that none of that data that is included in this document 




The data gathering was a natural but systematic consequence of ‘living’ the experience. The data is 
rich and varied, from corporate PowerPoint presentations to field notes. The analysis involved 
gradual comparisons of the data with perception identified within notations. The aim was, as is the 
case with much qualitative management research, to move between the emerging themes and the 
data itself (Corley and Gioia, 2004; Gioia, Corley and Hamilton, 2013). 
 
Previous research into the organisational learning has used a variety of methods. For example: 
ethnography (Berends, Boersma & Weggeman, 2003; Stevens and Dimitridas (2004); single and 
multi-case study approaches (Antonacoupoulou, 2006;  Vince, 2001); hypothesis testing (Bontis, 
Crossan Hulland, 2002); and grounded theory (Edmondson, 2000; Kennedy 2006).  Research that has 
focused on developing the Crossan, et al (1999) 4I Framework has used both single case study 
(Crossan and Berdrow, 2003) and multi case study (Cramer 2005) and ethnography (Lehesvirta, 
2004). Longitudinal studies were developed to study OL by Zeitsma, Winn and Branzei  (2002) and 
Stevens and Dimitridas (2004).  Crossan aand Berdrow (2003) employed a single case study but used 
several types of data:  archival data, corporate documents, participant observation of meetings and 
retrospective interviews to triangulate their analysis.  Stevens and Dimitridas (2004) and Lehestriva 
(2004) conducted lengthy ethnographic studies to describe links between different levels of learning 
from individual to group.  These studies suggest that organisational learning can be appropriately 
studied using both single case study and multi case study that use qualitative data analysis 
approaches from multiple source of data (Yin, 2011).  Based on the methods employed in previous 
studies, a case study approach was used with two healthcare organisations.       
 
 
3.2.  Research Philosophy 
This research is situated with a constructivist/ interpretivist paradigm (Guba and Lincoln, 2005; 
Charmaz, 2007). A paradigm is the nomological net that contains a set of beliefs used to guide a 
researcher’s action (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). “All social scientists approach their subject via 
explicit or implicit assumptions about the nature of the social world and the way in which it may be 
investigated” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, xii). Researchers must make some assumptions about ‘the 
reality being investigated’ (ontology), the ‘basis of knowledge’ (epistemology), and the manner in 
which knowledge is obtained (methodology) (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p 4 – 5). I  am using a 
relativistic ontology. In other words, reality is constructed by the members of the organisation who 
produce and follow healthcare routines. Organisational members give meaning to the routines and 





The research questions for this study utilise a qualitative approach which is influenced by the social 
constructivist paradigm.  the ontological and epistemological foundations belong to the 
constructivist/interpretivist approaches.  Ontology is concerned with how the world is perceived 
whether there is an objective reality or a subjective one.  Epistemology is concerned with the 
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knowledge that exits within it.  How the nature of thesis knowledge is borne out.  The scholarly 
writing on these topics use the definitions and arguments in different ways.  For clarity,  this 
research uses the Bryman (20120 definitions of epistemology and Ontology.  In Bryman’s (social 
research methods ;  Interpretivism is defined  in terms of contrasting epistemology to positivism.  
The choice of paradigms is driven by the type of research and the questions.  To understand a 
particular phenomenon one must locate it within its own ontological and epistemological home.   
Ontology is described as the how we understand our existence of the world at large (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1982).  Are we to accept that the world stands on its own as a factual objective place or do 
we see the world as a constructed reality for us to attach meaning to each phenomena?  
Epistemology is concerned with our knowledge of the world and how we come to know it.  Each 
researcher must decide what is the most appropriate ontological and epistemological setting for 
their research.  Eaterbsy –smith  , et al (2012) dicusses how evne reachers have difficult agreeing on 
the relationship bewtene philosophy and methodlogy.  Often these terms are used 
intercharngeabley and terms are not always clearly defined.   
 
Ontology and epistemology are inextricably intertwined in a complicated relationship.  They can 
cross boundaries (Cunliffe, 2003). In order to focus on the research to be undertaken for this thesis, 
it is important to frame the knowledge and beliefs of the researcher and how this would impact the 
how the research is conducted.  Interestingly, this research is situated within a positivistic culture of 
science and medicine, the core element being researched is the perception of individuals.  
Therefore, it is relatively straightforward to use a constructivist, interpretivist approach.   
Table 5 sets out a composite of the research ontological and epistemological positions.   The 
nomenclature surrounding ontology and epistemology is not always consistent from text book to 
textbook.  Therefore it is important to show which definition one is using.   
Table 5 below positions positivism at one end of the ontology spectrum and constructivism at the 
other end.  The present study aligns with the relativist’s ideologies that the world is socially 
constructed.   The table below supports the interpretative inductive methodological choices within 
the present study.    
Table 5. Research Paradigms (Lincoln and Guba, 2005) 
 
Item  Positivism  Postpositivism  Critical Theory  Constructivism  
Ontology  Naïve realism 
“real” reality but 
apprehendible  




Historical realism – 
shaped by social, 
political, cultural  
values,  
Relativism – local 
and specific co-­­ 
constructed  
realities  
Epistemology  Dualist objectivist;   Modified 
dualist/objectivist;  
critical tradition  
subjectivist; valued 





Methodology  Experimental/ 
chiefly 
quantitative  
methods   
Modified 
experimental 
falsification of  
hypotheses  












Our ontological assumptions are concerned with the nature of reality.  The philosophical 
assumptions underpinning ontology are on a continuum between realism and relativism.  Theorists 
advocating a realist view argue that reality is objective and externally corroborated.  Realists seek to 
define concrete structure, laws and processes (Collis and Hussey, 2009).  These definitive edicts tend 
to be replaced only when there is new evidence to suggest a new laws of generalisations.  This 
philosophical approach is favoured by the life or natural sciences. However there are some 
phenomena that are not easily explained by using an objective realist framework.  In order to get 
underneath feelings and beliefs and a depth of complexity, one must turn to a more holistic view of 
the relativists.  
Relativist ontology takes the view that the world is constructed through our own human 
interpretation.  This philosophical view attempts to consider many different points of view in 
establishing the ‘truth’ of the situation (Buchanan, 2010). For relativists, truth is an agreement 
amongst the members of a particular group and relies on their consistent interpretation of meanings 
(Gabiel, 2008).   
These ontological positions seem to be at complete odds with each other but they actually exist on a 
continuum, with many other research philosophies being espoused in between.  For this particular 
research study, a relativist’s view is the most appropriate.  
Positivism is most commonly associated life sciences subjects such as medical studies accompanied 
by hypothesis testing for certainty, accuracy and generalisability in laws and principles (Crotty, 
2010).  Positivism seeks to understand the world in objective terms and verifiable facts.   Easterby-
Smith, et al (2012) describe positivism as viewing the social world as external  and the research 
subject can be measured  objectively through deductive methods establishing casualty and 
generalisation.   A research study in a positivist’s view would normally seek to large sample sizes and 
statistical methods to reach generalizable conclusions.  Results are discussed using reliability and 
validity and levels of confidence that statistics.  The desired goal in positivistic studies is to reach 
objective conclusions.   
Constructivism is based on the idea that our reality is created through our perception of the world 
around us. (Berger and Luckman, 1969). It is in the ‘meaning’ that we create our reality.  A common 
association with social constructionists is that researchers are influenced by this paradigm explore 
how language is used by research participants in understanding social realities and relationships 
within it. (Burr, 2003; Cunliffe, 2011).  Cunliffe (2011) discusses the researcher interest in multiple 
interactions and reflections and as such accounts are written which focus on people and their 
perspectives. Cunliffe (2011) goes on to describe these account as being stories which include 
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feelings and reactions impacted by contextual meanings.  Knowledge is socially constructed y people 
in their environment which impacts their acceptance and transmission of knowledge (Berger and 
Luckman, 1969, Burr, 2003).  
 
      3.2.2. Epistemology  
Epistemology is what we accept as valid knowledge (Collis and Hussey, 2009).  An epistemology is 
linked to our understanding, communication and validity of knowledge.  As with ontology, 
epistemological debates also exist on a continuum ranging from objectivism to subjectivism to 
constructivism.  The complexities that plague the writing on ontological perspectives are also 
present when discussing epistemologies.  
Objectivism according to Crotty (1998) holds that reality exists outside of our consciousness and 
therefore can be study separately.  Things exist or they do not without the influence of our 
perception or sensitivity.  Cunliffe (2011) described objectivism’s core assumption as “reality as a 
concrete structure” (p650). This means that investigations and methods can be independent of the 
researcher.  Knowledge can then be theorised though causal linkages, rules, laws; and dependent on 
scrupulously following correct procedures; reliability and validity of the findings can be established. 
The critical aspect of assuming the mantle of objectivism is positivistic notion that knowledge exists 
independently to be arrived ‘at’ by experimentation.  This approach strives for research to as 
objectively as possible uncover the truth given the evidence at that particular juncture. The ‘truth’  
can be amended as new evidence arrives and old assumptions are discarded Crotty, 1998).  
Interpretivism is often seen as the polar opposite to positivism and objecitivism.  In this paradigm, 
researchers acknowledge that ‘facts’  are ‘value-laden’ and can be biased by perspective.  It is 
assumed that knowledge is subjectively created and needs to be understood from the point of view 
of the individuals in organisations (Saunders et al 2009). Interpretivists look for understanding in the 
meanings ascribed to data.  Patterns and theories are developed for the purpose of understanding 
not for the inclusion in a ‘law’. Interpretivism produces ‘rich’ qualitative data (Collis and Hussey, 
2009) as it uncovers the complexities of human interaction in everyday experiences.     
OL draws from a wide variety of social science disciplines and as such there are many approaches to 
research design (Li et al, 2009). Over the last two decades a pattern of use has developed separately 
in the US and UK. The US largely uses quantitative methods and the UK favours qualitative methods 
(Li et al, 2009; Easterby-Smith, 2011).  While quantitative methods may be appropriate for 
generalisability, it does not always help to answer the questions behind actions. Qualitative methods 
help to give meaning and add new dimensions to research (Bartunek and Seo, 2002). “There needs 
to be a balance between qualitative and quantitative” using each method where it is justified by the 
study itself (Li et al 2009, p 444). This study requires an inductive comparative approach to uncover 
meaning behind actions (Charmaz, 2006; Charmaz and Henwood 2007). A constant comparison 
method is used to “examine all possible theoretical explanation for their empirical findings” (Bryant 
and Charmaz, 2007, p 2). 
The aim of this study is to understand how learning is experienced by people within two healthcare 
organisations. Therefore, the research employs an interpretivist approach specifically in order to 
elicit those meanings and descriptions, and to align with the specific research question being 
investigated (Bryman, 2008). Popper and Lipshitz (1988) argue for the use of a field setting to 
understand organisational learning with research methods that can assess the effects of an 
organisational context. In this research, I am using a hospital setting to understand how healthcare 
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workers who are learning and implementing lean into their medical routines describe this learning. 
Research can be seen as a ‘living thing’ (reference?) and adaptable to the field setting and the 
research question and topic of the study. 
3.2.3. Study Design  
A discussion of research study design and relationship to the current project, one must provide 
clarity over terminology used in terms of designing and conducting research.  Research design and 
methodology are often taken to have the same meaning but there are subtle differences.  For the 
purposes of this thesis, the design of the study sits within qualitative research and the methods 
employed to investigate the topic follows a general case study design. There are two case studies 
that were completed sequentially but not used as part of comparative design.  The first case study 
for HealthCo was much mire narrow in tis focus.  The second case study at St. Lydda’s was broader in 
terms of the data collection and deeper in its analysis of the complexities of organisational learning.     
The qualitative methods used in this research include participation observations, semi –structured 
interviews, document analysis of corporate archival material and photographic evidence from 
corporate artefacts. Each of the data collection methods is discussed in turn in chapter section 3.4.  
Previous research into the processes of organisational learning have included a variety of 
methodologies; for example: quantitative (Bontis et al, 2002), single case study (Crossan and 
Berdrow, 2003) and longitudinal case study (Zietsma et al, 2002). These studies suggest that 4I 
organisational learning processes can be appropriately studied using qualitative data analysis 
approaches. Rich qualitative data provided deeper understanding to the underlying issues and 
perceptions of individuals.  
Case Study design 
This research has been conducted in an exploratory, descriptive and explanatory manner in order to 
uncover how individual in general experience the learning during lean implementation (RQ1)  and 
further how do individuals perceive the process of learning under these conditions (RQ2).  These are 
linked to exploratory aspect of the design. An explanatory case study would generate some idea 
about perceptions, beliefs and attitudes towards the processes of learning (RQ3) help to create 
greater clarity in what occurs in learning during a lean implementation. The questions in the study 
that pertain to how learning (RQ4) moves across the organisation aligns with the descriptive manner 
of the case study design. Description can help consolidate what we know about a theoretical 
framework and help to clarify previous descriptions and classifications.  Finally, exploring the 
experiences how lean influenced learning speaks to the exploratory manner of the research.   Yin 
(2011) advocates for case study for its richness in the variety of evidence it can achieve.  Besides 
observation and interviews, the researcher has access to corporate documents, databases, and 
corporate artefacts. Having these different types of data offered additional triangulation to enhance 
reliability and validity of the research.  It has helped to add to the descriptive element in determining 
meanings behind the statements and perception of the clinical individuals involved in learning new 
techniques and procedures under Lean implementation.   
Case Studies can be deployed as single organisation case studies or comparative studies between 
organisations (Eisenhardt, 1998; Yin, 2011).  This research is iterative using two case studies over 
time to be revelatory, encompassing exploratory, descriptive and explanatory in how learning is 
affected during Lean implementation.  In this research, there were multiple opportunities to 
delineate the unit of analysis.  Within a single case study, units of analysis dependent on the 
research question.  The might include groups or the evaluation of project or staff roles.  The 
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interaction between staff could also be a unit of analysis.  This research chose to observe the 
phenomenon of the perception of what is/has been learned during a Lean implementation phase of 
a healthcare organisation.  Its purpose is to be descriptive and explanatory in delving deeper into 
these of barriers to learning under the Lean lens.  
This research uses an adapted Eisenhardt (1989) case study framework.  This framework is 
appropriate as it allows for credibility, dependability and confirmability through the utilisation of 
multiple source of data for triangulation which then can allow for discussion of consistency (Miller, 
2008).  The focus of this research was on a single topic of learning under Lean conditions which lends 
itself to case study design.  The Initial sampling was within a single setting of healthcare but with the 
flexibility to explore different levels of interaction; e.g. individual to individual, individual to group or 
group to organisation.  In this research, observations made at individual, group and organisational 
level allowed for triangulation of the data.  Understanding the different perspectives of senior 
managers versus the ‘front line’ clinical workers of a single event such as the lean launch event help 
to create the emergent themes within the data.  The multiple viewpoints supports the credibility of 
the themes and forms the basis of improving or creating theoretical constructs.   Theoretical 
saturation can be achieved when multiple examples lead the researcher to the same or similar 
constructs in the themes.   
The present study represents two case studies which were conducted sequentially. Study One was 
completed in a US healthcare organisation. This reviewed the learning journals of a cohort of 
clinicians as they progressed through a nine-month training course called Leadership Academy. In 
addition, interviews and visits to their medical sites were undertaken as part of data collection. A 
range of organisational materials were analysed in addition to the interviews and learning journals 
excerpts. 
Study Two was conducted at a large urban hospital in the UK. The hospital was undergoing a change 
to use lean methods to improve efficiency. Several overlapping improvement projects were in 
process in the organisation. Examples were taken from different projects from this time period. 
However, the majority of the examples are from the Acute Coronary Syndrome Pathway. The 
material relates to the experiences of employees separate from any patient data. 
 
3.3. Data Sampling 
Sampling Approach 
The sampling challenge for researchers involves the choice of selection for specific reasons; i.e. 
which units and why.  The research questions drive the choice of data sample selection.  It I also 
important that the units provide the “broadest range of information and perspective son the study” 
(Kuzel, 1992, p37). In this regard, individuals who may hold opposing views within your study topic 
should be chosen to attempt to reach a balanced view (Yin, 2010). Therefore on can avoid bias in 
confirmation of one’s own preconceived notion on the research topic.   
In case study research, purposive sampling is often used to have a deliberate method of choosing 
participants.  It produces relevant data because the participants have been chosen for a specific 
attribute or some experience they have undergone.  The Attribute or the Experience is explore 
within the relevant theoretical framework and analysed Os that some conclusions can be drawn 
about the chosen topic.  This research for this thesis used purposive sampling in order to gain an 
understanding of healthcare workers learning under Lean conditions.  The participants were chosen 
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for their involvement in the Lean projects. For example, the members of the Lean service 
improvement team in the Acute Coronary syndrome pathway were interviewed.  In addition, 
activities relating to the implementation of lean were observed such as: project meetings, Public 
presentations, Launch meetings, lessons learned presentation meetings, network meetings and 
training session.   
 3.3.1. Access to the field  
Qualitative studies of the type described in this thesis involve field work in a real life situations and 
observing people in specific settings.  The ‘human events’ become a part of the study.  Therefore 
choosing where and how the research is conducted is of utmost importance.  One of the biggest 
obstacles to qualitative research is gaining ‘access to the field’ where one would ike to research 
(Patton, 2002).  Access should not be viewed as an ‘event’ but more of a ‘process’ (Yin, 2011).  
Thinking of access as an on –time event massively over simplifies things (Yin, 2011, p114). Once 
access is gained, the research may be constrained by a gatekeeper within the real life setting.  This 
can influence the substance of study.  The researcher must be careful remain sensitive to the 
‘implications’ of how a site was accessed and ‘pleasing’ all the gatekeepers at the research site. The 
limitations of field research are far outweighed by the richness of the data that can be collected.  
The research for this thesis involved working directly in the field.  The field setting, using Yin’s (2011) 
definition, was a work group of healthcare workers undergoing lean implementation at their 
institutions.  This provided ample opportunities for data collection through interviews, participant 
observation and review of corporate documentation whilst in the field.   
My professional life spanned a number of organisations involved in healthcare in both the public and 
private sector.  I stated my career as support staff in a research lab in large US research hospital.  My 
research department had both clinical and basic science research labs.  I have done everything from 
weigh the adrenal glands of culled rats (a study on smooth muscle cells) to typing DNA sequences for 
ordering genetically modified mice to taking minutes and facilitating lab meetings.  My more recent 
professional experience within the last 10 years, as a Learning and Development Specialist, brought 
me into contact with clinicians involved in improvement projects for hospitals and other healthcare 
settings.  Thus, I had a ready network of contacts to call upon for access to field settings. My initial 
contact for Case Study One was through my involvement as part of a Leadership Academy for a 
Healthcare consortium in North-eastern United States. A Healthcare consortium is a cooperative of 
healthcare facilities that range from GP surgeries to hospital settings. For Case study one, I was 
employed as a trainer and consultant but also knew many of the medical professionals as former 
colleagues.  Constant dialogue between the employees and former colleagues was used to engage in 
open and frank discussion about the interpretation of the data.  
 The clinicians and Senior managers from these groups in Case Study One were participating in a 
leadership academy to learn new ways of managing their staff and improve efficiencies through Lean 
in their sites. Some of the sites were undergoing Lean transformation which provided additional 
opportunities to gain access to the field.  Case Study one was completed for my transfer viva and 
once that was successfully completed, I searched for a UK site.  One of the US clinicians from Case 
Study One introduced me to an American in the UK who worked for the King’s fund.  Through that 
contact, I was referred to St. Lydda’s (the pseudonym given to the London Hospital for Case Study 
Two).  St. Lydda’s was keen to draw on my professional expertise whilst at the same time allowing 




In Case Study two, I was under an honorary contract. So, although I was not a paid employee, I had 
open access to all information and meetings.  This created a further dilemma in relation to the 
danger of becoming too close to the information.  However, the credibility of the data can be 
supported by the use of different sources of data, and their triangulation within the analysis.  In 
addition, I fed back information about the study to the service improvement team who were 
implementing the learning of lean methods. The Feedback was given in the form of a report and 
presentation to the staff so that there could be open dialogue on everything from method of 
collection, the sampling, the interpretations.  Some new information came to light in these 
discussions that initiated the re-reading of field notes and re-coding of examples. 
 3.3.2. Organisation from Case Study One  
The first study was conducted within a large US healthcare system in Northeastern United States 
which I have given the pseudonym ‘Health Co.’.  it is a non-profit healthcare organisation which 
delivers a system of connected care.  It has 34 clinical locations, 50 specialities and 900 physicians. It 
covers 740,000 patient in America’s northeast region. The healthcare system had both hospital, GP 
sites, speciality sites and administrative offices in a major US city. Access was granted through 
professional contacts and former colleagues to physician and administrative managers who were 
taking part in a Leadership Academy.  The idea of the research was driven partly by the 
organisation’s desire to understand what learning was being transferred back to the workplace after 
the Leadership Academy training (including lean methods).  The scope of the project grew through 
discussion with the organisation and the progression of my own academic studies.  
3.3.3 Organisation from Case Study Two  
The second site was a large urban hospital. The hospital, which I have given the pseudonym, ‘St. 
Lydda’s’ is located in southern England employs over 8000 staff.  It is one of the UK’s largest teaching 
hospitals.  It trains medical students and carries out medical research.  It is a foundation hospital 
providing specialist care alongside a large number of services to the community.  They have recently 
embarked on a programme of lean transformation using a well-known consulting firm, CG to assist in 
training and guiding leaders’ teams through the elements of lean methods. Four Rapid Change 
Pathways were chosen (RCPs) and another Integrated Care pathway (ICP) to form part of this study. 
Context to Organisation in Case Study Two 
In order to fully understand the issues and struggles at St. Lydda’s,  I want to give some background 
and context to my experience and subsequent reposting of the empirical evidence.  When I first 
began attending meetings at St. Lydda’s the goal of the projects was represented as definitive and 
unchanging. Staff members talked about the lean project as a solid fixed feature. Over time, I began 
to understand that the stated public goals of senior management were not as fixed in the devolved 
departments and ward projects. The disappearance of senior management left individual clinical 
managers to be able to change or alter the project definitions and the implementation of lean. In the 
early days of the projects, top leaders were involved in the meetings. As the months wore on, senior 
leaders dropped out and the membership of meetings began to look more clinical than executive. 
About 6 months after the start of the whole programme, a clinical leader or ‘clinical champion’ was 
appointed. The clinical champion knew very little about lean and its principles. To further complicate 
matters, a subtle shift in reporting style became evident. The focus of each individual project started 
to look like individual research projects, not overall improvement structures. Below is a schematic of 
how I viewed the changes overall within the organisation.  
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Figures 2a and 2b  are a visual depiction of my understanding of the context of the change taking 
place at an organisational level for Case Study Two.   
 
Figure 2a Timeline of Project changes in Case Study Two 
 
 




I’ve drawn the timelines in figure 2a and 2b to give a frame of reference for the reader for the 
changes that were occurring within St. Lydda’s, in Case study Two. The data collection in Case Study 
Two is as much about understanding its content and meaning but also the relevance to changes in 
relative terms. For instance, in explaining the theme of Managerial control (section 5.3.1),  the 
concept of meeting membership is discussed.  The empirical evidence provided  is about who was 
attending meetings and when they were attending.  The importance of who ‘fell off’ the meeting list 
and when that happened helped to illustrate why knowledge was not being shared. 
The next important organisational component to understand is the change in goals (Figure 2b 
above).  This is also explored in the data analysis.  From my perspective as a researcher, it was 
important to appreciate that as I was collecting data, the organisation was changing its focus on the 
lean programme.  This is likely to be one reason why organisation members found it difficult to 
learn.  This idea is discussed and developed in the data analysis section. As I reviewed meeting notes, 
action items and agendas; a pattern emerged that the Consulting Group (CG) was responsible for 
initiating most of the projects.  The CG’s financial analysis drove which Integrated Care Pathways and 
Rapid change Projects were adopted and which were discarded and when this happened. The 
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timeline shows a migration of goal setting and ideas and influences across the programme.  
Although, I have not touched on time as a factor in the PhD it provides a frame of reference for the 
confusion and angst that surrounded this learning environment.  
At the time of the study, St. Lydda’s was undergoing its transformation to Foundation trust status.  
St. Lydda’s was offered ‘free help’ by a Major Consulting Group (CG). CG had worked in many 
different industries but was clearly trying to step into the medical arena.  CG were most notable for 
their contribution to manufacturing industries and their expertise in Lean.  CG had a medical 
professional on their team assigned to St. Lydda’s.  in an initial interview with the Chief Executive  
and chief Nurse of St. Lydda’s it was revealed that The senior executive team allowed CG ‘control 
over major decisions in the early stages of the implementation of lean project’.  Part of the 
reasoning for my presence in the host institution was to the review whether the Consulting Group 
was a helpful and cost effective influence into the changes being implemented at St. Lydda’s.  
Hospital senior leaders were concerned with producing a lean programme that should have the 
greatest impact on the diseases with highest cost value to the hospital. There were suggestions from 
the clinical group about what they thought were the best options for patient care and for the change 
needed to the system. However, it was CG who decided what the hospital would focus on. 
 
3.4. Data collection Methods  
Qualitative research is often linked to an interpretivist paradigm based in historical custom and 
practice of linking the ontologies and methodologies (Bryman and Bell, 2011, Easterby-Smith et al, 
2012). A qualitative research strategy is designed to ‘human element’ within a given research topic 
by understanding how individuals experience their world (Given, 2008). The present research study 
topic lends itself to using qualitative design methods.  
The benefits of qualitative research are numerous and popular across many different disciplines in 
social research.  Qualitative research has grown in popularity in healthcare research (Flick et al, 
2004) for its ability to gain deeper understanding of the complexities of patterns and relationships/  
Unlike other research strategies, qualitative research has a freer rein to include many events and 
types of data within research environment (Yin, 2011). The suitability of qualitative research is linked 
to a flexibility of inquiry employing a variety of methods: interviews, observations, focus groups, 
archival research, oral histories and content analysis (Preissle, 2011).  The methods and analysis used 
are not distinct to this research strategy as multiple methods and analysis can be employed in 
varying degrees.  Qualitative research is commonly carried within the participants setting and it is up 
to the researcher to interpret meaning and highlight the complexity of the field under study 
(Creswell, 2009).   
The perceived limitations of qualitative research appear to be enmeshed in debate over paradigms 
with positivist research (quantitative) generating truths and science and interpretivist (qualitative) 
research being associated with narratives and participant stories which may not carry the  same 
‘truth’ impact (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011).  These views impact on how generalisability, reliability and 
validity are perceived in qualitative work in demonstrating the objectivity of the research.   
This research study is a qualitative study that depends on in-depth, detail rich data to understand 
how organisational members describe the process routine gets embedded into the organisations 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). “Qualitative inquiry is highly appropriate in studying process because 
depicting process requires detailed description” (Patton, 1990 p 95). This study requires an 
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inductive, comparative approach (Charmaz, 2006; Charmaz and Henwood, 2007) . I am not using an 
inductive method to create new theory, but instead to stay close to the data and to look for “all 
possible theoretical explanations for the data forming hypotheses for each possible explanation, 
checking them empirically by examining data, and pursuing the plausible explanation” (Charmaz, 
2006, p 188). 
The data for this research has been generated from 77 semi-structured interviews (Johnson, 2002; 
Kvale, 1996), corporate archival documentation including: 10 project meeting agendas and minutes, 
144 emails, 30 action logs, 14 executive reports (Bowen, 2009; Welch, 2000), visual material 
including 9 photographs and 31 screen shots (Stanczak, 2007; Yin, 2011), field notes (Yin, 2011), a 
reflexive diary (Alazewski, 2006; Haynes, 2012) and prolonged engagement with the research 
institutions (Yin, 2011; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The broad range of data collection methods were 
selected to provide methodological triangulation and because of their natural fit with the 
philosophical underpinning of the research question. 
Table 6 provides an overview of the types of materials gathered for this research project. The studies 
included a very wide variety of source materials.  Table 6 provides a brief description of the type of 
source and the reasons is was used.  
Table 6 Source documents used in data collection 
Data Type Numbers Collection 
Timeframe 
Purpose Reasons for Use 
     














working in the 
institution – 
primary data 
Work Diary ~100 page A5 
leather bound 
diary 








Data examples for 
another study 
SLaM (service level 
agreement 
measurement "one 
version of the 
truth" 





Feb 2013 – 
March 2014 





institution not for 





Feb 2013 – 
March 2014 
Primary data Primary data 
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 project    











Reports 14 reports 
between 2 
and 4 pages 
April 2014 – 
October 2014 
Secondary data Secondary data 
Action Logs ~30 action logs 
(initial version 
counted) 
Feb 2013 – 
March 2014 
Summaries of the 












from the launch 
day) 
Feb 2013 – 
March 2014 











Feb 2013 – 
March 2014 















Emails 144 emails Feb 2013 – 
March 2014 







Methodological triangulation helps to provide a fuller picture of the phenomena being studied. 
Triangulation helps to establish the credibility and authenticity of the data itself and later the 
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interpretative analysis.  It builds trustworthiness not by any specific procedure but by creating 
internal integrity in the research study (Yin, 2011).  The triangulation creates ‘converging lines of 
inquiry’ about the research and the assumptions of the researcher (Yin, 2011). This was of particular 
significance in this study because some of the emergent themes describe the contradictions in the 
organisation.  The only way to illustrate this was to provide evidence something being said in an 
interview that may have contradicted what was seen in a photograph of a bulletin board or what 
was recorded in a report. The researcher’s own assumptions and thoughts about the interpretation 
of these organisational contradictions then were part of the journey of reflexivity. An overall 
methodology was created from the five different methods intersecting  to examine all the 
possibilities of how individuals perceived organisational learning particularly under Lean 
implementation.   
3.4.1. Semi structured Interviews  
The interview is one of the most common methods in qualitative research. Even so, interviews can 
vary greatly in their type and form.  Interviews are socially interactive with the researcher and the 
participant playing active roles in creating socially constructed understanding and knowledge of the 
research topic (Holstein and Gubrium, 1997).  The goal is to understand from the interviewees’ 
perspective the issues within of the research topic. In order “to meet this goal, the research 
interviews will generally have the following characteristics: a low degree of structure imposed by the 
interviewer, a preponderance of open questions; a focus on specific situations and actions’ (Kvale, 
1983, p 176). The researcher needs to stay true to the interviewees interpretation of the research 
topic rather than a general opinion.  
A relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee is a key component of a qualitative 
reach interview.  The researcher’s main concern is to extract an accurate depiction of events, beliefs, 
attitudes of the research topic.  There are two ways of approaching this: one is to minimise the 
impact of a personal relationship between interviewee and interviewer and the other is to make a 
feature of that closeness of that relationship.  The special relationship between researcher and 
interviewee can elicit deeper information than if the researcher has arrived with recording and 
structured questions.  
Semi-structured interviews were adopted for this research as should enable key areas to be 
discussed and allow for flexibility where interviewees would discuss their own experiences which 
could allow for insights to emerge. Using the methods suggested by Kumar, Stern and Anderson 
(1993), interviewees from each of the RCPs and ICP were chosen to take part in semi structured 
interviews. In total between the two studies about 80 interviews were undertaken. Some of those 
interviews were follow-ups to the original interview. Not all interviews were recorded (at the wishes 
of participants). The questions covered how employees understood the learning that had taken 
place, from the initial ideas through to how it was finally embedded. The questions were adapted 
from the work of Bontis, Crossan and Hulland (2002). Interviewees were given a wide latitude to 
discuss their own ideas, issues and perceptions about the learning of the new lean routines. A copy 
of the interview consent form used in the research is attached in the appendices. 
Table  7 gives the details for the participants in Case Study One. The cover a range of posts within 
the organisations so that a holistic view of perceptions could be gathered.  There is a bias towards 
clinicians as they form the greater number of employees in the organisation and that the case study 




Table 7 Organisational Participant Demographics for Case Study One 
 
Participant Demographic characteristics 
  
Organisational tenure Mean of 8 years, mode 7 years, Range 1-27 
years 
  
Race 84% Caucasian 





Organisational Level 67% Clinical 
31% Admin/Managerial with clinical 
background 
2% Admin with no clinical background 
  
Organisational work role Clinical Examples: Nurse, Nurse 
Practitioner, Physician Assistant, Midwife, 
Physician 
 
Clinical Managerial examples: Nurse 
Leader, Physician Executive (Chief or Head 
of Department) 
 
Admin or Non Clinical Managerial 
examples: IT Project Manager , Practice 
Manager, Operations Manager, Finance 
Managers 
  








Lean Introduction Mean 1.5 years range 0 – 3 years 
 
 
These participants represented individuals who were involved in the lean implementation and could 




Table 8 shows the number and timing of interviews for Case Study One.  They cover time period of 
pre and post implementation of Lean transformation. 
 


















2 2 2 6 
Interviews with Learning Cohort 
Nurse Manager  1 1 2 
Nurse 
Practitioner 
1 a 1 b 1 c 3 
Pharmacist  1 1 2 
Lead Nurse 1 1 1 3 
Physician Executive 1 1 1 3 
It Project Manager  1 1 2 
Practice Manager 
(1) 
1 2 1 4 
Practice Manager 
(2) 
1 2 1 4 
Practice Manager 
(3) 
1 2 2 6 
    37 





Table 9  depicts the demographics of interviewees for Case Study Two showing a range of individuals 
who were involve in the implementation of lean.  The choice of sampling is explained into 
Methodology chapter section 3.3.  
Table 9 Demographics for Interviewees in Case Study Two  
Participant Demographic characteristics 
  
Organisational tenure Mean of 6 years, mode 11 years, Range 
0.3 -28 years 
  
Race 88% Caucasian 





Organisational Level 84% Clinical 
11% Admin/Managerial with clinical 
background 
5% Admin with no clinical background 
  
Organisational work role Clinical Examples: Nurse, Nurse Practitioner, 
Physician Assistant, Midwife, Physician 
 
Clinical Managerial examples: Nurse Leader, 
Physician Executive (Chief or Head of 
Department) 
 
Admin or Non Clinical Managerial examples: IT 
Project Manager , Practice Manager, 












Lean Introduction Mean .7 years range 0 – 2 years 
 
 
Table 10  shows the participants and timing of interviews for Case Study Two.  The interviews were 
of differing lengths and many of them were recorded by hand written notes.  St. Lydda’s staff in Case 
Study Two, on the whole, preferred not to be recorded.  


















1  1 2 
Interviews with Project Members 
Nurse Manager  1 1 2 
Nurse 
Practitioner 
1  1 2 
Lead Nurse 1 1 1 3 
Clinical 
Executives (13) 
1 x13 1 x 6 1x 4 24 
It Project 
Manager (2) 
1 1 1 6 
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3.4.2. Participant Observation 
Qualitative studies are often associated with participant observation, especially in the field of 
anthropology and sociology.  In fact, fieldwork is often synonymous with participant observation 
(Anderson-Levitt, 2006).  Participant observation ‘emphasises close, intimate, active involvement’ 
(Emerson, Fretz and Shaw, 2001, p17-18).  There is ‘relative emphasis’ on participation and 
observation, this can produce a number of variants: (1) being a participant only, (2) being a 
participant who also observes, (3) being an observer who also participates, (4) being an observer 
only (Yin, 2011, p 143). The usual practice is to fall somewhere between (2) and (3) that is ‘having 
some participation and some observation’ (Yin, 2011). In participant observations, researchers are 
fully immersed into the field (Angrosino and Rosenberg, 2011).  Thus the researcher becomes an 
‘instrument’ of the research. In these real-life situations,  the five sense ‘become the main 
modalities’ and a limitation to measurement will be the ability to recall  and remember actions when 
writing up field notes  and recording events, behaviours an actions (Yin, 2011, p144).  
As part of the data collection method, participant observation “encourages researchers to remain 
close to their studied worlds and to develop an integrated set of theoretical concepts from their 
empirical materials that not only synthesize and interpret them but also show processual 
relationships” (Charmaz 2005, p 508). Research questions such as the ones in this study that seek to 
explore beliefs or perceptions are well served by using qualitative methods (Annells, 1997). Because 
“qualitative studies are often judged by quantitatively-oriented readers” (Corbin and Strauss, 1990, 
p.4), a triangulation method of interviews, corporate documentation and field notes has been used. 
This helped to retain the integrity of qualitative social science and to address questions of validity 
(Corbin and Strauss, 1990). 
Full immersion allows the researcher to gather many different sources of information and gain a 
‘true feeling’ for the organisation. Alongside interviews and corporate material, it is possible to 
triangulate the data to establish a fuller picture of the phenomenon (Patton, 2002).   
In Case Study One, the research was conducted as part of training programme in which the learning 
cohort was observed all together, being trained and in writing their learning journals.  As the trainer 
in this programme, I interacted with the learning cohort but also kept a distance.  For Case study 
one, I was employed as a trainer and consultant but also knew many of the medical professionals as 
former colleagues.  Constant dialogue between the employees and former colleagues was used to 
engage in open and frank discussion about the interpretation of the data.  
In Case Study Two, I observed new routines in the hospital setting. I was under an honorary contract.  
I attended team meetings for six months where the routines were discussed amongst the clinicians 
and ward staff. I also had access to public events and presentations about the new routines and 
these were recorded over a six-month period. A copy of my honorary contract as a research student 
in the host institution included in the appendices.  
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So, although I was not a paid employee, I had open access to all information and meetings.  This 
created a further dilemma in relation to the danger of becoming too close to the information.  
However, the credibility of the data can be supported by the use of different sources of data, and 
their triangulation within the analysis.  In addition, I fed back information about the study to the 
service improvement team who were implementing the learning of lean methods. The Feedback was 
given in the form of a report and presentation to the staff so that there could be open dialogue on 
everything from method of collection, the sampling, the interpretations.  Some new information 
came to light in these discussions that initiated the re-reading of field notes and re-coding of 
examples. 
I was officially attached to Cardiology as a Research Student. My honorary contract gave me full 
access to all participants and all parts of the hospital.  In the first few months or meetings, 
participants were reminded verbally at the beginning of each meeting that I was there to gather 
data. The clinical champion for the Project was my supervisor.  He was an Obstetrician and did not 
have daily contact with the ACS team. In fact, HB’s knowledge of Cardiology extended only to what 
he had learned in medical school and he had no training in lean methodology. I became part of 
Service Improvement Team with official liaison status to the Cardiology Department.  
 
Figure 3 helps to illustrate how close my relationship was to the participants and the material in Case 
Study Two.  This special access as a prolonged participant observer is part of my comment on 
methodology in practical contributions in Chapter 7.  









3.4.3. Prolonged engagement  
The use of prolonged engagement allows for a level of detail that is not possible in short-term study 
designs.  It also delves deeper than the more tangential contact with an organisation, for instance in 
doing interviews only.  Spending time within an organisation culture provides a more appropriate 
level of knowledge in determining the importance of data that is provided in other forms of data 
collection i.e. document analysis, interviews, and observations (Given, 2008). The most important 
element of prolonged engagement for a qualitative study is to build trust with participants and 
experience the breadth and variation of activities within the research sites.  A first meeting for an 
interview on a research site might develop into a particular view of that organisation.  However, if 
one has the opportunity to view the organisation over a longer period of time, the complexities of 
that organisation begin to emerge and could make a re-interpretation of what was said in an 
interview very different.  There is no set amount of time that a qualitative inquiry should last.  The 
length of time should be long enough to develop familiarity with all the idiosyncrasies of the 
organisation’s process and its individuals.  Persistent observation is a technique used in conjunction 
with prolonged engagement. The persistency proves a depth of experience and understanding of the 
phenomenon in addition to the broad scope of prolonged engagement (Bowen, 2009). 
In order to overcome the perception of bias in the interpretation of the data certain strategies were 
used: as a researcher I had prolonged engagement with both institutions. It is also important to note 
that prolonged engagement comes with challenges.  The researcher can drift into being ‘part of the 
team’ and therefore perhaps the study almost becomes an ethnographic study in which the 
researcher must be ware of influencing the outcomes.  In the present study, I overcame this problem 
in three ways. Firstly I wore my Research Student labelled badge as a reminder of my status.  
Secondly, in meetings or interviews I verbally reminded staff that I was research student.  Lastly, 
conversation about the data analysis with my PhD supervisor and student cohort helped to give me 
some objectivity.  
In the design of this study, the main data collection involves interpretation and self-reflection of 
interview transcriptions, field notes, documental analysis, and artefact analysis.   The credibility in 
the accuracy of the data is established through methodological triangulation and theoretical 
saturation.  
 
3.4.4. Documents  
 
O’Leary (2004) contends that there three primary types of documents: (1) public records  e.g. Official 
reports, mission statements of an organisation; (2) personal documents, e.g. e-mails, learning 
journals, blogs, duty logs; and (3) physical evidence, e.g. flyers, posters, agenda and training 
materials. A researcher must choose which documents will be used and illustrative to the research 
study.   Bowen (2009) suggest that there be the widest array possible.  The researcher must also 
consider bias, both from the point of view of the researcher reading the documents but also the 
organisation’s use of documents and their overall tone.  An evaluation of the purpose of the 
document must also be considered in order to place it into a frame of reference within the research.  
The information that is gleaned from these documents is organised into  “what is related to central 
questions of the research” (Bowen, 2009, p32).  Document analysis is the practice of interpretation 
of the ongoing public record of an organisation’s activities. (Bowen, 2009).  The rationale for using 
this type of data is part of the triangulation source to ‘provide a confluence of evidence’ that creates 
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credibility (Bowen, 2009). The analysis can provide a broad overall picture of the organisation and 
the phenomenon that is being studied.  
I had access to written documentation, which included the minutes and agendas of team meetings; 
notice boards recounting the new routines and methods that staff have learned; PowerPoint 
presentations given by and to staff; and the presentations of NPC consultants. All of this 
documentation provided an integrated picture of how learning moved through the organisation. The 
variety of the data also provided opportunities for triangulations (Corley and Gioia, 2004; Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2002).  
 
Table 11 gives the details of the document types and timing of access for Case Study One.  The 
Learning Journals served as the most useful part of the empirical data as discussed throughout 
Chapter 4; Findings of Case Study One.  
Table  11 Documents from Case Study One  
 
Table 12 in a similar vein is the data for documents and materials for Study 2.  This second set of 
documents for case study 2 covers a wider range of types because the access to Case Study Two 
organisation was much deeper than Case Study One.  




















2 5 5 12 
Web Pages 4 3 3 10 
Learning Journals N/A 40 43 83 
(NB each learning journal contained between 7 and 15 pages depending on how much 
the participant wrote; the learning journals accounted for approximately 300 
pages) 
Meetings 2 2 2 6 
Training sessions 2 3 4 9 
Focus groups 1 2 2 5 




















N/A 3 N/A 3 
Meeting minutes N/A 12 2 14 
 
Meetings 4 12 2 18 




    




3.4.5. Non-narrative material: Photographs and Screenshots 
Non-narrative representation of data can enhance a qualitative study by providing additional 
meaning and context for the reader (Yin, 2011).  Non-narrative representations might include: 
“graphics, photographs and reproductions, even drawings and sketches. Some version of any of 
these materials, narrative and non-narrative might appear as slides.”(Yin, 2011, p 249). The 
assumption is that the audience for your data is interested in the ‘condensed’ version of the data 
and be drawn to its conclusions.  A photographic representation of some of the data highlights for 
the audience what the researcher saw and felt during the fieldwork.  It helps to places the audience 
in the mind of the researcher and perhaps the participant to visual images. This combined with the 
field notes help to ‘paint a picture’ of the data story for the reader.     
The use of visual material in qualitative research is not new . There is a rich history of using 
photographs in anthropology and sociology (Bateson and Mead, 1942, Prosser and Loxley, 2008), 
and a broad field of using visual methods to conduct research (Grimshaw, 2001;  Pink 2003). 
Photographs help to convey meaning about the research study.  Visuals may hep the reader to  get 
‘beyond the situated-ness’ of assumptions (Stanczak, 2009). The visual material helps to establish 
the credibility of the research adding to the ‘truthfulness’ of empirical social knowledge (Stanczak, 
2009).   Photographs can help to express the researcher’s “strongly held ideas” the places and 
culture, in this case organisational culture of a given study (Gubrium and Harper, 2016). 
 I used photographs in both of the case studies to establish congruency between descriptions of 
events in the field notes and the depictions of events in the organisation (Gubrium and Harper, 
2016).  In Case Study Two, I used photographs as historical evidence to aid in the interpretation of 
meaning for the learners in the lean programme.  I noted what was being seen, and heard that might 
influence the learning of new routines.  
 
3.4.6. Trustworthiness of the data 
 A major concern for any research project is the trustworthiness of qualitative data (Tong, Sainsbury 
and Craig, 2007; Tracy, 2010).  Guba (1982) states that there are five components to 
trustworthiness:  credibility, transferability, dependability, confirmability and reflexivity.  ‘Credibility’ 
seeks to establish whether the findings are plausible based on the data presented, and whether the 
findings can be established as a reasonable interpretation of the participants’ views. Other factors 
that contribute to credibility re: prolonged engagement, persistent observations, triangulations, 
peer debriefing. Triangulation can be accomplished by repeated questions to different participants  
and collecting data from different sources.  Dye, Schatz, Rosenberg and Coleman (2000) also suggest 
‘member checks’ as a way of confirming the interpretation of data.  This involves asking participants 
to review the data collected by the researcher.    ‘Transferability’ relates to whether the results can 
be applied to other contexts or settings. Generalizability in qualitative studies in limited by the 
nature of the studies.   ‘Dependability’ expresses whether the findings will have stability over time. 
In other words, are the interpretations of the findings and recommendations supported by the view 
of the research participants? ‘Confirmability’ refers to how the research can be validated by others, 
by showing that the findings aren’t a singular representation of the researchers own views. 
Reflexivity highlights the researcher’s own biases and preconceived notions about the research, the 
research site, or the participants (Guba and Lincoln, 1985).   
In April 2014, the Service Improvement Board asked me to present my findings about what had been 
learned in the lean implementation in Cardiology. Some of this information is not included in the 
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PhD as it contained patient data. However, as part of professional reciprocity I did do some 
statistical analysis for St. Lydda’s and part of that was presented back to the Improvement Board. No 
patient information was contained in presentation. The relevant information for my qualitative 
study is that there was a very small positive effect on patient outcomes. It was already apparent that 
no real learning had taken place. The development areas were largely to say that good quality 
clinical care was being given but in the nearly the exactly the same way as it had before Lean was 
introduced . 
 
Reflexivity in a Field Notebook 
Feld work diaries, reflective diaries, personal work journals are a parallel form of data collection (Yin, 
20011.  These journals or diaries chronicle the journey of the researcher and the emerging thought 
and themes of qualitative research.  The researcher immersed in field work is also an instrument to 
record the data of sights and sounds.  So the field diary is way of recording the impression to fit 
empirical data that can’t be captured any other way.  It reveals the tendencies in interpretations of 
over time which can either confirm or refute the interpretation of emerging themes.  Reflection is 
the art of examination of our ‘ways of doing’ and questioning ourselves (Haynes, 2012).  
Interpretation of the data doesn’t always mirror reality but is instead influenced by the researcher’s 
own influences and assumptions (Alvesson and Skodburg, 2000).  Thus the researcher needs to turn 
their examination towards themselves and question their own claims of truth (Cunliffe, 2003). 
Diaries are a natural method of data collection and serve as a self-surveillance tool.  A researcher can 
make entries at regular intervals during the data collection and the period of analysis these entries 
can be a recording or the decisions and thought processes in the development of the analysis 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985).    
In this research study, as a researcher I was so close to my subjects and the data that a diary was 
helpful in gaining distance and objectivity in my interpretations of events and meanings. The diary 
was also helpful in recalling dates or occurrences of conversation and timelines of events and 
dissemination of information. In a section of my field diary for Case Study two, There is a recounting 
of a very open dialogue with senior executives at St. Lydda’s  about whether length of stay had 
changed or whether it was a natural phenomenon to be expected when reviewing over a number of 
years. I also recorded in the field diary, a subsequent discussion on the data I was collecting and 
checking my interpretations with participants in the lean learning.   
I used a field diary to record how I felt about the information I was collecting.  My supervisor and 
fellow PhD cohort were involved in discussion of the emerging patterns.  My supervisor and 
colleagues challenged assumptions and help to confirm the robustness of my analysis (Langley, 
2009).  In addition in case study one, I had the help of external resources at an American institution 
to discuss and review the interpretation of the data to help ensure its reliability and accuracy 
(Bryman 2012).  
 
3.5. Ethics 
Ethics in this project were guided by four main principles: to avoid harm to participants, to obtain 
informed consent (Eisner, 1991), to avoid invasion of privacy of participants or peripheral agents 




Studies that are conducted within a healthcare setting need special consideration where there may 
be a tendency for participants to perceive an alliance with the researcher because of the setting 
(Ramcharan and Cutcliffe, 2001; Stacey, 1988). For example, research in health care can prompt a 
‘therapeutic misconception’ where patients, caregivers or clients believe that results will be better 
because they are associated with a ‘clinical trial’ or ‘experiment’ (Bourgeault, Dingwall and DeVries, 
2010, p 590). However, no patient data were used in this study and discussions were centred on 
medical practices and procedures to highlight learning processes. 
There is also a phenomenon known as ‘Institutional vulnerability’ when health care workers 
sometimes feel compelled to participate because research is for the greater good. As health care 
workers are part of a caring profession they may be more tempted to participate in research. Extra 
vigilance is required in ascertaining consent and understanding the participants’ frame of mind 
towards their involvement in interviews or other parts of the research. 
Most importantly, a “self-critical attitude” should be taken towards the unequal relationship that 
inevitably exists between researcher and participant, “with requirements of informed consent in 
mind and practice” (Bourgeault et al, 2010, p316). As a participant observer, I was very close to the 
participants and to the data. I kept a reflective diary in order to maintain some level of separateness 
from participants and to record my experience as a researcher within the host institution. 
 
3.6 Data coding and analysis 
 
As outlined above, this research study is grounded in an empirically-based approach (Gioia et al, 
2013, Langley, 1999; Pratt, Rockmann & Kaufmann, 2006; Seale, 1999).   The study comprises of a 
range of data that illustrate perceptions of individual learning during Lean implementation.   
A ‘flexible method of inquiry’ was an important approach in relation to establishing themes and 
concepts about learning as they emerged (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007). It allowed the researcher to 
explore more fully the underlying reasons for a particular phenomenon. The study also made use of 
a naturalistic approach in that it is a “discovery oriented” study (Patton, 2002) conducted in situ as it 
seeks to understand a real-world situation without any manipulation of the environment, and 
without any predetermined constraints on the outcomes. 
Qualitative studies depend on in-depth, detail-rich data to understand a phenomenon (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2008).  Patton (2002) supports the use of qualitative inquiry for studying human, interactive 
processes because a study of this kind requires such intricate detail to understand the 
interrelationships between the environment and the participants.  In this approach, a ‘naturalistic’ 
methodology generates new understandings of current theory through ‘systematic comparative 
analysis’ between theory and observation (Patton 2002, p 133).  
Data analysis using this empirically based grounded approach (Gioia et al, 2013, Langley, 1999; Pratt, 
Rockmann & Kaufmann, 2006; Seale, 1999) is guided by themes which are emergent from the 
research and not by preconceived notion (Bryman and Bell, 2011).  The process of coding and 
analysing the data consists of three main stages: first order coding, second order coding to reate 
themes and then finally creating aggregate dimensions (Gioia et al, 2013; Saunders, 2009).   
Many PhD students choose to use NVivo when interpreting the data for qualitative research.  
However, most of those studies tend to have transcribed data from interviews.  This present study 
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had data form many varied and rich sources as previously described. Some of my data did not neatly 
fit into the types of notation that is required by NVivo.  I had to rely on my interpretations of the 
various source material such as the photographs or screen shots and distil the impressions of  those 
data sources into notes and words. Therefore, I took the decision to use an ‘old-fashioned’ method 
of index cards, post-it notes and concept maps to make sense of the data. Memo-ing and 
diagramming were also part of this process. The memos provided written records of ideas and 
thinking that emerged during the course of the analysis.  I provide an example of ‘memo-ing’ from 
the research below with a photograph and a table.  
Figure 4 is a picture example of one of the sets of post-it notes and concept maps that guided the 
interpretation of the data. Following on from Figure 5 is Table 13  on the next page  is an example of 
the memo notation that helped to sift through the data and bring ideas for the concepts, themes 
and aggregate dimension.   There were many iterations of this process to conclude in the final data 
structure shown in section 3.6.2 and 3.6.3  
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Table 13 of memo notations that I used to uncover the themes and concepts in Case Study Two.  I 
used ‘post-it’ notes and discussions with colleagues on the meaning of events, the meaning of 
interviewee phrases, and how these pertained to my research. This is a screenshot of the table for 
economy of space.  
 
Table 13 is an example of the memo-ing used in the data analysis 
 
 
The data analysis used an inductive method favoured by recent research papers dubbed the ‘Gioia 
method’ (Gioia, Corley and Hamilton, 2013).  The Gioia method provides a rigour to an inductive 
research process. The method identifies concepts, to categorize them and to identify the 
relationships between the categories (Gioia et al, 2013). After a series of interpretive processes 
undertaken individually by the researcher, and collectively in relation to participants, various 
emergent themes were drawn out of the analysis into a rigours data structure (Gioia et al, 2013; 
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Nag, Corley and Gioia, 2007). Therefore the following reasoning logic was not exclusively inductive 
but also abductive (Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013).  
Coding is an integral part of the analysis through which distinct units of meaning can be labelled in 
into general concepts. Through iterative rounds of analysis, concepts are grouped into descriptive 
categories and re-evaluated for their interrelationships (Goulding, 2002; Saunders et al, 2009). As 
categories are abstracted, the underlying elements of a theory being to emerge.  The coding process 
is guided by a chosen perspective in this case social constructivist perspective that was described in 
the research design section.  The researcher is seen as the knowledgeable agent thinking at multiple 
levels simultaneously and making sense of the data through a constructivist lens (Gioia et al, 2013).  
The abstracted concepts highlight the substantive issues regarding the research questions (Goulding, 
2002).   
During analysis, the new concepts are at first provisional and those that are repeated take on greater 
significance. The repeated demonstration of significance helps to guard against bias.  Data, including 
incidents, events and happenings, are analysed as potential indicators of the phenomenon and given 
conceptual labels.   Concepts that pertain to the same phenomenon can be further connected in 
terms of similarities and differences and are then grouped into more abstract categories.  These 
categories must be developed in terms of the properties and dimension of the phenomenon it 
represents.  These specifications help define the categories and give them explanatory powers.  By 
comparing the data and naming similar phenomena with the same conceptual label, the basic units 
of theoretical explanation begin to appear (Gioia et al ,2013; Langley, 1999).  Categories can later be 
related to each other and integrated into a theory.  
 
The present study is complicated by the fact that there were two consecutive case studies.  The first 
case study chronologically occurred over the period of my transfer viva and a conference of the 
OLKC.  As noted in the Chapter 5.1., the first case study was the subject of a conference paper and 
presentation and The data analysis is explained in Case Study One in that section of the thesis.  The 
same methods and principles have been applied to both case studies.  The following paragraphs 
describe the coding of concepts and themes in greater depth for the second case larger case study.  
The Second case study was larger because I was embedded in that organisation, St Lydda’s, for a 
sustained period of time and on a more regular basis.   
The initial stage of first order coding was quite honestly a bit chaotic as Gioia terms it ‘getting lost in 
the data’ (Gioia et al, 2013).  In order to identify initial concepts, I re-read corporate documents, e.g. 
meeting minutes, emails, project agendas as well as the transcribed data form interviews and 
interview notes.  As the body of initial concepts grew, I stopped selecting documents when I felt I 
had reached theoretical saturation in terms of core categories that are described in the findings and 
discussion chapters. In practical terms, I reviewed the notes form the interview transcriptions and 
entered them into a concept map on A3 paper.  Then I reviewed the notes from interviews that were 
not recorded (some interviewees did not wish to be recorded so I only had my notes to rely on).  
Ideas such as ‘induction haphazard’, ‘meeting before the meeting’, ‘empowerment’, ‘involvement’, 
‘voice’, ‘not speaking up’, ‘his agenda’, ‘object of the lean programme questioned’ began to emerge. 
These ideas in the concept map began to take a more meaningful form, for example,  ‘meeting 
before the meeting’  eventually became ‘the concept ‘good will over stretched’ as a first order 
concept. I spent a lot of time reading and arranging the data, the initial approximately 50 concepts 
were whittled down to about 28 concepts.  This refinement was partly semantic as some concepts 
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seemed to be describing the same idea and partly reductive to draw out the most important 
concepts in the study.  
  
The next stage of selection was Second order coding in more substantive themes.  According to Gioia 
(2013) the object of forming the thematic codes in to identify “concepts that might help … to 
describe and explain the phenomena” that are being observed. I formed a nap of the thematic view 
of the codes to determine the connections and associations.  This was difficult because the data 
comes from different sources.  The concept of the ‘meeting before the meeting’ had to be reviewed 
in the context of using the meeting attendance lists from the meeting minutes.  So the interview 
data from the participants was matched with the corporate archival documents in the programme 
meeting notation and agendas.  The importance of who was involved in meetings was significant in 
more than one of the concepts and themes.  In this process, overlapping concepts were merged 
together and unclear concepts were discarded.  A major breakthrough in terms of the data was to 
realise that the themes needed to be grouped together differently.  Specifically, the themes 
describing Barriers and Silence were in fact describing individual perception of barriers to learning an 
d on another level the organisational barriers to learning.  The final data structure reflects that 
change in order to bring clarity to the phenomena being described.  
The final stage of the coding creates the Aggregate Dimensions.  These link the concepts and themes 
through a reflexive and dialogical process between the existing literature and data, the aim being to 
prepare a foundation for the explanation between (Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013).  This process also 
underwent an iterative process. For example, discipline an domination is an allusion to the  
propositions presented by Lawrence(2002) and Jones (2000) and the idea of ‘Myth’ is a reference to 
research by Gabriel (2004).   Initially, I described four dimension as Discipline and domination, 
Barriers and Silence, Integration of Myth and Aimless Learning.  However, after my viva, in reviewing 
my thesis, I realised that Aimless Learning should stand alone as the new theoretical construct and 
that the four dimension titles should be changed to Discipline and Domination, Barriers (1) 
Organisational,  Barriers (2) Employee Expectations and Integration of the Myth.  This made the 
description of those concepts much clearer and aligned mores succinctly to the extant literature.  
The iteration of the data structures is provided in Figures .   
 
3.6.1. First Data Structure (Case Study One, HealthCo) 
Figure 5  below is the schematic of the data structure from Case Study One.  It depicts the concepts 
as and themes as they relate to the aggregate dimensions.  The memo notation as described in 
section 3.6 of this thesis was used to collect my thoughts about the barriers to organisational 
learning and the precursors to successful learning. The memo notation led to me organising the data 
structure to show how the perceptions of individuals undergoing Lean transformation in their 
organisation lead to non-engagement in learning.  The themes and dimensions are explained in 











3.6.2. Second Data Structure (Case study Two, St. Lydda’s) 
 
The second data structure went through two iterations.  When I was writing up the discussion, 
realised that I wanted to separate out the theoretical construct of Aimless Learning. I discussed the 
aggregate dimension with my PhD supervisor and we decided on a better alignment of the concepts 
theme and new grouping for the aggregate dimensions.  I realised through conversation with my 
supervisor that the barriers to learning fell into two categories: organisational and individual.  
Therefore, I changed the names of those aggregate dimension to more accurately reflect the 
phenomenon that were being described.  Furthermore, I realised that the aimless Learning was a 
description of the final outcome of the dimensions.  The refinement of the analysis resulted in the 
four Aggregate dimensions of:  discipline and domination, Barriers (1) Organisational, Barriers (2) 
Employee Expectations and Integration of the Myth are the antecedents to the outcome of the 
theoretical construct Aimless Learning.   Below are two schematics that depict the thinking process 
of deciphering and narrowing the concepts and ideas into the aggregate dimensions.  The individual 
concepts and themes are explained in Chapter 6 of the thesis.  
Figure 6 is the schematic for the first iteration of themes and dimensions of Case Study Two.  This 
data structure represents my initial thinking in terms of the themes and concepts for the data 














Figure 7 represents the second iteration and final data structure for Case Study Two.  This improved 
data structure more clearly defines the barriers to learning at different levels, organisational and 
individual. It highlights the ideas of ‘domination’ and ‘myth’ that were perceived by the participants.  
Any future publications of this research material would use this structure to point towards the 
theoretical contribution of Aimless learning.  



















































 Misdirection of meaning 
 Funnelling information 
 Normative discourse of mixed 
messages 
 
Organisational dysfluency * 
Discipline & domination Silenced (dominated)  Socially accepted messages 
 Saying the right things 
 
 Consultants know everything 
 Consultants are experts 
 Consultants have experience  
 
Role of Management 
consultant 
1st Order Concepts 2nd Order Themes Aggregate Dimensions 
 Who’s in meetings 
 Meeting membership 
 Empowerment ‘talk’  




 Application Discrepancy 
 Politics of information flow 
Managerial control 
System control 
 Knowledge ownership 
 Suppressing challenges 
 Micro feedback loops among 
clinicians 
 Why should I speak up 
 Waning interest 
 ‘Just the next thing’ 
 Change fatigue 




 Voice of group non existent 
 Good will over stretched  
Ennui: The malady of 





 Public record vs private record 
 Present a public version 
 Consultant as decision-
maker/validator of truth 
 Having ‘one’ version of truth 
 ‘short termers’ 
 ‘It comes and goes’ 
 ‘It fades out’ 
Public belief in data 
Integration of the 
myth 
Myths Stories and Lies  
Fads & Fashions 
 Systems thinking propagated 
 Systems as panacea 
Casting Lean spell 
Lean solves all 
 Process over substance 



















Practical aspects of the analysis stage 
Throughout the data analysis, I conferred with my supervisor, Professor Russ Vince, for sense 
checking and practical advice about the interpretations.  I also had the opportunity to feedback to 
the host organisations in both case studies. This meant preparing executive reports and PowerPoint 
presentations to the host institutions.  They challenged me with questions about my interpretation 
and recommendation for future actions.  This helped to clarify my thoughts about the research and 
the conclusions that I had made.  I had the unique opportunity to review the data in a more 
expansive way after my viva.  This resulted in a refined data structure that more accurately reflects 
the meaning of the dimensions and most importantly the contribution of the new theoretical 
construct.  
 
3.7. Chapter summary 
The chapter described the methodological approaches used for this study ranging from philosophical 
choice for the research to sampling, collecting and analysing the empirical material.  It also covered 
the methodological tools used to explore how learning moves across the two case study 
organisations:  Semi-Structured interviews, corporate archival documents, non-narrative 
documentation of photographs and screen shots.  Each of these has been discussed in terms of their 
theoretical fit to this study.  Moreover, my personal experience of applying these tools in the field 
has been recounted. As a reflection of the nature of the study, the inductive approach grounded in 
empirical data was deemed suitable for illuminating the ways in which organisational learning is 
experienced in the organisations under investigation. I have also included the methodological and 














Chapter 4: Findings  
4. Findings from Case Study One, HealthCo  
4.1. Introduction  
This chapter presents the findings on the collected data from Case Study Organisation One, 
HealthCo. The findings from this section formed the major portion of a conference paper ‘The 
Missing Steps’ at the Organisational Learning Knowledge Capabilities Conference (OLKC) and 
traversed the timing of the transfer viva and initial data collection of the PhD. I have left the write up 
of the paper fairly intact to demonstrate the progression of my thinking from Case Study One to 
Case Study Two. With exception of the description of the research site organisation, I have 
formatted this chapter with the intact conference paper findings and discussion.  I have previously 
described the research organisation of Case Study One in Chapter 3, section 3.4.2.  However, for 
points of clarity for this chapter, I have reiterated Case Study One’s aims and analysis.  The Case 
Study One aims are within the theoretical scope of the research questions for this thesis and the 
analysis is also fully aligned to the explanation of analysis and coding as described Chapter 3 
methodology of the entire thesis.  
I describe the learning pathway for mostly clinical managers as they learned Lean methodology and 
attempted to implement those practices into their medical sites. The underlying story gave a rich 
picture of how managers and their staff were learning within the complexity of a healthcare system.  
When I undertook this first case study my initial thoughts were to use Crossan’s 4I framework as a 
lens for interpreting the empirical data and to build theory.  The main focus is the processes by 
which individuals, groups and organisations learn and how each of the concepts relates to a stage of 
the 4I framework.  Using the Crossan and Berdrow (2003) matrix, each stage of the 4I framework is 
considered and explained in terms of the data collected from the host institution and employee’s 
experiences of their learning. The data reveals a complicated pattern of interrupted feedback loops 
and interactions between individual, group and organisational levels of barriers to learning. This 
chapter covers the main aggregate dimension of ‘Triggers for Non-engagement’, ‘Arrested Learning’ 
and ‘Role Conflict’.  Each section of the aggregate dimensions provide a short summary of the 
content of the themes that support each dimension.  
The qualitative analysis which undertook a close examination of interview transcriptions, corporate 
archival documentation, field notes from meetings and participant observation in the host 
organisation. The corporate archival documentation includes: internal and external PowerPoint 
presentations, information from bulletin boards, meeting minutes and agendas, action logs and 
email announcements to committee members both staff and non-staff. The aims of the analysis for 
Case Study One were to: 
1. Understand how staff members were experiencing learning with the new lean processes  
2. Understand how staff members experienced the stages of the 4I framework  
3. Explore the underlying perceptions and beliefs towards learning ‘lean’ in a change 
programme  
My primary intention was to follow clinical leaders through their learning journey from clinician to 
manager. My pilot phase centred on a cohort of clinicians learning lean practices. Their learning 
journals revealed much about their individual learning but also about how the staff were learning to 
change to the new lean methods. Delving into these stories created a rich picture of how people 
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learned within a healthcare setting.  From this discovery, I progressed the intent and interest to 
expose the complexities of learning in this particular healthcare context and scenario. The decision 
to use 4I framework was not to prove or disprove Mary Crossan’s theoretical framework. Instead, 
the 4I framework seemed the best fit to attempt an explanation of what was happening although 
there were marked and interesting differences in the phenomenon uncovered in these studies then 
had not been previously explained, namely that managerial control over the flow of information 
produced surprising outcomes in the integration phase of learning stages. Therefore, I used the 4I 
framework as a basic structure to probe in more detail how learning take place in these healthcare 
settings. 
For Case Study One, the analysis focuses on identifying the underlying elements in each of the stages 
of the 4I framework. Crossan Lane and White (1999) first described the 4I framework as multilevel 
interactive process that showed how learning moved through an organization. The ‘4I Framework’ 
(Crossan, Lane and White, 1999) proposed that learning moved across an organisation in an orderly 
and systematic way as a ‘pure process’ to embedding learning in the organisation. The feedback 
loops, both feed forward and feed back, were essential to the assimilation of learning into the 
institution. Yet similar to Rashman, Withers and Hartley (2004), I have uncovered barriers to learning 
in each of the stages. At the same time, the organisations were instituting Lean Methodologies 
which has its own area of research. Learning lean provided a platform to understand how employees 
perceive learning a new method of working and the learning itself. The contribution to the literature 
is to bring together the intersection of these two areas of research for the healthcare sector. 
In a large US healthcare consortium, I analysed the learning journals from a cohort of clinical 
managers as they learned new Lean methods. The study began as an analysis of how physician 
leaders viewed their learning journey from clinician to manager whole learning lean. When 
deciphering the meaning of comments and actions of these managers and their staff, it was clear 
that there was a bigger issue about learning lean in general. Having mapped the progress of lean 
implementation and its effect on processes and procedures, it was evident that not all staff were 
experiencing the learning in the same way, and some not at all. There were gaps in learning and gaps 
in implementation. To make sense of the data, the 4I framework was used as one legitimate 
explanation for how learning was meant to be moving through the organisation. However, not all 
employees had the opportunity to follow an ordered way of learning. It seemed some were missing 
steps in the process.  
I found that at each level of learning, staff described differences in their experience of how 
information had passed through the organisation. There were peculiarities about the way in which 
information passed through each stage of the framework and indeed if the stages were experienced 
by all in the same way. Toward that end, I analysed the data to assign a range of theoretical concepts 
that have been previously used to describe related phenomenon but have now applied this to 
organisational learning framework.  
Case Study One: Data collection and Analysis 
This is a description of data collection and analysis of Case Study One as the intact paper that was 
presented at the OLKC conference. Data collection employed three techniques: (1) semi structured 
interviews (2) written and electronic documentation, (3) observation.  We relied on all three sources 
of information as important triangulation (Corley and Gioia, 2004; Guba and Lincoln 2005) and to 
understand how events and comments were related to each other in building the concepts and 
themes (Yin, 2009). The interviews were conducted in person and over the telephone with senior 




For my analysis, I drew from a constant comparison technique (Corley and Gioia, 2004, Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990) as well as recent examples of moving between first order issues, second order themes 
and aggregate dimensions (Corley and Gioia, 2004; Payne & Payne, 2004, Palmer & Short, 2008). The 
overall focus of my analysis was to understand how learning passes from one stage to the next from 
the employees’ perspective and in particular how learning of a new routine moves through the 4I 
Framework.  
My data were grouped into categories using open coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The themes 
were found using axial coding (codifying relationships between the categories and themes). Three 
researchers coded the data independently in order to be able focus on shared interpretations 
(Huberman and Miles, 1983; Yin, 2009). The researchers then came together to ensure consensus on 
the interpretation of concepts and themes. We worked through the process of coming to a shared 
agreement on the codes. We combined codes that were similar to each other developing a list of 
codes that we included in the next iteration of coding. When two coders disagreed, the third coder 
would use their judgement to help come to consensus. We kept coding until we came to theoretical 
saturation (Locke, 2001). We triangulated our findings by using multiple sources of information, 
interviews, documentation and observation (Corley and Gioia, 2004; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). To 
further enhance the trustworthiness of our data we consulted researchers not connected with the 
study. Two of these researchers were from management and the other from sociology. An additional 
researcher was then asked to review the themes and concepts where variation between the three 
coding researchers had occurred.  
For completeness of the intact conference paper, the table linking the themes to stages of the 4I 
framework is included. Table     brings together the explanation of the themes that linked to previous 
research articles and to a particular stage of Crossan’s 4I framework or Huber’s explanation of 
learning, e.g. policy fatigue links to a lack of motivation as previously described by Szulanksi (2003) 
whose work links to the Intuiting phase in Crossan’s framework.   
Table 14 The table depicts the interdependencies between the barriers to learning at different 
levels. For example, A distancing begins to occur at intuiting level.  As that behaviour gets embedded 
in the organisation, the institutionalising result is that systems are blamed.  
Table 14 Links to of Barriers to OL definitions 
Themes & Concept 
Based on grouping of 
theme 
Link to Previous Research 
Articles  
Links to OL 
Definitions 
Crossan (C) and 
Huber (H) Stages 
Triggers of Non Engagement – some intuiting, interpreting, integration of site 
specific information not company’s intention 
Policy Fatigue 
Initial Enthusiasm wanes 
Interrupted feed forward  
does not pass from 
intuition to integration 
 
Lack of Motivation 
Szulanksi (2003) 














No integration or 





and interest supressed 
Lack of absorptive capacity 
Szulanksi (2003) 
 





















Site specific changes to 
lean feed fwd and 
feedback interrupted 
because integration filters 
other items 
 
Person specific changes to 
Lean feed forward limited 




Unwilling to follow Top-down 
change (Beer & Eisenstadt, 2000) 










Lean used for personal 
agendas 
 






Power structure & power 
relations (Starbuck & Hedburg 
2003) 
 
Focus on unimportant activities 
(Gilley, Boughton & Maycunich, 
1999) 
Management Fads 

















Use of 3rd person when 
describing errors 
Systems blamed  
Distancing (Argyris & Schon, 
1978) 
 







Unwilling to engage in 
deep discussion 
Reluctance to tackle big 
issues 
 
(Argyris & Schon, 1978) 
 






Misalignment of leader role & learning – some integration and institutionalising 
but of personal agendas 
Misalignment of roles 
Expressed learning and 
actual learning differ 
Desire to learn and ability 
assimilate differ 
 
Identify with past learning 
(Weick, 1996) 
Not stored in organisation’s 






Learning values ≠  
Leader action 
Publicly declare Lean not 
applicable 
Declare lean important ‘in 
some cases’ 
 
Inconsistency in goals 
(Godkin and Montano,1991) 
Perceived lack of improvement 





An Adaptation of Schilling & Kluge (2009) 
 
Case Study one was using the 4I framework as a backdrop to  make sense the empirical data. Table 
15 is a selection of quotes from the empirical data  used in the analysis. This serves to show how the 
quotes were used.  These specific examples and quotes from participants were used to illustrate the 
interpretation into themes and concepts.   
 
Table 15 Representative  Quotes form Empirical data in Case Study One 
Theme  Representative quotations 
   
  Triggers of Non-Engagement 
Policy   “People get really excited about change when they are in 
the (Lean training) sessions and we’ve had some good 
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Fatigue results from the first round of RIE (sub committees for 
Lean) and lots of sites had their success on bulletin boards 
but once that first round is done, any other learning 
seems to slow down” 
“There are the small victories but to keep it sustained 
seems impossible” 
“I would like to see the group on board but it’s enough to 
meet criteria for standardizing care” 
“the principles enhance the clarity” 
“there’s no time make changes” 
“the process of reviewing the department’s 
accomplishments helped me individually” but there are 
weaknesses in the department 
“trying to prevent burnout; learn to deliver constructive 
criticism” 
“prioritize corporate initiatives for change in department 
so that there isn’t change fatigue” 
Discrepancies in application 
of programme (Lean, Six 
sigma) 
 “At first, the changes were easy, we changed the 
checking-in process and now there is no waiting time for 
the well visits…. but when we tried to change the docs 
schedules, they just wouldn’t do it”  
“We could learn new ways of doing things in some areas 
but not when it came to the docs, their view of Lean was 
different” 
“We were using as support for the changes in case 
management” as process improvement 
“I look at the goals and then redefined them” Nurse,  “we 
were able to look again at the procedures and address 
what we considered to be the barriers” 
“using lean to affect change” 
 “I don’t order diagnostics 9x-rays) unless I believe it is 
essential to the outcome” [admin staff]  
“ if all leaders viewed their departments within the lean 
concept improvement should be the outcome” 
Conflicting managerial 
agendas 
 “It’s all well and good to change the waiting room but my 
patients aren’t cars, they can’t be treated like that” 
“Revising the plans so they’d fit with I needed the RN pool 
to do, some of it was physical layout but it was mostly 
aligning the RN to with our (phsucican0 practices” 
Use lean to “make department feel like they have a say in 
how we run operations” 
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“find ways to increase my visibility in the organisation” 
“ I will learn to manage my time more effectively through 
new routines” 
“interpret the new ideas and opportunities to ensure that 
the organisation can grow” 
  Inhibiting learning or problem solving 
Distancing from errors  “Errors with lab orders were found”. “They [physicians] 
continued to undermine and are unable to take 
suggestions” “corrections made with others” *** use of 
objective third person to describe error 
“the agencies (temp staff) don’t always follow through on 
our priorities” 
“the agencies aren’t as effectives as we would like” 
“ promote good citizenry” 
“we are trained to be good soldiers not good generals” 
“difficulty retaining people” 
“clinicians feel isolated” 
“resolve sub-optimal performance; support policies and 
protocols which will continue to improve provider 
satisfaction 
“learn the vocabulary of leadership to evaluate problems 
and drive solutions” 
 
Disconnecting from difficult 
issues 
 “Some staff were depressed and afraid of punishment” 
“People backed away from making decisions even when 
they were hiring new docs” 
“a couple of outliers persist” in doing things their own 
way  
“ we need to present ourselves in a positive light to our 
customers”  
  Dissonance of leader ambition versus aim 
Leader espoused values 
versus daily activities 
 “In the meetings she’d say one thing but then do 
something else or worse say things to other people”  “it 
was a case of yes in the room and do something different 
afterwards but if you ask them if they think Lean is a good 
idea they’d all say yes” 
“I directed the problem solving and I felt the outcome 
met my expectations” (leader isn’t allowing the group to 
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gather feedback and adapt to it – he is still ‘directing’ the 
solutions 
vision: “create a department that provides highest level of 
patient care”  versus Personal learning goal was for their 
own “maximum efficiency” and “marketplace positioning”  
“adapt the lean goals to suit us” 
“Things [changes] have to be aligned with my mentors” 
“most of the physicians in my team appreciate their 
strengths but don’t want to see their own weaknesses,  
they blame the programme for hold-ups” 
“outcomes vary 1/20 continue to undermine any 
suggestions and failed to recognise any feedback/ideas” 
 
Learning values ≠  
Leader action 
 
 “The new docs that were hired don’t even want to work 
the evening schedules, no one is prepared to do the hard 
stuff” “when there’s a difficult conversation, the docs just 
ignore it” 
“it [the project] has to be in line with my goals to move 
forward” 
“we talk about encouraging authenticity but my docs 
don’t speak openly about objections, they just do what 
they have always done” 
“learn to communicate my goals to them” 
The leaders we want to convince need to be “profiled and 
targeted” yet they would describe themselves as “open 
minded and creative problem solvers” 
“learn how to mould individuals” 
“become more involved in committees” 




Phase One: The Pilot for Case Study One 
My project began by reviewing the reflective learning journals of 40 LTP participants. The ‘learning 
journals’ were personal written accounts of the individuals’ learning journey through leadership 
classes and Lean ‘Rapid Improvement Events’ (RIE) over the nine-month period of the training. The 
journals were personal and professional expressions of their learning and their experiences during 
the implementation of the Lean approach. 
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My initial goal was to understand how journal authors were experiencing the impact of their 
learning. The learning journals encouraged free narrative, but journal authors were also guided in 
their responses through specific questions (see Appendix X). These included, for example: ‘does the 
learning support my personal vision and goals’ and ‘how did I apply my learning from the last 
seminar’? The participants did not constrain themselves to the questions and wrote detailed and 
confessional accounts of their own daily activities, as well as writing about the experiences of their 
staff. I identified a strong theme from the journals, which was that they experienced learning about 
and implementing the routines of Lean improvement both as an obstacle to learning and as an 
opportunity to learn. I decided to concentrate on analysing this contradiction in relation to the 4I 
framework for organizational learning. 
The findings from phase one led us believe that there were obstacles to learning that had not 
previously been uncovered in other research with respect to the 4I framework. Participants viewed 
learning differently depending on what stage of learning they were introduced to an idea. For 
example, “we didn’t own the process (intuition), it was just handed down to us (integration)” 
(Practice Manager 3). 
Participants expressed their learning goals in terms of new institutionalised routines, for example 
‘memorise protocol for concussion management guidelines in student health’ (Physician LJ 22). The 
routines were not questioned or fully interpreted by all staff, they were simply implemented and 
institutionalised. We therefore decided to investigate the flow of learning, paying close attention to 
how people describe their own learning and staff learning in terms of the 4I framework. 
 
Case Study One: Phase Two 
Phase Two of the study involved interviews with 9 of the individuals who were involved with lean 
implementation in their medical sites. The participants had various roles in the lean implementation.  
Some were leading their own RIE session, others were only involved in discussions about changes to 
protocols or relaying the new set of protocols to their staff.  Thus the participants represented the 
full range of experience in the stages of implementation and learning.  
In addition, we reviewed a further training cohort giving us a total of 80 learning journals.  We 
supplemented the learning journals with public information about the medical group such as 
websites, written and electronic documentation relating to remaining and the Lean improvement 
exercise, such as Whiteboards with the RIE progress charted or employees notices on websites. One 
of the authors also had the chance to observe participants in meetings and training sessions.   
In accordance with Guba and Lincoln (2005), a procedure was followed for choosing interviewees 
and participants. The leadership and Lean trainees were chosen as participants because they had the 
knowledge of Lean learning and application in HealthCo, both pre and post training. These ‘trainees’ 
were a select group of individuals from the organisation who had privileged knowledge and access to 
committees and decisions. The leader trainees were considered among the best in the organisation; 
fast learners, initiators of change and people who were capable of challenging the status quo. In 
principle, this group should have been able to translate new learning quickly and institute new policy 
without difficulty. We assembled the accounts into themes and concepts from the full combination 
of interviews, documents and observations. 
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The analysis produced the second-order themes which were grouped into three aggregate 
dimensions, which I refer to as: triggers of non-engagement, arrested learning and role 
conflict/missed learning.   
In this section we describe in more detail the first order concepts and second order themes that 
were uncovered in our analysis. The second order themes depict operational constructs that block 
learning flow through the 4I Framework. Each theme describes a range of issues or symptoms that 
stop learning from entering the framework in the expected way. 
 
4.2. Triggers of Non-Engagement 
This aggregate dimension is meant to represent the circumstances that might create barriers to 
learning. The underlying themes to this aggregate dimension 3 organisational culture conditions that 
create the foundations for barriers to learning.  The idea of a ‘trigger’ is to denote that this is a first 
clue that individuals no longer wish to participate in learning lean. The comments from the 
participants were expressing a ‘satisficing’ (Cyert and March, 1963; Winter, 2000) limit to their 
decision to continue or not with lean suggestions and implementation. The clinical leaders saw a lack 
of coordination for how to prioritise changes from the Lean programmes. Clinical leaders saw one 
policy after another being instituted but not being applied in the same way in each department.  This 
created inconsistencies in the way organisational resources were allocated. It also created a 
situation in which individuals could operate under their own ways of working to their own agenda, 
eg.. “find ways to increase my visibility” (Physican 46). The example itself points to an organisational 
culture that allows mangers to set their policies and institute the learning they wish to embed in 
their part of the organisation. The emphasis in the illustration is on the idea of ‘creating a situation’.  
However is wasn’t just one instance or policy or managers that created barriers to implementing or 
learning.  The word trigger is a deliberate choice to convey there was more than one condition and 
reason for individuals not to want to participate in engaging with Lean.  
 
4.2.1. Policy fatigue:  
About six months into some of the Lean projects, the practice managers we interviewed described a 
slowing down of initial excitement. One manager explained that the first two projects had gone 
really well, waiting times had been improved and supplies were being stored more efficiently. 
However, once capacity was reached with improved waiting times and another revenue stream 
needed to be identified, the group seemed to lose the inclination to continue with the lean process. 
The Physician Executive interviewed put it this way: ‘once the easy stuff is done no wants to 
continue, they think the system won’t work for them’. Lean did not continue to be applied as a 
holistic philosophy but instead as tools and techniques used to implement changes that were part of 
an existing strategic plan (Dutta and Crossan, 2003, Pettersen, 2009, Fillingham 2007, Ferlie and 
McNulty, 2002). The ‘rhetoric’ and ‘ritual’ of Lean (Radnor, Holweg and Waring, 2011, Waring and 
Bishop, 2010) were used to implement policy but the thoughtfulness in innovation was lost. This led 
to non-compliance with the policies and to either ad hoc implementation or no implementation 
(Schilling and Kluge, 2009; Radnor and Walley, 2008). The strong idea that there is a ‘correct’ Lean 
process got in the way of the emergence of a shared understanding of learning, blocking the 




4.2.2. Discrepancies in application:  
 
Members of the organisation expressed discontent about how routines were applied in different 
ways across the organisation. For example, as a vibrant and growing company, HealthCo continued 
to take on new staff during the lean process. In the recruitment of new professional staff, an on-
going issue of common practices such as discussing lab results over the phone or how speedily to 
return information to a patient was called into question. When these topics were raised, the 
Physician Executives ‘lost their backbone’ or ‘no one had the energy for it’ (Practice Manager 2). 
‘They wouldn’t take the tough decisions to get them [new physicians] to come on board’ (Practice 
Manager 2). Doctors also complained about Lean not being appropriate ‘across the board’ and that 
patients do not fit into a neat package (McCann. Hassard, Hyde and Granter, 2012). The doctors 
expressed a belief that Lean just didn’t apply in some cases and that ‘you just do what you need to 
do to care for the patients’. 
 
4.2.3. Conflicting managerial agendas:  
Managerial actions and attitudes affected the integration of the Lean routine as managers 
interpreted and used it for their own purposes using ‘their own good idea’ (Flinchbaugh 2008) in 
place of the Lean system. For example, in one particular site, a new functionality in the electronic 
medical record had been introduced. The new procedure for requesting blood tests and reviewing 
lab results had been developed through a Lean committee. However, Physician Executives refused to 
acknowledge the new way of doing things and they stuck to their old habits and rules of thumb 
about giving information to patients and what tests to order. There was a rift in the effort to be seen 
as providing physician services versus being concerned with administrative responsibilities. This 
meant any managerial decision would quickly be discarded in favour of the clinician’s interpretation 
of the situation. At times, it was as if the work on Lean had not taken place. The Chief Medical 
Officer in HealthCo expressed concern over getting good people regardless of ‘that system’ that we 
have. The Practice Manager, however, viewed it as a ‘step backward’. It was as if any efficiency that 
had been gained in the first round of Lean process were slowly slipping away. The ‘interpretation’ 
(Crossan et al, 1999) of action in this case was that doctors apply the programme as and when they 
think that it is necessary and when it works for them. 
 
4.3. Arrested learning 
This aggregate dimension is used to describe the building resistance to learning that occurred in the 
organisation.  The first order concepts of distancing and disconnectedness describe employees as 
‘backing away from’ the ideas of lean and beginning to disengage with new learning.  The arrested 
learning aggregate is an amalgam of the themes that illustrates how a fixed mind-set and fear of 
failure were being created.  The focus of Lean and performing at top level continuously was a 
daunting prospect to the already perfectionist driven clinicians in a healthcare setting.  The ‘systems’ 
thinking of Lean subdued to the ideas of creativity and curiousity about mistakes or failures.  
Moreover, because the language of Lean allowed individuals to use third person, it helped to 
attribute failures to the system rather than being self-reflective.  This inability to critically review 
one’s own behaviour and learning meant that there was a loss of insight which lead to a stoppage in 
learning.  I termed this cessation of learning to arrested learning because there had been an 
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opportunity to learn, but organisational circumstances stopped or ‘’arrested’ the learning from 
taking place.  
 
4.3.1. Distancing:  
When leaders described their positive experiences with their teams and with the implementation of 
new initiatives, they used a first-person narrative. Strong connections between the lead and the 
team emerged. ‘I spoke to each individual in my team’ (Physician LJ 8) to make sure they 
understood. ‘I went around to everyone to see how they were doing’ (Physician LJ 8) and so on. 
However, when they described their experience with difficult people or problems, they expressed it 
in the third person, for example, ‘there was an error made’ (Physician LJ 62). The shift from 
individual accountability and towards passive dismissal happened when a problem occurred. The 
dichotomy of Lean in HealthCo was that it encouraged ‘systems’ thinking rather than blaming a 
person for problems.  However, it also had the effect of helping to undermine personal responsibility 
for actions and, at times, the abandonment of common sense, which created barriers to embedding 
any type of learning (Hu, Found Williams and Mason, 2011). 
There was a split between taking on the learning about teams and projects and having to tackle 
difficult issues. The use of a third-person narrative allowed managers to be more subtle or reserved 
in their expression of problems. They also attempted to distance anyone from the error, mistake or 
problem. For example, one respondent expressed concern that a ‘medication error had turned up 
but the agency that supplied the medicine had been notified’, which was expected to resolve the 
issue, with no mention of names or use of a first-person narrative. Our respondents switched from 
using the first person to third person without hesitation and this appeared to be an embedded 
behaviour within the organisation. At times, respondents distanced themselves from personal 
responsibility and from the ‘rhetoric’ of Lean (Waring and Bishop, 2010). Even the word ‘Lean’ began 
to be used against people in meetings. 
 
4.3.2. Disconnectedness:  
Difficulties of connection, in-depth discussion and the reluctance to tackle some issues were 
apparent when members of the LTP were asked to reflect on their learning. Most expressed great 
strides in learning. However, this did not always match what had happened in committee meetings 
or problem solving sessions. On one occasion, a group of physician leaders were working on a 
problem-solving vignette in training, one of the managers left the room to gain clarification on the 
problem. Meanwhile the other physician executives stopped working. When prompted why they 
were not discussing the issue. They reply was ‘we can’t, there are rules about discussing’ (Physician 
86). This was especially true when they were discussing a contentious issue. The managers become 
reluctant to speak poorly of one another or the company and the conversation would reach a dead 
end. 
 
4.4. Role conflict 
 
Clinicians were in a difficult position.  The had a role as a medical professional but also as an 
administrator (Hoff199;  Hoff and Mandell, 2001).   The difficult for the clinicians was that they 
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needed to be change champion for the Lean transformation. Often this lead to changing priorities  
for the teams and perhaps changing the way things had previously been done for patients.  
Sometimes, the Clinical champion for Lean did not want to participate in this. The priorities and 
outcome for the two roles were difficult to reconcile.  As one Nurse practitioner put it “am I a nurse 
or just a manager,  who is my responsibility to…” (L5 NP 8) 
Being part of an organisation with structures and procedures means that there is a dual commitment 
on the part of the clinician.  They must carry out their administrative duties  according to rules and 
regulations set by the organisational strategy not medical strategy. Physicians are trained to lead in 
clinical decision making.  They are not necessarily ready to be seen on the ’other side’  with the 
management. The idea of lean was viewed with scepticism by those who regarded their role to be 
first and foremost clinical.   
 
4.4.1. Misalignment of Value and Role Ambivalence 
 
Research participants expressed a great many aims and objectives in their reflective journals. 
However, direct interaction with them revealed that most of them had not been able to achieve 
their aims. For example, one participant said, ‘when you get back to base, it’s easy to slip into old 
habits (Physician 67); and, ‘nobody has the time to spend on learning the new stuff’ (Physician 67). 
Their aims and their activities slipped further away from each other until they discarded the aims 
and went back to ‘the daily business at hand’. Participants expressed a desire to learn and to change 
but could not compete with their physician responsibilities (Hoff,1999). Furthermore, they found it 
difficult to transfer what they’d learned as an executive to their team (Swart and Harcup, 2013). 
 
4.4.2. Leader value doesn’t equal Leader action: 
Most participants had fixed ideas about the meaning of being a leader. One participant expressed 
surprise that it didn’t have to be ‘us and them’ or that leadership should be viewed negatively. The 
leaders were more effective when they had time to be reflective about their own journey to 
leadership. Yet they still had trouble putting in to practice what they had learned. When they set out 
to develop lean routines, they found it difficult to manoeuvre. The physician executives had a keen 
desire to please both their staff and their patients. Yet because safety for the patient was of 
paramount concern this eclipsed any learning or change that might take place. Their default 
leadership behaviour was to tell patients and staff members what to do. Some physicians explained 
it by going back to their medical training (that the physician is in charge and what he learns for a 
protocol he must adhere to or the consequences could be dire. The physicians held that notion 
above all other edicts from any other policy or management discussion. If a management policy 
called into question their role as a physician, they would withdraw their effort from management 
and concentrate on medical work. Hoff (1999) explained this as a paradox of legitimacy; an 
administrator is not trusted by their physician colleagues and vice versa. The emotional difficulty for 
these leaders affected their own learning and that of their staff (Vince, 2001; Swart, 2013; Yukl, 
2008). 
The 4I Framework links the flow of learning to strategic change on an organisational level but also to 
individual learning and changes in behaviours. Interruptions in this flow will lead to interruptions in 
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learning and prevent learning from being institutionalised. We identified themes within participants’ 
LTP journals that describe these interruptions and their effect on learning flow. 
Furthermore, Crossan, Lane and White (1999) suggest that for learning to be embedded, information 
or knowledge must pass through each stage. Similarly, Lean implementation is an attempt to 
encourage ‘knowledge flow’ (Anand, Ward and Takikonda, 2009). It seeks to address the problem of 
‘scatter’ (things that disrupt flow) such as poor ‘hand over’ between groups within the organisation. 
The experience of our participants reveals a more complex explanation for learning flow. 
 
 
4.4.3 Misalignment of their role:  
An obstacle for physician leaders was the tension between their professional responsibility as a 
physician and their leadership role. They felt they had taken on too much when they ‘had to be a 
leader too’ (physician LJ 13). One physician explained it this way: ‘I want to give other people a 
chance to do things but when at the end of the day, it’s my license on the line, I’m responsible’ 
(Physician 81). Participants felt conflicted between a desire to change old or broken systems and the 
worry that their daily professional work would not get done (Yukl, 2008; Fitzgerald et al, 2006; Hoff, 
1999). 
 
4.5 Focus on 4I framework for Case Study One 
 
When we examined our data, we found examples that do and do not map onto the expected path of 
the 4I Framework. In one example, staff members of a team experienced each stage of the 
framework sequentially. As one doctor described it: ‘[Lean] provided solutions which would be 
impossible to arrive at alone’ (Physician LJ 70). Another physician put it this way: ‘Delegating to staff 
to let them institute process, this gets a positive response, leaving them to develop and implement’ 
(Physician LJ 54). In this team, staff members were able to reflect, ask questions, and explore what 
the new routine meant to them. They ‘passed’ through each stage of the learning process at their 
own pace.  
When organizational members were able to follow the four stages and had a mechanism to feed 
forward ideas to make change; institutionalizing the intended procedures was successful. Positive 
examples of institutionalization of new routines leading to better performance included shorter wait 
times; clearer processes for prescriptions; and a streamlined process for follow up appointments. 
We found that the positive experiences tended to reflect the simpler problems, particularly those 
problems that were not dependent on other parts of the organization.   
However, difficulties in following the expected path mapped out by the 4I Framework were common 
in more complex situations. Stages were missed out or not experienced at all by some members of 
the organization. Feedback loops became stuck in a particular stage and learning was not carried 
forward, but a routine was still instituted. Such routines reflected the desires or political strategies of 
local managers more than the original intent of the learning. Employees’ descriptions and 
experiences of the learning stages were different across the organization. Some felt that they were 





Our findings suggested that new procedures could hinder learning rather than support it, and that 
when learning is either interrupted or disrupted, unintended routines can be institutionalized. From 
our analysis we concluded that there can be ‘missing steps’ or anomalies in the 4I Framework when 
new procedures or routines are introduced. These anomalies lead to interruptions of learning and 
they form the basis of barriers to embedding and institutionalizing new routines and procedures. 
The anomalies support a tendency to create localized learning rather than organizational learning. 
Our view of these dynamics is that there is an inevitable tension between the adoption of new 
routines as a tangible outcome of learning and the tendency of routines to constrain the emergence 
of new ideas and ways of working. Healthcare organizations offer an excellent context within which 
this tension can be studied because they strive for standardization at the same time as they struggle 
with a wide range of contextually specific and persistent organizational problems and issues. The 
implementation of Lean offered a good example of these dynamics. Research participants 
experienced learning about and implementing the routines of Lean improvement both as an 
obstacle to learning and as an opportunity to learn. We do not see the tension here as problematic, 
but as symptomatic. We think that it may be more effective to design approaches to persistent 
organizational problems and issues from the perspective that there will always be tension between 
the potential for organizational learning and the micro-political processes that become obstacles to 
learning. 
We found that micro-political processes, particularly relations between professional groups and/ or 
hierarchical layers of the organization, have a direct effect on feed forward and feedback loops. In 
our study, learning did not proceed in the same way for support staff as it did for managers or Lean 
committee members. 
Managers and Executives were part of the Rapid Improvement Events and committees, and they 
were expected to ‘pass down’ the ‘relevant’ information. Learning was presumed to result from a 
top down approach. For example, we tracked the learning of a new scheduling method across the 4I 
Framework. The idea was to open new slots so that patients had more choice of appointments and 
greater capacity for patient volume. For this to happen, doctors had to adjust their patient 
assessment method, prioritize between patients and allow for more ‘free’ slots in the week. This 
meant that the routine of scheduling appointments had to change considerably. The physicians and 
managers decided on a course of action through RIE sessions and then told administrative and 
support staff how it should work. The support staff had to institute the new method before actually 
learning what it represented or its meaning to the overall strategy. 
While feedback loops were evident, feedback was not generally used to develop an idea but instead 
it was used to change a routine into something else entirely. For example, one front line support 
staff member described her experience.   ‘We were just given these forms for the patients, to find 
out if they spoke English. Nobody wants to bother with that, but we were told we had to do it. I 
don’t know why. We started asking people but got pushed back. We just told them we have to’ 
(Focus Group 2). Patients were asked questions from a pre-printed survey, but the questions were 
asked out of order and staff recorded answers that did not pertain to the question. The staff had not 
been given an opportunity to interpret new procedures on collecting demographic information on 
patients, or to understand how to integrate the idea into their work activities. They instituted what 
they thought was the correct procedure but ended up alienating patients and co-workers. The 
learning ‘entered’ at the integration stage from the point of view of support staff. There was no 
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opportunity for questions or feedback. The result was that the data collected were often unusable 
for the medical site and the whole project needed to be started again. 
It was imagined that feedback loops would help the organization to take advantage of individual 
learning and to exploit it into systems that made the organization more efficient. In HealthCo, there 
were examples where individuals tried to pass on their learning formally or informally. These 
attempts at exploitation were met with resistance: ‘When that medical assistant got really good at 
taking the calls (triage) then she sort of passed it on to the rest of them but if it didn’t comply with 
Lean then the [management] consultants told us not to do it’ (Physician LJ 78). Although physicians 
would admit that Lean could have provided solutions that previous working groups or committees 
couldn’t have foreseen or developed (for example, see participant quotes in Table 2), the solutions 
did not become sustainable. A lack of coherent strategy meant the loss of learning opportunities. 
When an idea enters the 4I Framework at integration or institutionalization, it is more likely that the 
idea will be distorted and will lead to unintended learning. Conflicting organizational priorities fuel 
the already difficult task of grasping new learning and changing work habits. Organizational learning 
and other initiatives compete for attention (Hu et al, 2011; Flinchbaugh 2008; Ferlie and McNulty, 
2002). The feedback loop is interrupted by managerial agendas, lack of learning focus, lack of shared 
understanding, restriction of learner’s interpretations and over reliance on rigid implementation 
(Radnor Holweg and Hines, 2012; Stan and Vermuelen, 2013; Addicot, McGivern and Ferlie, 2006; 
Fillingham, 2007). Feedback loops, when they are manipulated by the political wrangling of 
managers, can stop the flow of learning altogether. Learning is interrupted within and between 
stages. 
Feedback and feed forward loops become ‘dead ends’ resulting in arrested learning. Localized, 
fragmented versions of lean routines were adopted. This meant that the routines differed according 
to the manager’s interpretation and implementation. Employees, mostly frontline staff, felt they had 
been ‘missed out’ in the process of learning. Managers ‘jumped’ processes in order to get what they 
wanted. We also identified difficulties in intuition and interpretation. For example, employees felt 
‘passed over’ as managers ‘leapt forward without them’ (front line desk staff). Integration was seen 
to be the domain of managers. Institutionalization was more likely to be ‘localized’ when employees 
were not fully involved in each step of the learning process. Some members of the organization 
‘missed out’ on the experience of proceeding through the first two steps of intuition and 
interpretation or never experienced the integration or institutionalization for themselves. In this 
sense, we did not find that learning was connected across stages in the way that envisioned in the 4I 
Framework. We found a messier, more politicized model.  
Case Study 1 revealed that there were triggers for non-engagement. Many aspects centred on staff 
perception that they hadn’t owned the process or the information. The learning hadn’t passed to 
them in a way that allowed them to progress through the stages of the 4I framework. With this in 
mind, I wanted to look more closely at the experiences of the ‘front-line’ employees as they 
participated in learning a new procedure and process within the hospital.  We also identified specific 
dynamics in leadership behaviour and interaction relating to discrepancies in clinical leaders’ ability 
to sustain what they see as conflicting clinical and managerial roles. These two dynamics were 
reinforced by emotional responses that created distance and disconnection from organizational 





4.5.1. Feedback Loop 
A major component of Crossan’s 4I framework was the idea of feedback from individual to group to 
organisational level and vice versa. However, the empirical data uncovered in this case study showed 
that there were obstacles to that feedback.  The obstacles then created a situation in which learning 
may stop altogether or be severally hindered.  
Below is an adaptions of the 4I framework matrices (Dutta and Crossan, 2005; Crossan and Bedrow 
2003). The diagram illustrates the progression in my thinking and understanding of how employees 
described the learning pathway for lean in the organisation.  
I sought the use of a pictorial representation to help explain how the themes and concepts 
interacted within the 4I framework.  There is an interdependence between each of the levels of 
organisational learning.  Crossan’s stages of the framework represented different levels of 
organisational learning.  Intuiting knowledge was done at the individual level.  Interpreting began 
the cross over form Individual to group in terms of shared knowledge.  Integration was done at the 
group level and finally institutionalisation happened at the organisational level.  The theme of 
waning interest at the individual level turns into a propensity to discard innovation at the group level 
in Crossan’s interpretation stage.   
This study uncovered some interesting aspects of the interrupted feedback loops and learning 
somehow interrupted or stopped as I had first named it, unintended learning. The interruptions or 
missing steps add to our understanding that some other underlying context was at play in the 
organisation. 
In Figure 8, I tried to depict the movement of learning in the different stages and levels of the4I 
framework.  It shows learning moving form an individual level in the intuit stage to the interpret.  
Waning interest without any feedback from manager leads to distancing and discarding innovation 
when it gets to the interpretation stage of the framework. Likewise,  if discrepancy in the application 
of lean is seen by organisation members in the Interpretation stage then at the integration stage, the 




















Notes on the 4I Framework    
Although this research study was not entirely devoted to the 4I framework, it’s important to note 
that some of the comparison of these phenomenon to the theoretical description of Crossan’s ideas.   
These notations are related to the aggregate dimension and themes but specifically focussed on 4I 
and the possible implications this data from this study provides as comment on the framework.   
 
We learned that there were aspect to the framework that were not well understood from the 
employee perspective. Employees did not always have the opportunity to intuit the new learning. 
Often employees were introduced to a learning concept at the integration stage. Furthermore, 
Managers seemed to have a great deal of control in the integration stage and room to change the 
implementation of an organisational concept. Factions of leadership were aligned to how the 
information was passed down to the employees. The result was a kind of ‘aimless’ learning that 
couldn’t be relayed upon to project what the Organisational stated goals were. 
Although the initial stage of learning stage is considered preconscious, many employees discuss the 
project details in terms of not being ‘introduced’ to an idea at the beginning so they could ‘think 
through it themselves’. The ideas were ‘forced’ on them without any mental space to think about 
them. They felt they hadn’t ‘connected’ to an idea and hadn’t ‘internally processed’ the initial ideas 
of the lean methods. The examples illustrate some key difficulties at individual level that both affect 
and are affected by institutional level learning. The following items are explained: Absence of 





4.5.2. Politics and OL 
The politics and power relations that surround and pervade organizational learning are an intrinsic 
part of the process that researchers have to understand and appreciate (Lawrence et al, 2005). We 
are using Fleming and Spicer’s (2014) distinction between politics and power. “Politics consists of 
activity that rearranges relations between people and the distribution of goods (broadly defined) 
through the mobilization of power. In turn, power is the capacity to influence other actors with 
these political interests in mind. It is a resource to get things done through other people, to achieve 
certain goals that may be shared or contested” (p. 240). This is because different political dynamics 
across the levels of the 4I framework are implicated in ‘why some insights are institutionalized while 
others are not’ (Crossan, Maurer and White, 2011: p. 452). Our research identifies three micro-
political processes or ‘triggers of non-engagement’ that illustrate why some insights were 
institutionalized and some were not in HealthCo.  
Below is an adapted version of Lawrence’s (2005) vision of the political influence on organisational 
learning. I’ve taken the themes and concepts uncovered in the two studies to show how learning is 
interrupted by the political manipulation of information and feedback. Lawrence et al (2005) had 
previously proposed that discipline and domination would facilitate learning. In this study, discipline 
and domination seemed to arrest learning.  It hindered feedback flows and knowledge sharing 
amongst group members. The domination of processes in this study was perceived by staff as 
unnecessary and counter to their work ideals of healthcare. Staff perceived the public statements 
that manipulated meaning through a series of statements, i.e. disfluency, to be a counter attempt on 
the part of management to undermine their work. The effect of not listening to staff concerns was to 
silence staff into a superficial compliance with new methods. They hadn’t learned to do new things 
properly. They only performed new report tasks to the bare minimum of compliance. Management 
consultants contributed to discipline and domination by perpetuating the myths of Lean methods to 
senior executives.   
Lawrence’s (2005) article suggested that the addition of a powers and politics to the model gave a 
fuller explanation to organisational learning. Lawrence et al suggested that new ideas were 
dependent on ‘interested actors’ to put them into new work practices and routines and culture. This 
also had implications for access to resources for these interested actors. Social movement of 
information in interpreting and integrating new ideas into the organisation would be very much led 
by a political process. Information couldn’t be shared without the possessor feeling compelled by 
moral persuasion or by organisational culture to share it. 
This research does not distinguish between Lawrence’s definition of power as either episodic or 
systemic. In the context of healthcare, the definitions of power are blurred (Cott, 1997, MCallin, 
2001; Apker et al 2005). Peculiar hierarchical structure that are encouraged by regulatory 
requirement have an element of power, i.e. consultant, Registrar, SHO, Nurse, HCA, Admin. A nurse 
may not speak out against adoctor’s orders (Cott, 1997). Equally the struggle between administrative 
process and medical ones present another unique power aspect (Hoff, 1999). 
Our particular interest in the dynamic that power is influencing the flow of information in all stages 
of learning. Power led to information being withheld or manipulated so that what was learned was 
not the original intended message of the organisation. In particular they expressed the notion that 
‘legitimate interpretation’ could be encouraged by a ‘strategy of influence and force’ (Lawrence et al 
2005, p 184). The two strategies came in the form of discipline and domination but Lawrence et al 
(2005) explained this as a positive force to make the interpretation of ambiguous information for 
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employees more clear and thereby facilitating the sharing of knowledge and learning. These studies 
did not show a positive effect of influence and control by project or clinical managers. 
Below is a schematic of how Politics may affect learning in an organisation and suppress learning. 
Figure  9  is an updated  pictorial representation of Lawrence et al (2005)’s schematic of political in 
organisational  learning using the findings from Case Study One.   





4.6. Chapter Summary  
This chapter laid out the findings from Case Study One organisation, Healthco.  The data in this 
chapter formed the basis for a conference paper at OLKC during the PhD process.  Through the 
analysis of the qualitative data, I arrived at the resulting three  aggregate dimension which are:  
Triggers of Non-engagement, Arrested Learning and Role Conflict.   
The analysis was done with backdrop of the 4I framework.  At this this phase of the research, I felt 
there was natural synergy between Crossan’s (1999) 4I framework as an explanation for how 
learning moved through an organisation and the phenomenon that was uncovered.   
This chapter comprises the intact conference paper, with minor editorial changes, from OLKC 2013  
which covered the period of my transfer viva of my PhD and the initial stage of my Data collection 
for this thesis.  I wanted to show the progression of  thinking in uncovering the qualitative 
phenomenon related to organisational learning.  My initial strategy , as discussed in Chapter 4, was 
to relate all the phenomenon back to the 4I framework but it became apparent through feedback 
from my PhD viva that this was limiting to the data and my ideas. Therefore, I broadened the scope 
of both my data collection in Case Study Two and my analysis of the empirical evidence form Case 





5. Findings from Case Study Two St. Lydda’s Hospital 
 5.1. Introduction 
This chapter explains the concepts and themes that emerged from the data collected for Case Study 
Two, at St. Lydda’s.  After reflecting on my work for Case Study One, I wanted to explore the ideas of 
‘trigger for non-engagement’ in learning and the idea of arrested learning.  It was clear that some 
organisational conditions and individual’s beliefs were barriers to learning.  I had narrowly focused 
on the 4I framework in Case Study One.   This focus had been useful to uncover that the 
implementation of Lean methodology was extremely complex and that it was not experienced 
uniformly by all staff.  However, for Case Study Two, there was a much broader approach to 
exploring the experiences of organisational learning.   
Using Study One as a springboard to understand how learning was moving through the organisation, 
Study Two looked more closely at the barriers to organisational learning and the perception of 
individuals who were part of a Lean Transformation programme.  The explanations for the barriers 
of organisational learning come from many theoretical frameworks within organisational studies.  I 
explore ideas in organisational change, organisational learning, and lean methodology. For example, 
silencing and distancing can find an explanation in the literature on organisational learning or the 
literature on organisational change.  
This chapter explains the four aggregate dimensions: Discipline and Domination, Barriers (1) 
Organisational, Barriers (2) Employee Expectations and Integration of the Myths.  Each aggregate 
dimension is explored for the relationship to organisational learning and organisational studies 
theories.  Examples from the data for the themes that support and explain the aggregate dimension 
are given to illustrate the meanings of the dimensions.   
I illustrate the overall picture of different levels and dynamics of change and learning within lean 
projects generally in St. Lydda’s Hospital, as well as specifically within the Cardiology department. 
The chapter concludes with a summary of the salient points from the aggregate dimensions.    
 
 
5.2. Discipline and Domination 
This theme explains the idea that the organisation created messages to  promote lean that affected 
how ornganisation members perceived Lean. It also covers how employees tuenrd ot slince as as 
defence mechanism perhaps to cope with the message about Lean. Participants in the Lean projects 
viewed Lean as a powerful influence.  They perceived lean has having control over their daily work 
lives.  Lawrence et al (2005) viewed this as legitimate form of  strategy to interpret new information.  
However, employees viewed this as oppressive and having a negative impact on their performance . 
the influence came in the form of message put across to the rest of the organisation about the 
success of Lean (see section  of the theme in5.2.1. Organisational Disfluency and its underpinning 






5.2.1.  Organisation disfluency  
I created this theme after reviewing the content of presentations and corporate material.  I 
recognised a pattern of using language to portray the organisation’s Lean activities and the ACS 
programme as a success story.  There were shortened statements to make employees believe a 
particular frame of the Lean story.  Corporate media such as articles in bulletins made one case of 
success into the ubiquitous case of success.  The Powerpoint presentations and speeches made a 
series statements that were true.  These statements, if strung together, created a picture of Lean for 
the rest of the organisation. Shortened statements about the different rapid improvement or change 
programmes were essentially true for a specific instance but not necessarily the whole story.   These 
linguistic gymnastics created a Lean success narrative.    
The term disfluency is taken from speech and linguistic theories (Yu, Castel and Bjork, 2012) which I 
have applied to this particular organisational narrative (Gabriel, 2000).  Disfluency pertains to 
interruptions in speech, and repetitions of certain parts of speech in order to create meaning.  It also 
has roots in psychology that suggest that disfluency interrupts our cognitive judgment to understand 
the context of a situation (Yu, Castel and Bjork, 2012).  
In psychology, the pattern of speech is studied for how it conveys meaning to the recipient.  
Disfluency is the deviation from normative speech pattern.  It is mainly the use of prepositional and 
inflectional phrases that create a different meaning other than the factual truth of a situation.   
The ‘human parser’ can detect the disfluencies but disregards them in favour of the gist of the 
meaning in context. A person will overlook parts of information if it helps to produce a coherent 
story.  “Garden path sentences contain a temporary synaptic ambiguity which causes the parses to 
build an incorrect synaptic analysis” (Ferreira and Bailey, 2004, p 232).  The sense of the objective 
meaning is lost, and constructed meaning is proposed and developed.  Two true statements uttered 
with a pause in between are likely to linked as the ‘full story’.  Meaning is inferred from information 
which may or may not be connected.  
These kinds of linguistic gymnastics were evident in the information presented in meetings regarding 
Lean Methods and the choices in rapid change projects.  Below is an excerpt from a presentation 
given externally to other NHS hospital by one of the lead Physician Consultants.  He presented a view 
of St. Lydda as having improved the Cardiac care with an ACS  proforma document.   In this talk, KR 
promoted the idea that the ACS pro forma was new and had been deployed.  This of course was only 
partially true. The pro forma wasn’t being used consistently by all members of the medical teams.   
The following example is a slide from a presentation given long after the Acute Coronary Project had 
begun.  The lead cardiologist on the project made a presentation to an influential funding body that 
helps to shape policy and practice for NHS England. The funding body also provides leadership 
development for the NHS.  KR, the lead cardiologist, told a story; a plausible story.  He stated facts 
and figures about acute coronary care programme.  His title beckoned the reader, it created tension, 
intrigue with the words he chose to use: the Magnitude and the Measure and the Intervention.  The 
title held all the elements of a good novel, the doubt and the cynicism, the clouds of despair 
descended but still a way out for the hospital. A happy ending awaited the audience of hospital 
executives.  
Figure 10 is a screen shot of the PPT given by the lead Cardiologist to external agency.  T tells of a 




Figure 10  KR’s ppt to External Policy Agency. 
 
 T 
The cardiologist rushes in with The Answer:  The Proformas and the Discharge Plans.  These are the 
New Things, The Invented Things.  The guests are held with rapt attention.  Funding has been 
obtained!.   This, of course, is the golden goblet for any hospital executive. ‘Obtaining Funding for 
the coordinator’ statement was true in part.  However,The funding was only for a fixed term and not 
even for the length of the project.  The post was untenable and ill-conceived in its workload and 
responsibilities to the process of introducing the lean system.   
In reality, 3 post-holders had held the post in the space of 18 months. The Proforma had not been 
developed specifically for the ACS project but had been created elsewhere.  The discharge plan was 
also borrowed from another source.  The e-pathway was given over to the software consultants and 
although useful information was obtained, the e-pathway did not fundamentally change how 
patients were identified in A&E before going to a ward.  
This was in contrast to data from the review of the proformas themselves.  SHOs (Senior House 
Officers), Registrars and Consultants were not using them, so they had not been ‘deployed’.  
Furthermore, it came to light in an informal conversation with one of the Nurses that the proforma 
had been used in a previous hospital by one of the Physicians and wasn’t originated with the Lean 
project.  
Below is an excerpt from feedback given to the Senior Board illustrating how the ACS pro forma was 
not being used to its fullest advantage. A GRACE score is a risk score to determine the severity of a 
heart attack and to guide the treatment options. This score was inaccurately calculated on many of 
the forms. ECG findings were necessary in order to assess whether a STEMI (elevated troponin 
hormone myocardial infarction) or an NSTEMI (non- elevated troponine myocardial infarction) heart 
attack had taken place. Initial treatment is similar, but a STEMI requires a PCI (percutaneous 
coronary intervention). It’s vital that clinicians have this information. An ECG is very expensive 
method of obtaining this information, so the GRACE score is quick and cheap way of making the 
clinical decision. According to the review after the pro forma had been used and as mentioned 
earlier,  the lead cardiologist would claim that the lean project had been critical in providing 
efficiency to the care that patients received.  
Figure 11 is a screen grab from a presentation that I gave to senior executive at St. Lydda’s.  I 
explained that although the lead cardiologist other Service Improvement Project Managers were 
claiming the form a success because it was helpful in determining the cardiac patients form others 
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patients and helping to track their progress.  My audit of the Proformas told a different story.  The 
staff were using the forms but they were not completing them to an extent that they would be 
useful.   
 




During the course of the project, the meeting discussions and paperwork seemed to move away 
from the individuals whose job it was to care for patients and instead focussed on the bureaucratic 
wins that could be gained from re-organising the staff. The pro forma audit revealed some truths 
about the ACs project.   
The origin of the pro forma form  had two different stories.  KR told the story of creating the pro 
forma for the ACS project to help identify the ACS and HF patients as they arrived in A&E.  It was also 
designed to help identify the severity of their episode.  KR wanted the SHOs to use the pro forma to 
record all the data about patients admitted with ACS related symptoms.   
The other story was told by another cardiologist one that was in charge of the SHOs training.  ZA 
wanted the SHOs to use the pro forma to learn how to recognise ACS related symptoms and reduce 
their time to diagnosis.  ZA wanted the SHOs to learn how to diagnose quickly, efficiently and 
improve the  quality of their clinical decisions. 
The chief cardiologist of the project did have a desire for the SHOs to record the coronary events in 
the pro-formas as they had been written. However, even this had a personal agenda attached to it. 
He wanted to them to record that information so that he could use it for larger study that he was 
conducting. There were numerous benefits to the patient regardless of the physicians and 
management consultant’s goals. But because there were differing ideas about how to use the final 
pieces of information, e.g. some tests and measurements were deemed more important than 
others. 
Enzyme levels, risk factors were recorded differently from patient to patient. The critical information 
was passed from emergency room clinicians to cardiology by use of tacit knowledge and custom and 
practice. This negated the use of the form, but still it maintained high levels of patient safety and 
care. 
We were 8 months into the project before the head registrar found out that “SHOs were not 
properly trained”, they didn’t even know their education supervisor and had very little contact with 
their senior registrar and had never had the pro forma explained to them. 
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The stories told by the clinical leads created meaning for Lean as a success but as the example 
illustrates that was far from the truth.  
 
Misdirection of Meaning    
This theme was created to describe the way the organisation was using information about the Lean 
projects selectively so that employees were directed to think Lean would solve most problems. This 
theme explains how the organisation used project examples to ascribe importance to lean and 
specifically lean success. This is more that use of rhetoric and language as described in organisational 
disfluency because misdirection of meaning was used to conjure a particular version of the abilities 
of lean to change and transform the hospital and the importance of Lean in learning new systems.  
This theme is similar to organisational disfluency but instead of just the statements that are strung 
together to create meaning this is a larger aspect.  This theme was devised to represent how 
different kinds of corporate materials such as publicly available scoreboards, project timelines, 
plasma screens with slide shows and short videos were put together to direct employees into 
believing Lean was a success and a worthwhile project.  It also pointed employees toward believing 
that the content of projects and the goals that would be met.  For example, large project timelines 
that were displayed on boards in hallways of the hospital (that particular photo is used to illustrate 
the theme of Fads and Fashion in section 5.5.3)   
Directing employees towards a show case of success stories and examples of on-going projects in St. 
Lydda’s created and maintained a façade of lean expertise and efficiency. Misdirection occurred to 
show lean as an immediate and concrete solution to the hospital’s inefficiencies.   
The Hospital senior executives wanted to influence St. Lydda’s public image by promoting 
themselves as a Lean Hospital.  In public talks and media imagery, the hospital presented itself as 
undergoing renewal and focussing on continuous improvement.  The Chief Executive gave a public 
talk to hospital executives/managers and gathered interested parties in which he gave examples of 
the benefits being derived from lean projects.  The message was that Lean was helping to change St. 
Lydda's into a more efficient hospital.  This put St. Lydda’s in a good position to gain foundation 
status and be used as an exemplar to service improvement .  To that end, Plasma screens were 
placed around the hospital to show the ‘success stories’.  Additionally, these plasma screen were 
used to solicit idea from staff on new projects.   
The presentations about Lean were not restricted to St. Lydda’s stories. Senior executives also used 
examples form other NHS institutions to show the positive aspects of Lean in a Healthcare setting.   
Figure 12 is from a PowerPoint presentation that was given to service improvement project 
members and organisations members invited to participate.  The audience was made up mostly of 
service improvement project people but also had a wider hospital employee presence.  The 
presentation recounted the impact of Lean successes in other institutions on their organisational 
culture.  The presentation explain about a nursing project conducted through Lean transformation 
that helped with drug counts and another project that helped with the Trauma team.  These stories 






Figure 12 Powerpoint of Success Stories in a Lean event 
 
  
Stories have the power to promote self-belief.  In this organisation, stories about the fledgling 
success of initial projects served to underline the importance of the new lean endeavours.  Stories 
about the success in other hospitals provided a sense of competition and urgency for change 
(Gabriel, 1991; Connell, Klein and Meyer, 2004; Grant, Keenoy and Oswick, 1998, Marshak, Keenoy, 
Oswick, Grant, 2000, ). 
A high profile Launch event to help persuade individuals within the organisation that lean would be 
good for the NHS took place after lean project had already begun.  It was about six months into the 
lean transformation.  A leading change expert in the NHS was the key note speaker.  She highlighted 
the success from pilot projects at St. Lydda’s such as the RCP in paediatric surgery were used to 
illustrate the benefits and cost savings that lean can have in an organisation. The ‘Are you Ready’ 
event and ‘Lean Show Case’ meetings were attempts to provide clarity for the staff at St. Lydda’s.  
however these meetings were by invitation only. Many ward Nurses were not allowed to attend as 
their managers dismissed the idea and deemed the meetings as not being necessary to attend. The 
attendance level was high but consisted mostly of service improvement staff, not the ward staff that 
carry out the procedures which were being changed by lean programmes..  
Another high profile NHS change leader spoke about the need for change in the NHS and how St. 
Lydda’s could improve efficiency and patient outcomes through Lean. Most of her external examples 
were about the clinical and executive leaders in the organisations and their ability to drive lean. Lean 
was presented as the solution to almost any problem in any hospital.   
Below are excerpts from a Service Improvement Team presentation.   This example was meant to 
encourage staff to think of Lean as building up from the ground floor.  A’ buddying’ system 
promoted the idea that all members could contribute to Lean and that Lean was something ‘fun’ to 
learn.  Service Improvement as a separate team entity within the hospital was a new concept.  This 
introduction of an SI team formed part of a narrative context to create legitimacy as part of a 
rhetorical strategy of Lean. Naming the individual projects as part of a Performance Project plan 
gave additional support to the notion that all these project were connected to greater improvement 
for the hospital as a system (this idea is reinforced in the example used for the Fads and Fashion 
theme in 5.5.3  and the example used for Waning Interest under the Malady of malaise in 5.5.4.) .  
Invoking the NHS Improvement Quality made St. Lydda’s project seem as though it was connected to 
all other NHS projects.     
Figure 13 is a slide from an Introductory slide form a What is Service Improvement? Presentation 
and What are we doing in St. Lydda’s?.  it shows Service Improvement as being embedded as part of 
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the everyday business of St. Lydda’s.  The service Improvement should be looked upon as any other 
team in the organisation.  
 Figure 13 Service Improvement Team slide ‘what is SI & why are we here’?  
 
Organisation have enormous power to create a narrative in the minds of their employee through 
PowerPoints and Organisational materials.  The repetition of a message can be either positive or 
negative.The difficulty for the organisation is maintaining that narrative if the product does not live 
up to expectations.  
 
Funnelling information   
This theme was a further development and refinement of the way in which St. Lydda’s used 
information and corporate documents and media to create cognitive bias towards Lean as problem 
solving. Funnelling information is about creating a story out of experience (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974; Kahneman, 2011). Other researchers have explained the importance of stories in sense 
making in organisations (Gabriel, 2000). This theme is a sub element of the story making in that it 
explores how information was promoted to persuade employees’ cognitive bias toward Lean. 
Kahnmen suggested that stories have significant events and endings.  St. Lydda’s was using the 
tendency of cognitive bias to create personal and bureaucratic stories and used information to guide 
employee’s beliefs. Public presentations, posters, plasma screens with rolling vignettes about Lean 
achievements were placed around the hospital. Lean awareness became part of the Induction for 
new employees.  
The use of the funnelled information is an illustration  Boje’s  (2000)  idea of ‘anti-narrative’;  that is 
a story told with an incoherent narrative.  Different kinds of narratives enforce types of thinking and 
conclusions.  For example,  Boje (2000) uses the notion of  personal narrative versus bureaucratic  
narrative.  A personal narrative is insufficient to overcome the bureaucratic narrative (Boje chapter 2 
in Holman & Thorpe book).  Rationality is favoured over chaos.  Some ideas are promoted and others 
subsumed into impracticalities; “personal experience narrative is in-admissible, reshaped and 
fragmented or surrendered” (Boje, in Homan and Thorpe 2000, p48 ).  St. Lydda’s created a 
bureaucratic narrative for the purpose of subsuming personal accounts of clinicians. The hospital 
executives used a coherent narrative about success to convince clinicians and al employees that 
implementing Lean was the right thing to do even if it meant changing the way they had always 
worked.     
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Whittle (2010) suggests that although an institutional actor may have already sanctioned a change 
within an organisation, it doesn’t mean that the individual actors in the organisation will consider it a 
fait accompli.  Change is required by change agents through a concerted discursive effort is need to 
make the change of innovation more palatable to the organisational actor (Whittle, 2010 p 17). 
Whittle’s research suggests that organisational change is reliant on funnelling of interests rather 
than just a fixed change in practices.  
Previous research has shown that discourse has played a role in giving voice to competing parties.  
The differing ‘sides’ use information and its publicity to strengthen their own argument. This 
example for this theme describes the funnelling of information for the improvements projects that 
have already been made.  The executives, as organisational actors, describe how the breadth of Lean 
methodology is already in use in  other hospitals and throughout St. Lydda’s.   
The funnelling of information was achieved by managing attendance lists at meetings;  choosing 
particular interested actors for the service improvement team.  In addition there were secondments 
from clinical work for defined areas of improvement.   The SI team had midwives, physiotherapists, 
cardiologists, speech and language therapists, pharmacists, paediatricians, and nursing staff. 
However access to minutes and access to meetings altogether were controlled by the lead managers 
and executives as part of the entire SI process improvement. The information in the SI improvement 
meetings was presented in such a way as to represent the projects perpetually moving towards the 
desired goal. Even when the goal shifted, the minutes and notes of meetings would reflect the 
desired rhetoric of the moment.  The institutional actors were using the rhetoric as symbolic action 
towards the goal of Lean adoption and lean learning.  
Figure 14 is a slide form a workshop to train new project members before they embark on a rapid 
change programme.  It outlines the steps of how to win ‘hearts and minds’ of the staff over to a Lean 
way of thinking.  It’s the rhetoric lean can do anything theme. The  advice was straightforward and 
positive and engaging.  Typically, some staff were cynical from the beginning.  but some were quite 
enthusiastic as to the promises that lean might fulfil.   
 





The people aspect of Lean was discussed in training and other presentations.  The promise of the 
rhetoric of the CG presentations and Senior Executives was that people would be accounted for in 
the lean transformation.  These presentations were given at the beginning of projects and the 
Launch of the whole programme.  
Normative discourse of mixed messages 
This theme was developed to explain how the messages from senior managers influenced the 
learning in the clinical teams.   It covers the dynamic of paradox (Smith and Berg, 1987) and social 
construction of change of organisational knowledge (Luscher, Lewis and Ingram, 2006).   Each actor 
wants to preserve their comfort by maintaining their conditions but they also crave change. 
Managers want to encourage the adoption of new routines and enhance the collaboration between 
nurses, A&E and cardiologists but they cling to the security of old methods (Luscher, Lewis and 
Ingram 2006).   
Crossan Maurer and White (2011) had described learning of shared meaning as a kind of dialogue 
that would convey meaning and shape action. This disconnect I observed was that the intended 
shared meaning was the public face of the ‘lean’ change and the subversive dialogue that existed 
between employees created a different shared meaning. There was a pattern of contradiction in 
both verbal and written communication.  Paradoxes were in the statements made in meetings with 
one intent and statements made outside meetings with another intent.. There may have been an 
acceptance of idea in a meeting but then when a nurse tried to action the idea, they were met with 
resistance.   Managers were espousing change but undermining it in meetings by use of inflections 
and intonation express true meaning opposite to the stated goals of senior executives. As previously 
mentioned, many meetings and meeting notes were slanted to present the Lean projects as always 
being successful and geared towards the desired patient outcome.  Managers used persuasive 
language to build ideas around using lean as a method of change and that all ideas were welcome.  
Managers also used persuasive and declarative language to express the idea that change was 
already under way for the improvement of patient outcomes in the Acute Coronary syndrome 
project.  
A nationally known change leader was brought in to the organisation to promote change 
management ideas.   This was purposefully constructed narrative to reinforce change as positive and 
natural part of an organisation’s development.  The purpose of the launch day was to create energy 
for adopting and learning new Lean methods.  The attempt was to reframe meaning for a specific 
organisational message (Vince and Broussisine 2000).    
This example illustrates a promotion of a concentrated focus on lean methods as part of change, and 
change as part of learning.  That narrative created is that Lean will have a positive effect on patient 
outcomes.   Learning lean is necessary.  Organisational change is a learning process.  In order to be 
able to learn new thing through lean some old methods will be adapted, others will need to be 
unlearned or discarded in favour of the new.   
Individual learning is amalgamated into ‘collective learning’ leading to change in institutional 
processes (Rampersad, 2004). The goals of the launch day learning as a natural part of change align 
closely with Dodgson’s (1993) idea of learning as part of ‘adaption’ and efficiency improvement.  HB 
was trying to present the idea of change as inevitable, flowing and continuous.  As a contextual 
issue, change and learning are inextricably linked, learning new things changes something;  attitude, 
skill, behaviour or knowledge. (Armenakis & Bedeian, 1993). HB was trying to get all of the clinical 
leads to see learning new medical procedures and guidelines as the inevitable part of changing 
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medical care. If change were appreciated and lauded, then changing to new lean methods would 
create an image of improvement and efficiency (Gioia & Chttipeddi, 1991; Maitlis & Lawrence, 
2007). Ideas for new projects were solicited form employees (Flinchbaugh 2008, Hu, et al 2016 ). 
Figure 15   is the schematic that I re drew whist listening to an external expert on lean.  HB gave a 
presentation on one of the Lean awareness Days at St. Lydda’s  about all her personal successes with 
Lean transformation.  There were a t least 100 people in the audience form St. Lydda’s. She was a 
charismatic speaker with amiable and friendly presence. HB focussed on how lean and change 
management Principles were aligned and mutually sustaining.   
Figure 15   My notation ‘drawing’ from the Presentation by HB 
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The ideas that were being given to staff were all about ‘creating hope’ and that staff could find 
deeper meaning in their work through Lean transformation.  Some Staff id think that all was possible 
with lean.  Of course, I have the benefit of hindsight in the analyse which makes me sound cynical.  
The impression that the presentations and message was that Lean was a good positive thing.  
Below are some further notes from the field diary on how the 5 energies of change as explained by a 
Lean NHS expert.  All of them are expressed as positive force for change.     
Excerpt from Notes on a Lean Awareness Day  
The 5 energies of change 
social  - energy of personal engagement, relationship and connections, 
feel of sense and them  
spiritual – energy of commitment to a common vision for the future, 
driven by shred values 
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psychological – energy of courage, resilience and feeling safe to do 
things differently 
physical  -   
intellectual - NHS improving quality online tool for  assessment for their 
energy for change 
I took these noes while HB was talking but I was also looking around the room to see if people 
actually believed it.  There were some enthusiastic nods and verbal affirmations. Most of the 
positive feedback was from the Consulting Group’s staff and form the Service Improvement team.  
Some clinicians, identified by their medical scrubs or name tags,  were sitting defensively with arms 
and legs crossed, chin jutting out and hard looks on their faces.   
I made the notes below some time after the event.  I was reflecting on the things that had been said 
to staff and the comments that were made to me in subsequent lean projects.  
Excerpt from my field diary notes  
The stories we heard were as powerful as the data we collected. I sat in 
those meetings and listened eagerly, I wanted that enthusiasm to wash 
over me and see this hospital change for the better. A lot of things 
happened to me while I was there in the hospital, I embraced the 
stories that were being told. We were getting better, we were getting 
more efficient!, The cardiac patients were headed for rehab, the CCC 
nurses were seeing progress with the patients. But then you started to 
peel back the layers, when asked to provide evidence that the progress 
they were making was sustainable. It turned out that the progress was 
mostly propaganda. 
 
In the early stage in the Lean transformation, there was some enthusiasm for Lean and what it might 
do.  However even in those first projects, some members of staff start to tell a different story.  
Below are some of my notes from the quote form the CCC Nurses on the rehab team.  I wrote these 
field notes after the event.     
 
 “link nurses in each ward to support discharge process” Message 
message from the presenter about a lean launch project-  
and this is the comment as heard by me from a member of staff 
‘well this wasn’t true 2 months later , maybe it was true at the time’  
(CNZ after the Launch Day with HB) 
“subjective discharge encouraged greater patient ownership”  - 
Message from the presenter about a lean launch project   
this is the comment as heard by me from a member of staff 
there’s no evidence of this. Patients still wait to be discharged for 




at each comment from the presenter, the clinical staff member is heard dissenting form the ‘facts’.  
Lean was beginning to be seen as having two sides,  the public positive side and the darker ‘real’ 
side.  
There was a tendency to over-state the successes and ignore any problems. The consulting group did 
stay in the hospital very long and therefore did not follow the groups to see if sustainable change 
had been made or if the learning had indeed been embedded in the organisation. 
The Hospital continued its theme of portraying itself as an exemplar for Lean methodology. Towards 
the end of my tenure, the hospital ran a ‘Perfect Week’ exercise. This exercise involves observations 
on every single ward for every single shift for a week. Various data are collected on discharge times, 
bed moves, patient wait times, patient transport, discharge lounge, communication between 
department e.g. A&E and Wards) etc. This data was so interesting in contrast to the messages that 
had been fed to staff during my time as a PhD intern.  
The stories and the discursive norms were being used to create Lean as learning, lean as change,  
lean as problem-solver.  At the same time, the personal discursive norms were being created: Lean 
as a hindrance, Lean as separate from daily work, and lean as an unwanted influence. 
 
5.2.2. Silenced   
This 2nd order theme was created to describe how the presence of ‘silence’ of employees true 
feelings and beliefs in favour of an organisationally accepted narrative; that is employees not voicing 
their opinions or ideas in meetings hindered embedded learning.  Silence was not an active choice 
but a response or reaction to feeling or being supressed.  
This theme describes examples of both acquiesced silence and defensive silence (Van Dyne, Ang & 
Botero 2003). This theme also captures the idea of silence as part of tacit-ness (Blackman and 
Sadler-Smith, 2009).  It also explores the idea that silence is a barrier (Bogosian and Stefanchin, 
2013; Blackman and Sadler-Smith 2009). Clinicians in the service improvement teams were given a 
‘voice’ to be able to discuss concerns about the rapid change projects or the lean programmes.  The 
experience of these clinicians was that they put forward a message, it was often rejected in favour of 
an already determined course of events.  
When Clinicians asked the service improvement project members questions, the answers were 
socially accepted version of events.  In addition, Questions were not encouraged in meetings by the 
way.  Meeting members understood this by the way in which service improvement project managers 
phrased things.  
Statements were made predicated on assumptions about the viability of Lean success. The 
organisational narrative of Lean as a success was more important than the desire for ‘real’ change.   
Below is an example of how people were commenting about meetings.  That there were meetings 
outside of meetings and that had no real input into learning or change.  
 
Field notes from conversation just outside the meeting 
JGr (this person sat next to me in some of the meetings and on this 
occasion leaned over and whispered comments to me about what was 
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being said) “oh here we go again, that’s now hat’s happening, we can’t 
even get the forms, and they’re not filling them out anyway, they’re 
dreaming if they think things have changed” 
This is a classic example of the way People use defensive routines in organisations to protect 
themselves against rejection (Argyris,1978). They keep silent in an effort to save themselves from 
being associated with a bad idea or a failure.  Individuals distance themselves from ideas and 
projects that they think will fail are not part of the organisation's ethos or are not part of what they 
view to be the core of the organisation. They felt silenced from superiors who wish to promote a 
view of the organisation that may not necessarily be the most accurate one 
Below are some further notes from the field diary form a conversation had just outside the a 
meeting in which presentation and talks about lean projects and successes so far.  
Field notes from conversation just outside the meeting: 
CNZ “I don’t care what’s said in there, we’re providing good care, just 
like we always have done and trying to pay attention to that stuff” 
(that stuff refers to the pro formas and electronic tracking of patients- 
although this is a nurse who diligently fills out the forms but uses the 
old system of bed notes and med notes to make clinical determination) 
she won’t say anything publicly in meetings or ‘on the record’ because 
she wants a ‘quiet life’ ( CNZ is a cardiac care nurse) 
At the same time the employees were bombarded by messages and images of the organisation’s 
making. One begins to see the division taking place.  Senior executives saw lean as success and 
others in the organisation saw Lean as a hindrance.  
 
(Excerpt from Field notes; interview with Rehab Nurse CK) 
 “it (the pro formas) was her idea – she used it another hospital in her 
previous post…KR had an idea for a research project and he was using 
this to investigate the idea, it wasn’t bad idea, it was good, you know 
for the patients, but still it was what he wanted to do isn’t it?, as a 
group I mean….CG had something to prove because they wanted to 
their system elsewhere in the NHS” “Of course patient safety was 
paramount but we could have gone about it differently, and from 
where I sit we were already doing the medical bit”(CK cardiac nurse –  
 
CNZ and CK were both on the ACS lean project team.  I came to know both of them very well.  They 
had the same first name so I had to distinguish their identifies in my notes by their initials.  Quite 
frankly, in the beginning, I did get them mixed up but they were both cardiac nurses and had the 
same sentiments about Lean and it benefit to patients. One of the nurses was from New Zealand so 
those are not her real initials.  She no longer works at St. Lydda’s, she emigrated back home just at 
the end of my time at the hospital.  CK explained that the ground breaking idea for a pro forma to 
identify ACS patients had been a consultant’s idea where she’d used it in a previous workplace. The 
idea did not originate from the Consulting Group nor was it an idea generated from Lean. However, 
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the pro forma was publicly announced as a Lean idea. These stories continued with CG making public 
presentations to staff and other NHS hospitals claiming success of different projects. 
Staff were reluctant to go ‘on record’ to complain about lean. Because I was a ‘fixture’ in the 
hospital, they spoke freely to me offline, having coffee, in hallways, etc. Many pieces of information 
were relayed in the form of ‘hallway whispers’. In fact most of the ‘real’ information about the 
project was relayed offline. If it had been a play it would have been an ‘exit stage left on display’ 
conversation for the audience to see the irony of the situation. 
 
Socially accepted message  
This theme draws on the ideas of legitimate accounts of identity and social practices (Creed, Scully 
and Austin, 2002) and the interplay of organisational rhetoric and identity to create cultural tomes 
(Meyer and Scott, 1983).  In this case, ‘Lean acceptance’ as the ideal.  The ‘social practice’  of the 
consultants describing St. Lydda’s as an exemplar case for Lean led to the adoption of the Lean ideas 
(Strang and Meyer, 1983). In general, the St. Lydda’s clinicians mostly regarded Lean as a 
manufacturing tool and not appropriate for medicine. The strategy by the CG and the senior 
executive was to talk about Lean as part of the cultural and social fabric of the hospital. 
Presentations, meetings, social networking events within the hospital all contained an element of 
social discussion of lean as a positive step for medicine.  This is consistent with previous research 
that Lean was evolving to be seen as part of social system (Hines, Holweg and Rich, 2004).    
CG presented themselves experts in field 'teaching' lean, and often quoted from an HBR article on 
leadership,  St. Lydda’s was creating a social structure (Wenger, 2010)  to identify itself as a ‘lean’ 
hospital (Ferlie, 2002; McCann, Hassard & Hyde 2013).   St. Lydda’s and the CG created Powerpoints 
and posters and talks in the ‘process of meaning making’ (Wenger 2002).   
Figure 16 is one of the Lean Awareness Slides initially given at Lean training. These slides were then 
incorporated into Induction slides and Lean Introduction.  The slides were used to assimilate both 
new and existing employees to the ideas of Lean and how it would function as a tool and a project 
within St. Lydda’s.  They became part of the fabric of the organisation.  The ideas of Lean were being 
embraced certainly by the management of the organisation.  






5.2.3. Role of Management consultant 
This theme was included to highlight the influential nature of the relationship between the 
Consulting Group (CG)  and St. Lydda’s. There were multiple levels of influence on various projects.  I 
take a critical view (Werr and Styhre, 2002) of the Consulting Group (CG).  In my examples for this 
theme and subsequent themes, the Consulting group is illustrated as “manipulator of symbols in 
order to create impressions of value” (Werr and Styhre, 2002, p46).  Consultant tend to serve a dual 
role both as support and influencer. Executives in an organisations look to the consultants to 
develop strategy and plans and to educate about change management (Scott, Barnes and Wanger, 
2012; Chun & Mooney 2009; Fincham and Clark, 2002).  When proposing a change, the consultant is 
viewed as an influencer (Scott, Barnes and Wanger, 2012). CG were an external group but were 
embedded into the internal Service Improvement group which gave them the opportunity to act as 
internal consultants enjoying special privileges of information, access and influence (Scott, Barnes 
and Wanger, 2012). Management consulting can encompass so many different activities but of 
particular importance in this case study are the activities of change and learning.  A standard 
approach to consulting is to undertake a process of data analysis, diagnosis then advice to 
implementation.  Consultants facilitate learning about new ways or working and new concepts 
(Scott, Barnes and Wanger, 2012).    
As internal consultants, CG were in a position to manage change and learning by gathering data and 
interpreting it on behalf of the Service improvement team.  This, of course also means that CG could 
manage and manipulate the situation (Werr & Styhre, 2002).  St. Lydda’s senior executives and 
service improvement management group became increasingly dependent on the CG for information 
analysis and strategy choice whilst ignoring the data reports and opinions of their own employees. 
The Consulting group was regarded as the authority on how to improve care for the ACS patients.  
Below is an excerpt from a presentation given by CG explaining the care system for coronary 
patients. CG had reviewed the hospital SLAM data and shadowed clinical staff for a day (literally a 
single day).the dominance of the opinion of CG’s experts was incredulous.  They had only shadowed 
the clinicians for a very short period of time.  Yet they were purporting to have expert knowledge of 
the situation with cardiac patients.  They used information from NICE and British Heart Foundation 
to bolster their arguments.  This was information about lengths of stays and patient outcomes that 
was publicly available before any of the lean programmes even started at St. Lydda’s . The 
Consulting Group made itself the expert on the care pathway. They spoke with assurance and 
conviction making the senior leaders in the organisation feel comfortable with their ideas and 
project outlines. Senior executives accepted these explanations but it was not enough to convince 
clinical staff who did the daily work on the wards. 
 
CG visiting project managers were emphatic in their explanations. In the interview excerpt below, 
we see the clinician explaining that CG tells the staff they need to ‘live’ through kaizen to really ‘get 
it’. CG introduced all vocabulary and concepts of lean. It was meant to get everyone using the ideas 
and concepts. However, it turned out to be ‘validation for a few key members of staff’. 
Figure 17 is from a presentation given to show that organisation success can be achieved through 
competency .  Furthermore, competency can be achieved though Lean. It just another example of 
how CG and the Senior Executives created the idea that Lean would help individuals to become 








These slick presentations can easily convince a new members of staff that once competent in the 
principles of lean they can solve all problems.  
Further example of the influence of Lean came from the presentations of decision on the Lean 
projects. The CG made much of their achievements made at other hospitals.  The management 
consultant who created the ICP programme was a statistician but he was the one that chose 
selectively what would be included in the ICP projects.  
In selecting the ICP CG ‘presented an analysis of Trust Data to support selection of the pathway and 
collectively agree which area of the hospital to choose for Lean work’. CG had full access to the 
trusts SLAM (service level agreement measurement) data. This data is used to determine repayment 
of Tariffs from the authorising agency, e.g. CCG (Commissioning Care Group). CG would not fully 
explain how they selected the data. They did not use all years and all patients. They used selected 
months from the previous 5 years of data for each morbidity. For example, Congestive Heart Failure, 
they kept in tight age ranges and time frames without readmits.(Source:  Field notes and Hospital 
ERM data). CG analysts grouped the data into ‘care families’ and balanced that against incidence and 
‘bubble volume’ or annual income. An associated ‘activity rank and income rank’ were used as 
determine factors in choosing the projects. 
Although there was only one physician on the CG team, the task of analysing and presenting the KEY 
determinants for the Lean Improvement projects feel to CG. Below is a screen shot of a powerpoint 
presentation given to senior leaders in the hospital explaining the need for change and new 
procedures. CG was seen by senior management at the hospital as an expert in data analysis, lean, 
project and change management. CG was never challenged about their ideas, findings or reports. 
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In CG’s presentation to senior leaders they gave their interpretation of data supplied to them by St. 
Lydda’s but analysed by their own consulting group staff. The Consulting Group chose the data to 
use in the comparisons, for example: the number of patients, type of patients, time frames, year on 
year comparison, etc. St. Lydda’s internal staff did not check the data or methodology used by the 
Consulting Group. It was assumed that all data were correct, and that the interpretation of the 
problem was sound.  Below are some excerpts from the presentations given by the CG.  Again, the 
role of management consultants is discussed and developed in the analysis section.  
 
Figure 18  is a screen shot which shows the analysis slide given by CG to the executives at St. Lydda’s. 
This is important because later in discussions with St. Lydda’s own clinical staff, it turned out that 
there were different views on which sets of data should be used and how one would measure the 
success of project.  CG wanted to concentrate on Length of Stay but the clinicians had first 
envisioned tackling the problem of discharges and return to Rehab.  Of course, length of stay is 
related to these issues, but they still have different concerns.   
 
Figure 18. Consulting Groups reasons for choosing Lean Projects 
 
 
To accompany this slide and give further understanding to the different message that were getting 
through to staff and what staff believed,  I have include some of the field notes below on how CG 








(Excerpt from field notes conversation with CA from CG) 
 
CA explained that: “proxy quality measures were created to show 
comparisons between different morbidities”. CG chose the proxy 
quality measures not the hospital. The decisions were based on 
financial information not necessarily patient outcome. The Lean 
measurement was about increasing productivity and reducing cost not 
quality aims of improving patient care. The driver is financial. 
In another example, CG analysts grouped the data into ‘care families’  
and balanced that against incidence and ‘bubble volume’ or annual 
income. An associated ‘activity rank and income rank’ were used as 
determine factors in choosing the projects.  
CA from the CG explained that: “proxy quality measures were created 
to show comparisons between different morbidities”.  CG chose the 
proxy quality measures not the hospital.  The decisions were based on 
financial information not necessarily patient outcome.  The Lean 
measurement was about increasing productivity and reducing cost not 
quality aims of improving patient care.  The driver is financial gain of 
reduction in length of stay; ££ saved   field notes  - The data ‘show’  
that took place had the software consultants giving us an overview of 
what could be done “ a comprehensive health record platform that acts 
as a single source of truth for clinical, operational, and financial 
transactions”  as in the tariffs that are charged for procedures. Below is 
an excerpt from field notes of meeting with the procurement team for 
the software developer.  
This became important when instituting lean when the message given to the wider audience was 
that patient outcomes would improve. However in the public “trust- wide communication of 
selected ICP” were reported as a joint decision between Clinicians and Management and driven by 
patient improvement.  The discussion that followed was to decide which clinical project would be 
taken on. The Executives along with the CG decided on the 5 RCP (Rapid Change Projects and ICP 
(Integrated Care Pathways). Acute Coronary Syndrome was among the top 5 projects to be chosen. 
Hereafter, the decision was made public reporting that it was a clinical decisions about the care not 
necessarily about the finances. 
 
Consultant as Expert  
This theme pays particular attention to the role of the consultant as the knowledge expert creating 
value.  Consultants are seen by the client as being able to provide objective advice and expertise 
(Werr  & Styhre, 2002, Alvesson et al, 2002). St. Lydda’s executive team saw the Consulting Group 
(CG) as the the validator and external authority. St. Lydda’s used all the CG data and strategic 
assumptions are the Lean Implementation project.  CG was driving the goals of the projects not the 
clinicians. CG were based in the Service Improvement team office onsite.   Their presence gave 
credence to the improvement work for the chief executive but wasn’t necessarily helpful to 
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clinicians.  The two internal leads on the project had personal career goals they wanted to achieve in 
becoming freelance consultants themselves.  
The Management Consultant was the validator (external authority/expert). – St. Lydda’s used all the 
CG data and assumptions to being project and not letting the clinicians drive the goals an outcomes  
- couple of assumptions here;  CG were based in the SI office;  Their presence gave credence to the 
improvement work for Miles but wasn’t necessarily helpful to clinicians.  Ronan and Peter had 
personal career goals they wanted to achieve. Below is an except from a presentation given by CG 
explaining the financial model. CG had reviewed the hospital SLAM data and shadowed clinical staff 
for a day (literally a single day).  Using this information and publicly available information from NICE 
and British Heart Foundation.  The Consulting Group made itself the expert on the care pathway. 
They spoke with assurance and conviction making the senior leaders in the organisation feel 
comfortable with their ideas and project outlines. Senior executives accepted these explanations but 
it was not enough to convince clinical staff who did the daily work on the wards.   
CG visiting project managers were emphatic in their explanations.  In the interview excerpt below, 
we see the clinician explaining that CG tells the staff they need to ‘live’ through kaizen to really ‘get 
it’.  CG introduced all vocabulary and concepts of lean. It was meant to get everyone using the ideas 
and concepts. However, it turned out to be ‘validation for a few key members of staff’.  
Although there was only one physician on the CG team, the task of analysing and presenting the KEY 
determinants for the Lean Improvement projects fell to CG.  
Figure 19 is a screen shot of a Powerpoint presentation given to senior leaders in the hospital 
explaining financial data model for Cardiac rehab attendance.   CG was seen by senior management 
at the hospital as an expert in data analysis, lean, project and change management.  CG was never 
challenged about their ideas, findings or reports.   
 











Role Relationship/ Client  
The theme was created to reflect the position of the consultant group in the St. Lydda’s case study 
as more than just an interested party.  The role in this case study was not a ‘time-limited 
transactional relationship depicted in some organisations and previous research (Greiner and 
Metzger 9183, Schein 2002). This theme explores the relationship between St. Lydda’s senior 
management, the relationship to service improvement team, the relationship to the clinicians, the 
relationship with external agencies and experts.   
The management consultants were looked upon as experts in all things, clinically and 
methodologically. They drove decisions, they made changes to the organisation unilaterally. 
Employees saw their own voices disparaged over those of the management consultants. If it came 
from outside then it was the right thing to do, if it came from someone who worked the system for 
many years it was discounted. The consultant is a symbol of strength to some in the organisation 
and a symbol of oppression to others. 
It was difficult for employees to develop a shared understanding and interpretation of new methods 
because there was no ‘common grammar’ to be able to agree a ‘course of action’. Project members 
felt distanced by more senior members of staff when they used phrases like ‘Lean will be used to 
strip away the inefficiencies in the system, we have to think in terms of ‘whole systems’ not just 
individuals. This had the effect of making nurses and clinicians (especially junior ones) to feel as 
though they were not needed or their decisions making was just a formality. Evidence based 
medicine was about filling in forms and recording only the information that was necessary to 
determine a course of action. 
Following the functionalist literature, the power dynamic in this case study was one of the 
consultant as a powerful influencer.  Werr and Styhre (2002)  provides support for the notion that 
the consultant acts with the advantage of ‘superior knowledge.’   The Frame was for CG to provide 
the data analysis in order to decide which projects would be approved for piloting the Lean 
efficiency Programme. It is in the construction of the client-consultant dynamics (Alvesson, 
Karreman, Sturdy and Handley 2009) that we understand the influence that CG had over the 
direction of service improvement and the learning of new methods by the clinicians in the project 
teams.   
 The relationship between the physicians and the CG management consultants had an interesting 
power dynamic.  The consultants were very much seen as experts, and validators in their roles.   
Below is an excerpt from interview notes.  The clinician is explaining about a rapid change project 
and how validated the people involved in the project felt,  The validation comes from the 
consultants working on the RCP.  This clinician is one of the new clinical champions of Lean.  
 
Interview notes with FM 
FM:CG introduced us early on and the concepts of kaizen, 
ME: Early on? 
FM: Introduced at the steering group 
ME: and the concept that there would be training? 
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FM: Historically, the Trust hasn’t been very good at sustaining 
things. We do it right for a week and then don’t continue. We get 
something new and then something else new and something else. 
We’re not good at keeping things going. 
So CG were introduced early on and explained the concepts, but I 
have to admit I didn’t get it and found it immensely difficult to 
explain it to my colleagues. Then CG said you have to live it. 
ME: How do you feel about the improvements (or not) with 
individuals? With processes? 
FM: It’s only until the training started that you could get a true 
insight. As we were teasing out how we would potentially like to 
work through the problem, they came and they were running their 
metric at what was measurable and what was not. They were 
doing their own independent review of the nursing staff and other 
communication lines and following patients through their 
journey. So they were doing a lot background research which may 
or may not have validated my opinion of what turned out to be. It 
was very useful, it was validating for people involved. A lot of 
interviews were key people of the group, it was validation for key 
members of the group 
 
FM though that there were real effect from conducting the lean project.  This was an example when 
the Lean project had helped to reduce waste and help employees to construct a better way of 
doings.  FM had his doubts Cg and found it difficult to sell the idea to his colleagues and co-workers.  
Overall he felt the project had been a success. For me the crucial comment comes right at the end of 
the excerpt when he says it ‘was a validation for KEY members of the group’.  All of the positive 
things he was saying about the lean programme were only about the key personnel.  
This new St. Lydda’s clinical champion for service improvement was appointed. The clinical 
champion had no prior knowledge of Lean nor was he a cardiologist. His role was to encourage the 
adoption of Lean throughout the hospital into ward and surgical procedures.  He had very little 
knowledge of the way things were supposed to work or how they were to be planned. Therefore he 
had to rely on CG to help manage the projects and the meetings.  Shortly after the appointment of 
the new clinical lead , 3 new clinicians appeared on the attendee list or service improvement team 
meetings.  One of these clinicians had instituted the ACS proforma at her previous employment (a 
fact not known at the time). No one from CG or senior management was in attendance. The issues 
and actions were not taken in ‘agenda order but rather the minutes reflect a chronological 
discussion. Already the ‘rules’ of the meetings were being ignored or changed as it suited the 
individual players in the team. A shift in priorities begins to take shape. There are suggestions of 
changes to IT systems and software databases and an online method of identifying ACS patients was 
discussed.  
The role of the Consulting Group was seen alternately as a threat and a saviour. They were viewed 
by senior management as a leading expert who could ‘solve all our problems’. They were given great 
power and influence over the project teams.  The consulting group was never questioned for their 
methods of reporting, the choice of data, their statistical methods, the data gathering and sampling. 
They were given carte blanche to undertake a paradigm changing methodology for the hospital. One 
that could potentially save money but also cost a great deal of time and money. There were no 
checks and balances as far as the Consulting group was concerned. If they said it, top management 
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believed it. Employees resented the Executives for making rash judgement about techniques that 
were in current use. They resented the managers who observed their work for half a day and 
suddenly knew exactly why they weren’t getting cardiac patients into rehab. None of the nurse and 
ward staff trusted them. There was surfaced acceptance of their presence but not deep acceptance 
of their philosophy and methodology. 
The Executive was hoping that I would find that Lean was the key to change in the hospital. Many 
other projects had tried and failed to make sustainable change within the organisation. He firmly 
believed that following consulting Group and the US method from Intermountain (a Lean project in 
the US) was the key to saving St. Lydda’s. He used phrases and vocabulary from the presentations 
that had been given by CG and articles from Health Affairs on Lean in Healthcare (James and Savitz, 
2011; Jimmerson, Weber & Sobek, 2005; Mozzocatto, Savage, Brommels, Aronson & Thor, 2010). 
 
5.3 Barriers (1) Organisation 
Organisations capture knowledge and information from their members in order to gain or hold onto 
their competitive advantage. Policies, process and structures are put in place to ‘manage these 
assets’ (Baily, Mankin, Kelliher and Garavan, 2011). Formalization and hierarchy are necessary for 
any organisation to maintain order and formalise learning.  Expectations of behaviours are set out in 
formal procedures.  However, this is not without its difficulties. High degrees of formalization may 
hinder innovation and reduce motivation and learning (Lawrence, et al, 2005; Cyert and March, 
1963; Bartol and Srivastava, 2002).    
This aggregate dimension focusses on the barriers to learning that arise from structural-
organizational issues (Schilling & Kluge, 2009).  Processes and systems put in place to manage 
experiences and information flow may also hinder the organisation’s ability to retain the information 
(Glynn et al, 1992).  The organisation’s desire to create new mental models and share knowledge 
across teams and departments can fall foul of conflicting structures and programmes.   Barriers also 
arise though politics and power structures (Crossan et al, 2009; Lawrence et al,2005).  Knowledge 
management also pays a role in the stoppage of learning (Vera, Crossan and Apaydin, 2011).  
The analysis focused on identifying and explicating how learning a new lean method occurred 
individually and across the teams and organisation.  The idea of barriers to organisational learning is 
explored from the perspective of different team members: senior leaders, project management 
staff, clinical staff and admin staff. These differing perspectives gives a fuller picture of the 
experience of employees in their attempts to learn a new process within the dynamics of the 
organisation. Excerpts are taken from observations in meetings,  interviews, and corporate material. 
Each piece of information gives a glimpse into the conflicts, struggles and mind-sets of the 
individuals involved in the learning.  
This dimension represents the aspects of perceptions, actions, behaviours and organisational 
structure that were observed and described as undermining the flow of learning. Team members 
frequently mentioned aspects of manager behaviour and manager actions that were perceived to be 
obstructions to individual and group learning. This dimension describes phenomenon that indicate 
barriers that arose from managerial control of the flow of information and manipulation of 
organisational structure.  Often the phenomenological data often contains examples that illustrate 
both managerial control and employee silence. This is used to show the differing perspectives that 




5.3.1. Managerial Control 
This theme explores the project control system used to track information and keep up to date with 
project changes. In addition, the theme follows the establishment of communication with the 
project team is a fundamental part of OD and learning.    In this case study, the Management control 
comes in the form of scheduling meetings and meeting membership, the discussion items tabled for 
the agenda.  This theme is an illustration of events and timelines of invitations to meetings and 
informational flow controlled by managers. Managers had within their power to be able to give or 
withhold information. Managers controlled decisions about how lean was implemented. Their 
professional role as a medical care giver kept dissenters from openly questioning how the new 
methods were being implemented. There was a distinct tension between localised practice and the 
strategic goals of the organisation. Managers control the flow of information and learning in as much 
as they control the codifying of knowledge in a specific group (Schulz, 2001).  The meetings and 
documents about a particular project combine new and old knowledge to exploit knowledge from 
the clinician’s work.  
Meeting membership 
This theme specifically focuses on the attendees at meetings.  This was important because people 
who attended project meetings had access to information where other clinical members did not.  In 
addition, often other strategic information as discussed in improvement meetings making 
attendance to them beneficial to their members.  If someone was interested in building their career 
at St. Lydda’s it would be very useful to be able to attend the Lean project meetings.  
Managers used these meetings as ‘rewards’ and punishments.  If you were out of favour, you were 
no longer invited.  If you were in favour, then you might get a ‘boost’ by having your name included 
on distribution lists. Managers used the meetings as part of control over the projects and over 
people.  
An aspect of Management control is information flow through coordination of project groups.  Part 
of this is about meeting membership.  Management Control Systems (Kaplan, 2008) use 
communication and coordination as part of an overall organisational control. The flow of 
communication provides part of the feedback loop in learning.   
The idea of a coalition was introduced by Lowe (1972).  Coalition in the context of this case study 
research takes the form of various service improvement and project meetings.  Of particular interest 
to this theme is  the make-up of the meetings attendee list.  The control aspect is visible in the 
‘invitation’ of who is allowed in these meetings and in what time frame. It supports the previous 
research on Information flow and information seeking in social networks (Borgatti and Cross2003). 
Meetings are the new Integrated Care Pathway for Cardiac Care were comprised of both clinical and 
admin staff.  At the start of the Project to introduce lean methods, the Consulting Group (CG) helped 
to draw up a list of attendees.  The initial attendees included the CEO of the hospital, Chief Medical 
Officer,  Chief Nurse, senior executives and senior clinicians.  In public statements,  senior hospital 
executives would extol on the importance of 'staying connected to pa project'.  The review of the 





Figure 20 comprises 2 screen shots of meeting minutes from the project meetings. In reviewing the 
attendee lists in a timeline of beginning of project to end of project.  The changes in membership are 
accompanied by change in goals. Statements about the goals of the projects are very different. 
The membership of the various lean groups, working groups, committees, training sessions was 
severely restricted.  An unseen selection process took place.  In the beginning to the project, 
individuals at highest levels of the organisation were invited to meetings to plan the activities of the 
new patient pathway.  The first 3 meetings were attended by senior management: Chief executive, 
Chief Nurse, COO, etc.  




By the fourth meeting of the ACS team in February of 2013. The list of apologies was longer than the 
attendee list (see extract below). ‘The right hand column’ of apologies included the CG head clinical, 
the HR business partner, the Senio executives. The ‘left hand column’ the attendees had now 
become the chief clinician for cardiology, 2 members of the project management team, 2 nurses and 
an IT person. The clinical champion was being introduced to the group for the first time!. The project 
had been going for nearly 5 months and this was the first time he’d heard any detail. 
Most of this meeting was spent trying to figure out the objectives for the project because the senior 
management objectives had been very different to this ‘working group’. A lot of discussion of ground 
rules admin support changed four times over the course of 18 months. With gaps in between and 
others covering for this post.   
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In the beginning of the projects, the meetings were run by the CG and attended by Senior 
management e.g. Chief Executive, Chief Nurse, Chief Operating Officer. One of the early meetings 
took place in December 2012. This meeting was a discussion of strategic objectives. However, there 
isn’t much recorded in the minutes. Subsequent interviews with the respective members of this 
group provided some insight into the meeting content. The Chief Nurse expressed the idea that CG 
was promising to help increases efficiency. Top level ideas and structures were discussed but plans 
were expected to be made by the project managers and clinical staff. The idea of clinical champion 
was proposed. There was agreement to attend the meetings every month and to follow the minutes 
and action points. In these subsequent meetings that clinical judgement is seen as the driver for 
decisions.  
 
Figure 21 is also of meeting minutes but this one is used to illustrate just how many apologies there 
are for the meeting.  The senior executives had started to drop off from the meetings.  The 
remaining individuals were people either doing the work or local project manager and clinicians who 
were invested somehow in making the Lena Project work.  By ‘invested’ , I am referring got their 
own career agenda in proving what they could do for the hospital.  This the impression I had from 
the way the meetings were conducted and the action points given to individual in the meetings.  
 





There were more apologies than attendees so you can begin to see a disinterest beginning to creep 
into the Lena programmes.  The action pints were still being dictated by the senior manages through 






Talk of empowerment  
This theme originated out of the comments from project members who felt their participation was 
being undermined whilst simultaneously hearing ‘you should ‘be empowered’ to make decisions.  
There were many instance of management executives mentioning ‘empowerment’ in public talks 
and presentations, in team meetings and as part of project explanations.   
Empowerment is generally used to describe ‘a form of employee movement initiative” (Wilkinson, 
1998, p 40).  The focus of empowerment is often “task-based based involvement and attitudinal 
change” (Wilkinson, 1998, p 40).  The work of Legge (1995) supported the discourse of 
empowerment “and this fitted the notion of an enterprise culture attitude with individuals seen as 
entrepreneurs” (Wilkinson, 1998, p42).  St. Lydda’s wanted employees to have this entrepreneurial 
attitude towards the new lean projects.  They wanted employees to suggest new ways of doing 
things as they were learning lean.   
Historically the Quality Movement including:  TQM, lean, Six Sigma had a ‘strong message of 
empowerment’ Wilkinson et al, 1992;  Durant, Kramer and Perry, Mesch and Parlberg, 2006;  
Spencer, 1994).  Continuous improvement was seen as a ‘bottom-up’ approach where the worker’s 
tacit knowledge was use to explore new methods and improvement to routines.  The St. Lydda’s 
corporate message was that clinicians had control over work process.  It was the idea of ‘sharing 
power’ (Spencer, 1994). SHOs were being encouraged to hare decisions making and given power to 
make decisions but they were also expected to refer to Senior Staff.   
Empowerment requires the elements of self-efficacy, sense of control over work environment and 
organisational practices that support delegation. There was tension between allowing for 
empowerment and having the underpinning organisational structure to support giving the SHOs that 
freedom to make decisions.   
The Lead clinicians in SHO education on the ACS project spoke of encouraging psychological 
empowerment (Ref) but the perceived competence of SHOs undermined the ability of employees to 
make their own decisions or change the methods.   
Autonomy and competence in professional practice is fundamental to nurses and physicians 
(Laschinger, Heather & Fida, 2015).  Authentic leadership (Avolio and Gardener, 2005) is seen as part 
of the foundation that creates an environment of participation.  Kanter’s (2003) model of 
organisational empowerment is supported by managers who are authentic leader.  In this case 
study, St. Lydda’s managers seems to have a duplicitous approach to ‘empowerment’.  They verbally 
encourage empowerment whilst not organising the projects and feedback in a way that would allow 
SHOs or nurses to contribute through empowerment and participation.   
Below are two sections of field notes that pertain to staff asking for clarification on using documents 
that pertain to Lean. In the training meeting for junior doctors, some simple questions revealed that 
they did not know how to use the forms. They were using the forms as scratch sheets when these 
were the forms that were supposed to transform the care in the Cardiac ward.  
We want to empower you to ask but if not push it up (ZA talking to the 
juniors) 
The education training session with the SHOs and ZA explaining that 
they didn’t know who their education supervisor was (PL) and they 
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hadn’t been taught how to use the pro formas.  The SHOs expressed 
frustration that they had been given little or no direction from their 
Registrars.  Many times the information they used in making a decision 
came from a Nurse Manager or Ward sister.  In the meeting of August 
2013, when the ICP Pro Forma sheets were reviewed, the SHOs 
confessed that they were unsure how to use them.   
 
Field notes 
This is about the summary findings of the review I did for St. Lydda’s.   
The SHOs were using the form not as it was originally intended but as a 
‘scratch’ sheet.  In the spaces for calculations to be made and recorded, 
narrative detail about the patient was recorded. The calculations for 
risk were often accompanied by other detail and not fully clear how 
calculation was determined.  The SHOs knew that this form was 
necessary to determine risk for a MI patient, they’d listened to the 
overview of the forms, or the matron on ward. Although the SHOs 
could tell you what the form’s purpose and bureaucratic chain, they still 
didn’t use it for its stated purpose.   
 
It was clear form meetings that there was a disconnect between what was said and planned in the 
project meeting sand what was actually being used in the departments and on the wards.  
 
Absence of Feedback 
This theme explores the phenomenon of the feedback loop that existed within St. Lydda’s.  Feedback 
in terms of team members talking to each other about the project and the feedback or lack of it 
from the Project leads.  Learning doesn’t proceed smoothly across the organisation and it is 
especially difficult when the feedback from learning is interrupted. The lack of internal process to 
give feedback to the ACS team created a stoppage in the learning.  There was no way to bridge the 
gap between old institutional learning and the new learning (Berends & Lammers, 2010; Ron et al, 
2006, Crossan and Berdrow, 2003).   
In this case study, we are interested in the interruption between the individual and group, for 
example the disconnect between the nurses and their feedback to the SI team.  Emotively, the 
clinicians felt left out of the detail of the project.  Emotions influenced ability of cognitive function to 
make changes to new methods (Shipton & Sillince, 2013). Where previous studies have shown the 
feedback element was an important aspect to strategic change.  This theme provides insight to the 
view that the absence of feedback stymies the transference of learning to new routines.  
Feedback is an essential part of the learning and the employee experience. Analysing failure can help 
learning if there is an opportunity for safe reflective learning. Lack of feedback leads to resentment 
and assumptions on the part of employees. Not wanting to appear incorrect leads to suppression of 
challenge and creative ideas (Askew and Lodge, 2000; Davies and Nutley, 2000; Nystrom and 
Starbuck 2015).   
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I observed individuals would filling the vacuum of knowledge with their own ideas and agenda for 
change.    Official ideas were domain of project managers, external management consultants and 
senior clinical staff.  The absence of feedback focused the attention away from official channels and 
methods. Information they’ve gathered or information from peers is far more important.  Buchanan 
(2005) similarly reported how individual interaction affected team learning in public health Although 
the team members were essentially creating communities of practice.  This information that passed 
within the community was not necessarily accurate or helpful to learning and change. 
These were cryptic field notes form a ‘bollocking’ meeting that we received form one of the senior 
managers in the lean programme. The Senior manager was frustrated that we were not making 
more progress on the project. After this meeting, some of the staff were excluded from meetings 
and I overheard some saying they were cut off from access to certain file folders.  It was clear that 
the senior manager on the team wanted ‘the right people and the right time’, but those people had 
to be of his choosing.   
Field notes from      
Then we had this meeting for setting the up database discussion 
Right ppl right time, right room 
The IT, the cardiac people,  
It was People who understood what they need was/is 
Actually knew specific areas that need to come out of the database 
Probably been in lots of meetings 
Talked about what was important to us 
Talked about how to get the info off the porformas 
Didn’t bother with KR’s (the senior clinician) stuff 
Too many fingers in same pie 
Confusion 
Meetings about the database stuff those we attended 
Meetings about the pathway, the official pathway 
I had to write these notes ‘on the fly’ because the meeting had been scheduled at short notice. It 
wasn’t part of the regular systems of meetings.  The progress of the software and the electronic Pro 
forma was very slow.  It was at this point, that staff members really starting opening up to me about 
their feelings towards lean.  
 
Application Discrepancy 
This theme describes how the managers applied the principles of Lean to suit their own needs.  The 
organisational structure of the Service Improvement enabled managers to use the Lean process to 
push their own changes and not necessarily the most efficient way of doing things.  
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Power and politics often have an overriding role in the delivery of new programmes in an 
organisation. Power can be used to effect a change or to suppress it (Lawrence et al  xxx) . 
There was a definite discrepancy in how lean was applied to the medical protocols and treatment of 
patients. From department to department, ward to ward, project to project, each manager had their 
own interpretation of how to affect change within their unit. The language of lean was used to 
justify actions that had previously been rejected. The lean method was used to blame bureaucracy 
for errors and to blame the system for not producing better medical care. This notion has been 
explored in some measure by Blackler and MacDonald (2000) in the emergent or established 
relations in and between groups.  Socialisation and reutilisation ensure some control over what is 
embedded into institutional knowledge.  Huzzard (2004) emphasises the struggle between learning 
in organisations through routines or through exploration.  Power is articulated through social 
practices. The examples for this theme show a struggle between the power of the service 
Improvement Project Managers and the power of nursing and clinical community to establish 
medical routines. I saw that employees did not want to be associated with the lean programmes 
because they felt as though they were personal managerial pet projects a not part of the overall 
scheme of the organisation. (Blackman and Sadler-Smith, 2009; Westpahl, Gulah and Shortell, 1997)) 
These are field notes form a conversation with the matron of Cardiac Rehab. She was talking about 
how there was a mismatch between what had been originally intended for lean programmes and 
what was coming out of them.  This particular project was supposed to be about getting more 
patients into rehab and it turned into something about forms  
 
Field notes  
 
HH told me today that when they first started it was supposed to be 
about the cardiac rehab….not everyone is engaged in that. If KR had 
wanted us to really change that he would have put in ACS nurses and 
Ward nurses into it (the ACS Project) EH*and C* worked nationally on 
rehab… they are very well versed on what’s what…. …….Other medical 
consultants see it as a side project……… struggle to get any 
documentation for the rehab…….. it’s all about the Lean stuff dictated 
by the SI team… 
 
 
Witness to manipulation  
This theme explores the comments from employees about witnessing the difference in explanation 
from managers about projects and the reality of the daily work on the wards.  Clinical project team 
members felt that the managers were ‘manipulating’ information about the success of projects or 
the progression of the work in order to present a successful picture of lean to the outside world.  
The team members saw the managers as ‘telling stories’ about lean and manipulating how lean was 
introduced for their own purposes.  
Stories have the power to convey organisational expectations (Young, Hesketh and Neal, 2006, 
Rasmussen, 2008)). Leadership stories develop the vision for the organisations.  Stories help develop 
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rapport and trust within teams (Pettigrew, 1979).   The stories that people perform in an 
organisation to make sense of change can themselves be powerful levers for change (Boje, 1991). 
War stories help to consolidate facts or beliefs into a sentiment of heroism and encourage belief in n 
organisational cultural phenomenon. 
Project Managers and clinical Executives enjoyed a kind of celebrity that accompanied being part of 
the Lean project. Public presentations were made to the hospital as well as to outside organisation. 
The Consulting Group, a very well-known and well respected organisation, lent an air of credence to 
the whole lean project.   
Figure 22 is about how CG calculated the ‘wins’ from the lean project.  They presented the two slides 
below.  Lean has had a positive effect in reducing the length of stay. In subsequent data analysis 
checking, I noticed that Cg had chosen their data points very carefully to tell a positive story.   






5.3.2. System Control 
This theme attempts to describe an approach to implementing the quality system of Lean as a 
control mechanism.  Control systems exist in al spheres of organisational work (Mullins, 2009).  In 
fact, a ‘main feature of organisational behaviour is power and control’ (Mullins, 2009).  Control 
processes help to circumvent  idiosyncratic behaviours and adjust individual interpretation of 
organisational culture and procedure into a bureaucratic system of standardisation.  Organisations 
require conformity in both their employees and their use of systems.   Lean has the capability to 
streamline the repetitiveness of a job and produce more time for thinking and problem solving of 
complex issues (Mazzacato et al, 2012).   
The shift from piecemeal work to a more systematic approach was used to convince clinicians that 
the new method of doing things was more appropriate to improving patient care.  The lean system 
was meant to support patient care as a more efficient process. Clinicians beleaguered by checklists 
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and measurements felt Lean was a method of control rather than being useful or helpful tool.  
Clinicians interpreted Lean as a surveillance tool (Waring and Bishop, 2010)  
The proformas weren’t necessarily helpful in the care of patients.  The clinicians were treating 
patients but they weren’t filling out forms.  The project manager and lead clinician responded by 
reinforcing the use of proforma rather than ask why it wasn’t being used. The lean system was being 
used as a form of control.   
The Clinical Project chair liked to use words like ‘enforce’ or ‘check up on’.  He didn’t probe as to 
underlying reasons for non compliance or commitment to the project.  He just stated his own 
interpretation of how the methods should be instituted and expected others to follow.  None of the 
other staff members mentioned in this action points list was given an opportunity to discuss how 
changes could be achieved or what they have learned.  
Figure 23 is a screen shot of minutes notes and how the nurses, SHOs and registrars were using 
them.  Everyone was using them in a different way with notation all over the place.  Kr the lead 
cardiologist wanted staff to use  them so he could gather data for a research project.  Because they 
weren’t being filled in properly, he was getting angry.  Not because, it didn’t’ comply with Lean  but 
because his agenda was thwarted. 
Figure 23 ACS Minutes      
 
 
Changing the Goal   
This theme represents the observation that the project goals shifted during the course of the Lean 
Programme.  Organisations initiate change for various reasons, innovation, establishing culture, 
streamlining the organisation, changing market strategy.  In this case study, the change goal seemed 
clear to establish new routines with identification and rehabilitation of cardiac patients.  A large part 
of this process was given over to the Service Improvement team and their Project Managers.  
Project management is there to enable strategy to be embedded in a documented and disciplined 
form. It is purposefully designed to highlight the end goal (Achanga, Shehab and Roy, 2006).   The 
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project management documentation itself leads to discussion of scope of projects, milestones, and 
desired outcomes (Womack and Jones, 1997).  The interesting dilemma is this case study is that the 
goals shift and change.  Over a progression of time, project members become more and more 
removed from the original goals.   
The Pro forma had become a large part of this project. In fact, you could almost say that it was the 
project. The discharge summaries are a natural part of the pro forma which identifies patients as 
STEMI or NSTEMI coronary syndrome cases. An audit that had been completed in the Fall of 2013 
suggested that the SHOs were not using the pro forma to its full advantage.  The pro forma was 
mostly being used by the nurses and their part was structured in much the same way as the work 
that had previously done. Education and training session with the junior doctors (SHOs) and 
consultants only improved the performance of usage and accuracy of the documents for a very short 
period of time. 
The new software add-on to St. Lydda’s internal database was supposed to ‘force’ consultants to fill 
in the relevant pieces of information of the e-pro-forma that the chief cardiologist wanted to cover. 
The competing objectives of various group members made it difficult to follow the action points. It 
was even more difficult to prepare training session and presentations. 
As goals began to shift, there was a distinct difference in what was being said about the end goals of 
the project.  The actual style of the minutes and the actions took on a different position. Now we 
have issues and actions rather than agenda items.  The language is of lists and tasks. Now we are 
getting other department involved in doing work.  Forging ahead with three strands of work: 
discharge summaries, CCC discharge lead clinic and pro forma to identify the ACS patients. This of 
course made it very difficult for clinicians to understand what they were learning to do differently.  
Which goal were they working towards learning?  
IT begins to feature as a component of the project. Lots of discussion about how to integrate the 
separate IT project into this whole ACS timeline. 
There was a change in the emphasis of the project. At this point the meeting ‘minutes’ began to 
resemble a ‘to do’ list. The layout changed to a table format. Each agenda item was accompanied by 
an action point, an owner, a date due, the dependencies and the ‘status’ whether open or closed. It 
hard to say whether this arrangement influenced the discussion or the other way round. But the 
meetings started to have the flavour of a girls’ scout meeting with the mothers reviewing who had 
to bake the cakes. It was no longer a strategic discussion but more of a working group to get things 
done. ‘Standing items on the agenda were now named ‘discussion points and featured at the bottom 
of the page. (see appendices for examples of changes in the structure of the meetings). 
In mid-2014, the discussion about changes to the Acute Coronary care pathway focused more and 
more on the e-pathway.  The group had not been successful in instituting a paper pro forma for ACS 
patients.  The majority of consultants and SHOs did not fill out the forms.  Physician consultants tried 
to keep form filling to an absolute minimum.   Patient care was still achieved at the highest level but 
it was dependent on the individual doctor or nurse.  Exactly the thing that lean was supposed to 
obviate.  
Politics are a natural part of organisations (Senge, 1990) and can be expressed at organisational level 
as part of strategic renewal (Dutta and Crossan, 2005; Jones and MacPherson; Vince, 2001) as well 
as a personal attribute in the form of political skill (Ferris, Treadway and Perrewe, 2007). In these 
studies, we saw Managers taking control of information in order to change the outcomes of the 
project. Project Managers had a desire to create new Lean systems.  Clinical Executives had a 
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number of reasons for orchestrating information: research aims and funding, creation of new 
facilities, heightening the profile of the project tor their own personal promotion.  The meeting 
‘agendas’ literally became the manager’s agendas.  Yet this was not unnoticed by staff members.  
Clinical staff could see that certain clinical executives ‘just wanted to do the project for his own 
research’.  Staff saw the agendas as being politically motivated and were not likely to fully change 
their behaviours.  
Figure 24 is to show the differences in the meeting agendas.  They are no longer agenda but simply 
action logs with names against different actions.  Managers are now just demanding that ‘their’ 
things get done and there is no longer any feedback discussion about what is going on.  
 




5.4 Barriers (2) Employee Expectations 
This aggregate dimension describes barriers of learning from the employee or individual perspective.  
I have used the heading Employee expectations to represent the mismatch between what employee 
anticipated or hoped would happen in the lean programmes to the actual outcome of events.  
Employees were often disappointed by the way they were treated by managers. The theme and 
concepts under this heading collate the perception of employees as they experienced lean and 
learning.  
 
5.4.1.Employee Silence  
This theme was created to describe the how employees were ‘holding back’ information and their 
enthusiasm for engaging in the new routines.  In meetings, clinical members would not voice all their 
concerns.  In some instance, I was aware that they were even withholding feedback about how the 
routines were working.  
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There are two kinds of silence: not saying what they believe, saying it and someone not hearing it. 
Without the ability to feel safe to challenge ideas, Employees ideas and worries are silenced. Even if 
they have the courage to say something, more senior ranking employees ignore or disparage 
(Miliken, Morrison and Hivelin, 2013; Blackman & Sadler-Smith, 2009; Morrison and Miliken, 2003 
Employees withdrew from the politically motivated process. Initial attempts were made to 
contribute to discussion about the project but were soon silenced.  A conscious effort on the part of 
nurses, HCAs and Admin to withhold their opinions was evident (Blackman and Sadler-Smith, 2009).  
Tacit knowledge was certainly lost to this void in information sharing. Future projects would not be 
able to benefit from experiential learning because there was not mechanism for silenced employees 
to share their explicit or tacit knowledge of ways of working.  
Below is an excerpt from field notes  from a conversation with an admin person who was not happy 
about not ‘being heard’.  She had difficulty understanding her part in the project and felt powerless 
to change. This powerlessness lead to here adopting a surface ‘do what’s necessary’ approach to 
learning the new system of recording patient data.  
Field Notes  
JGr left the organisation because she felt her complaints weren’t heard. 
She attempted to make sense of incomplete data and was asked to 
make a conclusion without relevant information. She felt that she 
couldn’t continue to do the job she was being asked to do. 
Employees actively refuse to acknowledge problems when they know or 
feel that something isn’t right with the work. They consciously supress 
tacit knowledge of the job in order to comply with the new methods. 
The perspective of ward nurses on the meetings and the progress of the 
project gave response such as this: 
 
Knowledge Ownership   
This theme describes how knowledge itself was used as a tool of domination.  There was conflict 
between the organisation and the individual in the ownership of knowledge.  This theme is 
concerned with the leverage of knowledge as a commodity in learning  
Although Knowledge can reside with an individual; it is through the sharing of and externalisation 
with team members that it becomes part of the organisation’s knowledge bank (Nonaka and 
Takeuchi 1995, Poyani, 1998).   Managers play a pivotal role in the balance of power.  Managing 
knowledge ultimately requires exerting control over the types of knowledge and how the knowledge 
is meted out amongst the members in the organisation. The power structure creates a conflict in the 
knowledge ownership (McCann and Buckner, 2004, Tseng and Fan, 2001).  The struggle over who 
owns the knowledge and who owns the right to access information to create knowledge, creates 
barriers to knowledge processes (McCann and Buckner, 2004; Rechberg and Syed, 2013).    
A natural conclusion would be to assume that the power resides only with the Manager.  A 
Foucauldian (Foucault 1977) reading of the situation would lead us to believe that managers hold 
personal power that allowed them to choose how and what knowledge is shared (Van Dijke and 
Poppe, 2006).  However, in this theme, the idea that employees hold power by withholding ideas 
and interpretations of data and new learning.  They use silence  (Blackman and Sadler-Smith 2009)as 
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a way of protecting their experiential knowledge. The silence was a method to exert some autonomy 
in not being controlled by the managers (Blackman and Sadler-Smith 2009; Van Dijke and Poppe, 
2006).   
I observed employees withholding their opinions in meeting sand withholding their natural 
experiential learning from the daily work on the wards. Silence was a way of gaining control over the 
situation.  It was as Blackman had suggested a ‘consciously withheld voice’ that prevents knowledge 
from being shared.  At the same time, Manager were restricting access to people with knowledge 
and basic data facts of knowledge.  Some clinical staff were not invited to meetings or given access 
to computer drives that held information on the Lean projects.    
Employees stayed silent about problems. They withdrew from the situation using defensive 
mechanisms (Argyris and Schon, 1978). . 
Field notes from a  conversation with a member of staff who was so upset about not having 
feedback during her part in the lean programme that she quit.  She felt she had been given an 
impossible task with no one to help her.  
Field Notes  
“They’ve asked me to do this. Enter the data but here isn’t any….no one 
will listen to me. I’m fed up. I’ve started looking for something else. I 
didn’t start on this project from the beginning. I don’t know what’s 
going on. I don’t tell them, I just stay quiet, I’m only telling you because 
you’re outside all this.  I just keep my head down and don’t go to the 
meetings and don’t say anything (Interview notes with JrG April 2013) 
Shortly before she left St. Lydda’s I caught up with JrG 
“I can’t stay here with all this going on. I’m invisible most of the time. 
They want something impossible. They want to me record something 
that isn’t there. There’s too much to do, too much to learn. All these 
crazy new procedures.” (Interview Notes with JrG) 
When problems surfaced, staff were discouraged from discussing them. The project manager made 
excuses at every ACS team meeting for why admin help wasn’t forthcoming, why the IT team 
couldn’t make the changes, the HRBP didn’t attend half the meetings and wouldn’t answer emails, 
the service manager didn’t give the project top priority. No permanent resolutions were given. 
In the meetings, the recorded notes had discussion altered. E.g. questions about the resources for 
CCC were tabled. KR asked HcM to speak to him ‘offline’ and those conversations hardly ever seem 
to happen. Information about what they were ‘really’ studying was discussed in hallways, closed 
offices, during coffee between ward nurses and SHOs but not brought up in the meetings. 
The Clinical Lead and Lead Registrar were enthusiastic about changes they were making. It wasn’t as 
if the meetings were entirely unpleasant they just didn’t focus on the content of the original project. 
The clinical lead had taken over the ACS theme for his own research benefit. Dissenters were 
discouraged from asking questions, information about IT changes were discussed between the 
senior project members (KR, HG, GMcS and JJ) without consent or knowledge from the others. At a 
subsequent meeting, AC, one of the IT specialists, would tell us that a change had been made.If I 
pressed the matter, The clinical lead, KR, would acknowledge that information was suppressed but 





This theme depicts the mini feedback loops that existed within the teams without using the 
knowledge from lean or the Project Managers.  It was a little microcosm of activity for learning.    
Feedback loops as conceived by Argyris (1980) in double loop learning describe the process of 
learning, adjusting and recalibrating knowledge based on feedback from previous experiences. 
Crossan’s (1999) conceptual framework describes a process of feedback between individuals and the 
group how they share their learning for new knowledge to be embedded into organisational 
routines.   In this case study, I examined corporate documents for evidence of the feedback between 
service project members and the clinical team members.  In addition, this theme contains data from 
field notes derived from conversation with clinical team members about the progress of learning and 
the feedback from managers.   
Double loop learning (Argyris, 2000) supports changes to our mental models of the world.  In order 
for learning to progress, linkages between the loops must be made both for our own individual 
mental models but also if we are to embed the learning into an organisation. Unfortunately, 
Individuals in organisations often see their own learning in an isolated way, disconnected from their 
team or department.    
Of course, all learning is essentially a feedback process.  Information is collected and used to revise 
decisions and form mental models for future use. However, the information gathering and 
interpretation are influenced by social practices.  Misperceptions of feedback and selective omission 
of feedback are detrimental to the discovery and interpretation of information necessary to embed 
learning (Sherman 1984, Bandura xxxx). The most basic feedback loop compares what we know 
about the state of the world to our current set of experiences (Schon, 1992; Womack and Jones, 
xxxx).  As we use our experiential learning, we understand that there are other influences to the 
feedback loop and it is more complex.  In this case study,  clinicians couldn’t fully use the reflections 
from experiential learning because the feedback loops were interrupted and didn’t flow back to the 
Service Improvement team. There were micro feedback between clinicians that developed ‘outside’ 
normal work information session but these were mostly about patients care; and how to avoid filling 
in forms.  
The streamlining of processes into specific protocols in modern healthcare contributes to this sense 
of isolation (Nutley and Davies, 2000).  Senge’s open systems thinking counters this isolation by 
teaching the merits of reintegrating activities and connect into communities of practice (Senge, 
1990; Brown and Duguid, 1991). The medical field was fond of using learning cycles to reflect and 
review patient outcome.  The (PDSA )Plan – Do- Study-Act cycles that were promoted as part of the 
medical Lean transformation have their basis in double-loop learning.   
Learning from good will meetings is essential but considered outside normal work day. Many of the 
project members described as “Got involved by chance” in the project itself.  Many felt that they had 
a moral imperative to help make the hospital more efficient.  They could all name instances where a 
patient hadn’t been identified as a cardiac patient when being admitted to hospital and while they 
couldn’t prove that the care was worse or better, they felt anecdotally it would have been better to 
have these patient all together.  They’d all had the experience of trudging through the hospital from 
ward to ward on a patient treasure hunt for their cardiac charges.  This was time consuming, 
baffling, confusing and sometimes heart wrenching when they would get to the bedside of patient 
whose liver had failed.   So this drove many of the clinicians to want to change the way patients were 
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recorded into the system when they first arrived.  They didn’t want to play the game of hide and 
seek once the patient had been seen in A&E. 
Figure 25 is a screen grab from the minutes on the discussion of the electronic ACs pro-forma.  Even 
though,  SHOs and Registrars were not using the paper form properly, the senior manager wanted to 
go ahead an commission the electronic form.  He was hoping to ‘encourage’ people to use the 
electronic form.  In other words staff would have no choice but to useit.  
 




These two excerpts display the outcome of conversations held within the smaller IT group of the ACS 
Lean project group.  This was a mini feedback loop of individuals who shared knowledge between 
them about the logo that was to be associated with the ACs programme and the pro forma for the 
GRAC scores.  These forms were for use in identifying patients as part of the cardiac programme.   
 
Politics of information flow 
 This theme covers the experiences of the team members and their descriptions of being able to 
access information, what information came to them from executives, service improvement project 
managers, and management consultants.  It describes the flow, of lack of flow of information.  It is 
important to the context of the case study because information acquisition (Huber, 1991) is 
fundamental to learning.  
Collaborative ventures between departments or projects that generate knowledge sharing add value 
to an organization (Hardy et al, 2003).  The effect of the collaboration should combine resources, 
ideas and transfer knowledge.  Transferring such knowledge can also be politically charged.   
Politics in organisations affect the movement of information and ideas (Lawrence et al, xxx, p182). 
“Organisations are political arenas in which multiple actors may be engaged in influence contests 
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aimed at acceptance of their own ideas” (Lawrence et al, p 185).  Assimilating new knowledge is 
affected by access to information and resources.   “Champions of ideas being interpreted need 
access to necessary resources” (Lawrence et al, p185).  Resources include expertise form other 
organisation members, Informal networks, electronic databases and organisation equipment.  In the 
case study organisation, the resource most restricted to the clinical staff on the ACS project were the 
informal networks and access to expertise.  Information seeking is an active part of information flow 
(Zeitsma et al, 2002 ).  In this study, information was important for handovers in ward rounds,  new 
procedures for capturing information about patients and new criteria for identifying types of 
patients.  For this to happen, there needed to be a shared norms and trust for your colleague’s 
information.   On an individual level, a person needs input from the group or organisation.   
In the field note, an example is given of how the staff members were not given information until 
after a new protocol had been instituted. Developing their own insights into a ‘new way of doings’ 
was hampered by their lack of information and lack of ownership.  The mechanical aspects of their 
jobs remain stable but the organisation was asking them to do use new routines to record their 
actions and decisions.   
 
Field Notes  
Staff member described not ‘owning’ the information about Lean or the 
new protocols they were ‘aware’ that ‘some kind of lean programme’ 
was going on but not part of it.  They saw the posters but didn’t feature 
into their everyday working patterns. Kaizen weeks were run but most 
staff had little involvement with it.  It was a select group.  Staff were just 
‘trying to keep our heads down’ and not get ‘mixed up with that’.  . 
The membership of the various lean groups, working groups, committees, training sessions was 
severely restricted. An unseen selection process took place. In the beginning to the project, 
individuals at highest levels of the organisation were invited to meetings to plan the activities of the 
new patient pathway. The first 3 meetings were attended by senior management: Chief executive, 
Chief Nurse, COO, etc. After those initial meetings, the standard list of attendees changes and access 
to shared drives on the hospitals network changed as well.  
 
Access to information 
This theme is more specific than the politics of Information flow and specifically concerns the 
permission to access information.  This idea of Permission extends to conversations, data drives and 
meeting minutes.     
Cyert & March (1963) observe that searches for information tend to be focussed on the vicinity of 
problems, symptoms or the current alternative. This idea has significance to understanding this 
theme in our case study.  Clincians were searching for information to resolve issues  of patient care 
but also how to reconcile the new Lean methods with the current ways of working.  
There was an uneven and unpredictable distribution of knowledge about projects and new ways of 
working. Cyert and March (1963) assumed that the search for knowledge and information tended to 
be focussed on problem solutions and remedies from past problems or current alternative options 
that are readily available.  The choice of information is greatly affected but the ‘source availability’. 
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The availability of information is fundamental to the ability for individual to engage in learning and 
create a knowledge store for the organisation’s routines (Grant, 1996).    Organisation members 
must determine the level of their colleagues expertise and readiness to share information to make a 
decision as to whether they seek information from them in future (Borgatti & Cross, 2003). 
“Knowing that someone else has valuable information is important but their expertise is really only 
helpful is they are accessible” (Borgatti and Cross, 1995, p 435).  Timeliness is also an issue.  For 
information to be of benefit it needs to be timely in order to help the individual learn to make new 
decisions. We rarely make informed decisions but rather satisfice (March and Simon 1995). Borgatti 
and Cross (1995) noted that as solutions become harder to find, the incidence of search reduces,  in 
other words,  people give up the search for new information when the access is difficult. Barriers can 
come in the form of technology or in the form of influence.  
Influence and force did not encourage individuals. Instead they hoarded information and built 
barriers to sharing across levels to project leaders and to colleague (Haldin-Herrgard 2000; Holstein 
and Field 2010). Learning and Information did not pass from Individual to group shared 
understanding. Status, power, and political struggle leads to uneven access to information. 
Although, rapid improvement events had workgroups comprising of employees at different levels in 
the organisation, information was not freely shared amongst them. These members did not always 
have the same access to resources. Meeting minutes and meeting membership show a clear 
demarcation between the ‘haves and have-nots’ in terms of access to information and decision 
makers. (Mura, Lettieri, Radaelli, & Spiller 2013; Waring, Curie, Compton and Bishop,2013).   
Information ownership and how knowledge is passed from one group to another was dependent on 
the willingness to share of more senior clinicians and management consultants. The information was 
held in the project leadership to the nurses or doctors who saw patients. 
 
The logical point of information flow for new members would have been Induction, but this was 
haphazard. The induction were meant to cover, among other things, the type of information needed 
for the ACS project and the best way to capture it in order to be able to assign cardiac patients to the 
most appropriate ward once their emergency procedures had been completed. However, SHOs 
rarely had a chance to exchange information freely amongst themselves. Their senior registrar or 
consultant would pass down the information and style of working to SHOs. This meant each SHO had 
a different way of interpreting pro formas and the goals of the ACS project. Throughout the study 
there was evidence that the information stated at different levels and was used by more senior 
managers to control less senior clinical and admin staff. 
Below is the example where the SHOs explain in a training session that they don’t where to get their 
information from and who to ask about using the new Pro forma 
Field Notes 
The SHOS told us that “My reg tell me to…. And the senior nurse told 
me to…” the SHOs were being trained by nurses on the ward and the 
emergency room.  Because of the working time directive, the SHOs 
have very little contact with each other. They just do what the sister in 
charge tells them to do or their shift registrar. Very little learning of 
new methods is taking place. 
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Meetings were outside work hours so it made it difficult ot compare information and the 
information take on a superfluous, unneeded quality like it wasn’t part of the mainstream of 
knowledge.  
 
Supression of Challenge 
This theme describes the ways in which more senior managers suppressed question from clinical 
staff about the evolution of the Lean projects.  An essential part of learning is asking questions.  The 
experience for many of the clinical members of the lean projects was an absence of freedom to ask 
questions.  Without the ability to have a dialogue of two way communication, the learning from the 
lean projects suffered. It is difficult to change anything when one does not know the basic 
information about the change itself.  
Psychological safety to able to ask questions is one component of change and learning (Tucker and 
Edmonson,200).  Without asking questions and open communications the organisation is in danger 
of supressing natural curiosity.  Even worse, Organisational silence ( Morrison and Miliken, 2000) can 
create destructive cycles of behaviour.  This kind of passive behaviour can lead to inaction and 
defensiveness (Argyris and Schon, 1978). It also creates a cognitive dissonance between what 
employees are willing to say publicly and what they believe privately or with close colleagues.  
Organisaitonal silence (Morrison and Miliken, 2000;  Blackman and Sadler-Smith) restricts the 
dynamic feedback between team members needed to present for organisational learning to take 
place. If employees refuse to ask question again new knowledge (Huber 1991), then no knowledge 
sharing (Nonaka, 2003) can take place.  
The whole project shifted to be about documentation not the work itself (KK) as one of the 
participant in the lean programme moaned. Below is an excerpt from my field notes diary after a 
coffee break with JGr.  She was the second admin support for the project 
In addition, nurse and clinicians felt ‘silenced’ and over shadowed by the slick presentations given by 
the CG. While the senior management was propagating and extoling the successes and ideas of the 
CG, the rest of the project team was struggling to have a voice in the feedback and to understand 
how this new system would fit with patient care. 
The process of interpreting the information about the lean projects needed to happen on an  
individual level but needed input from the group or organisation.  In the example below from the 
meeting minutes except, the staff members were not given information until after a new protocol 
had been instituted. Developing their own insights into a ‘new way of doings’ was hampered by their 
lack of information and lack of ownership. The mechanical aspects of their jobs remain stable but 
the organisation was asking them to use new routines to record their actions and decisions. The 
‘pro-formas’ were an invention of one of the managers but these were not introduced to the 
organisation in ways that encouraged intuition amongst the staff   
Below the document describes how the group continues to have trouble in getting people to even  
receive pro forma or fill it out.  
Below is a corporate document from a project meeting.  
1. ACS Proforma 
There is a gap in the numbers of proformas being distributed and the 
numbers being reported to the ACSPathway inbox. There were also 
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reports that some of the consultants (visiting and substantive) are 
resistant to completing the proformas. ZA reported addressing the 
issue with colleagues, but this needs to be reiterated by other 
consultant colleagues on the group. 
KT reported that she had pulled ten sets of notes which should have 
held proformas. Of these, only 6 included proformas, and of these 6 
none were completed in full. HG suspected that compliance varied 
depending on it being a weekday, weekend or bank holiday. 
 
 
The group agreed that it was important to work towards achieving full compliance. Changes have 
been suggested to the proforma which will, again, slim it down and support compliance. The 
message should also be continued to be enforced that these will eventually move to being electronic 
documents and therefore they will have to be completed in order to proceed to printing the 
discharge summary. 
The proforma should be modified to include ‘day two ward round’ and ‘day three ward round’ with a 
prompt at day two to remind the completer to check the results. CS highlighted an issue with 
patients who go from ACS to surgery as coming off the ACS pathway. It was suggested that Nora, 
surgical pathway nurse, would be well placed to track these patients to ensure they remain on the 
ACS pathway. It was also suggested that the ACS discharge summary should be done with the 
surgical discharge summary. 
The Clinical Project chair liked to use words like ‘enforce’ or ‘check up on’. He didn’t probe as to 
underlying reasons for non-compliance or commitment to the project. He just stated his own 
interpretation of how the methods should be instituted and expected others to follow. None of the 
other staff members mentioned in this action points list was given an opportunity to discuss how 
changes could be achieved or what they have learned.  
5.4.2.  Ennui: Malady of Malaise 
This next section describe the themes that support this 2nf order theme of ennui.  Staff member 
were getting very tired of change.  As the previous sections have shown, lean was beginning to take 
on negative connotations.  People interest was waning in the prospects of success.  Clinicians no 
longer felt that it was helping with their patient outcomes.   
 
Waning Interest 
This theme has roots in both psychological commitment theories and in the learning theories.  Huber 
(1991) expressed the idea of Information overload, whereby units in an organisation could not cope 
with all the information given to them.  It resulted in a kind of paralysis.  The evidence form the case 
study organisation was that the Lean programme was difficult to follow because of the pressure to 
adhere to complicated instructions I now to perform old tasks in a new way.  The desire to continue 
using the established methods of working may also been part of escalation of commitment strategy 
(Vermeulen and Sivanathan, 2017).  People may reinforce decisions in order to keep the status quo.  
In a similar vein to the explanations of defensiveness that Argyris and Schon (1978) discuss as part of 
decision making and learning.  There may also be an element of fear to loss aversion that employees 
129 
 
do not want to lose what they already know how to do. Additionally, there may also be an element 
of fear of change (Kotter and Schlesinger, 2008).  A classic resistance to change is to involve 
individuals in the change itself.  However, in this case study, I observed a lack of interest in change 
and a lack of interest in participation.  
I witnessed a waning interest for lack of belief in the new methods.  Change fatigue set in after initial 
changes are made. When suggestions from staff are not acted on they feel as though they are part 
of the process. They are just there to carry out orders and not think. If they see a discrepancy in 
what is being claimed has changed and improved and what they believe has changed and improved, 
they will stop trying to help with the change. Often senior managers talked about how many benefits 
were being realised but the photograph below shows a clear pattern of waning interest. The first 
few months had a flurry of activity and then it drops off. 
Figure 25 is a picture of the improvement board showing a drop off in projects. Only the first four 
columns are filled in and this about a year into the tranformations.  Fewer things were being 
recorded and fewer things were beig done.  






This theme further explores the difficulty that St. Lydda’s had in changing mind-sets about the Lean 
methods.  Many managers underestimate the variety of ways that people will invent to resist a 
change (Kotter and Shlesinger, 2008). Initiative Fatigue is one of the prime causes of failure of a 
change (Bamford and Forrester, 2003)  
 Managers themselves often resist participation in their own employees.  This has been seen in 
earlier themes describing restricting access to information and the political obstacles to the flow of 
information in the workplace.  
The ‘best practice’ in change programmes is that the change will be monitored by a senior executive 
or a project manager.  There would be a feedback mechanism for employees to air concerns and 
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grievances (Buchanan et al, 2005). But no one is monitoring the change then how can employees 
gain accurate experiential learning form it?  When do they know that they change has occurred?  
(Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). In addition, Change can sometimes focus people on their own self 
interest and create conditions for burnout (Buchanan et al, 2005). Employees engaged in self-
preservation mechanisms of closing ranks and doing just enough with the new forms to satifsy the 
lean project managers.   The change itself is often viewed as a valuable learning tool but only for 
those who can exploit the change experience (Buchanan et al 2008).  
The experience of staff at St. Lydda’s was one of isolation from the information.  Different levels of 
the organisation had information at different times.  The select group of ‘lean experts’ designed new 
forms and patient pathways with very little input from anyone else.  
Below is a brief excerpt from an interview notes with one of the clinical leads. He tells of the 
committee informing him that there would be a change.  He was striving to be enthusiastic but he 
couldn’t hide the sarcasm from his explanation.  Other previous change attempts in the hospital 
were viewed cynically and this latest Lean method project was seen in a similar light.  
Interview Notes  
ME: how would describe how were first introduced to the idea of new 
pathway or RCP? 
FM: Steering group committee which informed me that we were going 
to have a rapid change/lean/improvement programme.  The usual 
plethora of titles but that we would focus on paediatrics……Originally 
the focus was on the day ward, admitting 
Me: What did you think that mean 
FM: Weeeeelll truthfully,  having had 3 previous attempts at change, 
we didn’t have a lot of time for it….  ….Previous improvement 
programmes, which in my opinion,  had been farcical, directionless, 
didn’t really change anything for anyone,  de-motivational, my 
enthusiasm was immense (said sarcastically)……..but we haven’t got 
that engagement to go back to them again and again…….They need a 
radical re-haul…..In a ward that wasn’t as in flux that didn’t have the 
issues, the changes aren’t as obvious…..there so much else going on,  
the changes needs to be seen as a priority (shrugs)……Head consultant 
goes to ward everyday,  give news of the day……..but we are not 
getting to all the staff 
 
Staff interest in the Lean initiatives varied greatly.  As the clinical lead explained in the interview, 
many other projects had been attempted but never completed fully.  The well known consulting 
group spear heading this particular change programme with Lean was sanctioned at the highest 
levels of the organisation.  Therefore, clinical leaders, at the outset, showed a modicum of interest. 
However, even this level of interest could not be maintained.  
There seems to be a message that not all staff are engaged in the learning and it’s difficult to 
institutionalise the best practice.  
Disinterest in a dishonest programme 
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This theme describes the lack of trust on the part of clinical team members.  Trust is a vital part of 
learning (tucker and Edmondson, 2003; Edmondson & Moignenen, 1999). Collaboration in teams is 
essential for knowledge sharing to take place; one of the fundamental building blocks of learning.  
This themes describes the scepticism surrounding the Lean programme.  Clinical members didn’t feel 
able to ask questions, or promote their own ideas as mentioned in earlier themes.  The disinterest in 
lean manifested itself as: distrust, conflict, silence, and withdrawal from group interpretation.  
Levin and Cross (2004) described the term ‘receipt of useful knowledge’ as having a positive impact 
on a knowledge seekers in their daily work.   Without useful knowledge the teams cannot advance 
their practice of medicine, and without trust, knowledge isn’t likely to be shared.  
Lewecki’s et al (1995) conceptualization of distrust helps us to understand the disinterest in the new 
Lean programme efforts at St. Lydda’s.  Trust in management declined because of perceived 
injustices or failures to maintain integrity in organisational structures (Lewick et al 1995, Morgan and 
Zeffane 2003)   
Conflict in organisations is often studied with a focus on static transactional exchanges but the 
management of conflict is often set in complex multi-faceted relationships as was the example in our 
case study organisation. Beyond personal trust is the concept of Institutional trust in organised 
systems (Zucker 1986).  Employees must generalise their personal trust to large organisation made 
up of individual with whom they have low familiarity, low interdependence, and low continuity of 
interaction (Lewicki et al 1995).  
Trust can be further breached when a change is introduced into the organisation. “the trust and 
safety needed to engage open participation in a learning process is hard to build but easy to 
destroy” (Carroll & Edmondson, 2002, p.55).The teams need to have a ‘psychological safety’ in order 
to be able to learn.  Psychological safety is central to learning behaviour.  Without safety or trust,  
very little learning will take place and much less will be embedded into the organisation’s routines. 
Trust ‘enables the willing contribution of oneself – one’s ideas and actions- to collective work.’ 
(Edmondson, 2003). A learning ‘anxiety’ can occur when expectations are not met and prevents 
productive learning behaviour (Edmondson, 2003)‘Feedback-seeking’ was a behaviour identified by 
Edmondson (2003) as essential for successful task completion and embedding of routines. When 
people are under threat, they revert to defensive routines (Argyris, 1990) and sabotage their own 
organisation’s learning. Relational and structural characteristics of social capital are essential for the 
receipt of tacit knowledge. (Levin and Cross 2004).  
The field notes below illustrate Some clinicians and project staff expressed dissatisfaction with the 
Lean programme.  They felt the achievements were overstated and that routine patient care was not 
recognised as it should be.  
Field Notes  
“It’s a side project, we are still giving good care (KR) Of course patient 
safety was paramount but we could have gone about it in a different 
way and where I sit we were already doing the medical bit” Interview 






5.4.3 Patience Tested 
This second order theme is about how staff felt that their contribution was being put to the limit.  
They’re expected to use their good will to come in for meetings before their work day began.  As a 
group, they felt that their voice was not heard. It was difficult for team members to exchange 
information because the meeting were being held at inconvenient times to fit into daily work. Lean 
began to feel like an extra thing to do.    
Voice of Groups  
This theme was created to explore the barriers to learning from the silos that were created by 
limited sharing of opinions and knowledge.  Clinical members of the rapid change projects found 
themselves isolated form the main stream knowledge of the service improvement groups.  In 
previous themes, we have explored the lack of information flow and the political nature of inclusion 
in meeting sand privileges to access. This is theme is about the ‘voice’ of each group not being heard.  
The perception from employees, both clinical and administrative that their ‘group’ was not listened 
to for their feedback and experiential learning.  
Employees often complain about not getting information from other groups or project teams.  
Information about new lean projects is passed to them after implementation.  Out of date 
information frustrates the teams and they waste time trying to obtain new data.  The clinical teams 
then focus inward on the daily work of the wards and create stories amongst themselves.  
Isolation in and inward focus in the teams tends to create silos making interaction between team 
members and other teams very difficult (Senge, 1990; Vakola and Bourdas, 2005). With continued 
silo behaviour leads to silence as defined by Pinder and Harlos (2001). The focus is on silence as an 
act of withholding one’s true expression about the organisation.  In this case study, this idea of 
silence spread from individuals to their defined groups, i.e. ward nurses, project team members,  
cardiology technicians.   
‘Speaking up’ is a term used in the healthcare profession to define a behaviour about concern for 
patient safety.  There is a professional expectation to raise concerns about risks and mistakes.  
(Okuyama, Wagner & Bijnen, 2014).  While ‘speaking up’ is thought of as an individual act.  Is the 
start of sharing concerns with co-workers and team members.  This often leads to group discussion 
and to dissent.   
In a time of change, there is more pressure for expressing concerns.  Information about the new 
system can easily be lost.  Trouble shooting the initial problems of a new system may become 
impossible because not enough feedback from raised concerns I available to provide a complete 
learning loop.   
The perspective of ward nurses was that the voice of different groups was not heard.  Employees 
actively refuse to acknowledge problems when they know or feel that something isn’t right with the 
work. They consciously supress tacit knowledge of the job in order to comply with the new methods.   
The perspective of ward nurses on the meetings and the progress of the project gave response such 
as this:  
Interview Notes  
“KR wanted to use the data for his own research.  We knew how to do 
our jobs or (huffs) so we though…. we know some of our patients are 
not getting into cardiac rehab but the vast majority are. We do the 
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discharge plans but if the consultants and registrars don’t support us, 
we can’t change the process.  There’s a mismatch between what we do 
and what KR says we do.  But who is going to say that OUT loud? Not 
me? “ (Notes from Interview with CNZ June 2013)   
 
This comment was made just after an ACS team meeting in which CNZ had hardly spoken.  She’d 
answered a few direct questions but hadn’t given her true assessment of the situation. Staff didn’t 
feel able to give their feedback to more senior executives, project managers or clinicians.  The true 
picture of the work and its processes was not being shared amongst the group and certainly not with 
senior staff.  
Another nurse commented on the struggle to keep the project on track for its original intention of 
getting patients in to cardiac rehab: 
 
“Now they are talking about cutting back on the cardiac rehab.  The 
gym will be divided in two and they are making room for more offices 
(shakes her head in disbelief) the whole point of the project was get 
more people in to rehab but now they are cutting back.  It’s just goes to 
show you that they aren’t committed to this.  They want to show that 
they’ve done something not actually do something. Well I’ll just shut up 
and do my job and not say anything because that’s how we get along. 
I’ll learn my new GC methods and smile just like everyone else. (shrugs 
her shoulders)” notes from meeting with CS) 
 
“How are we supposed to send a patient down from the ward to rehab 
when there will be less available space? Who can talk about this?  Who 
can ask this questions? There’s nobody.  I can’t say anything because 
the person who should be helping me is the one who is making 
changes. So we just do our work he best we can and keep ourselves to 
ourselves” (Notes from meeting with KKO) 
 
In these examples, employees express a sense of being silenced by circumstance of the project.  
They haven’t been able to share feedback or interpret learning in the projects. The learning of lean is 
just a done to satisfy the project not to change behaviour or to make a new cognitive connection.  
 
Goodwill over stretched  
This theme describes the how employees felt their willingness to do extra work was exploited.  
There exists a great deal of ‘goodwill’ in the NHS.  Clinical team members generally stay late or come 
in early to ensure that all necessary work is achieved.  However during the Lean programme, the 
level of commitment being asked of the team members rose significantly.  The additional burden of 
Lean created ill will amongst the clinical team members. This resentment had an impact on learning 
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because is was the lean programme was connected to the new ways of doing things and employees 
simply did not have enough energy to explore a new way of working for themselves.  
Limited resources in the NHS has results in clinical staff having to do more in of their good will or 
OCB.  It has benefited the management of the organisation in terms of the workload accomplished 
through sheer extra effort.  Organisations often depend on extra ordinary effort on the part of 
employees.  OCB proposes the gestures of goodwill’ are exchanged between employees and the 
organisation (Mohammed, Habib and Alvas, 2001).  
Hopkins (2002) concept of reciprocity helps explain the expectation of employees.  OCB has been 
linked to motivation and learning (Somech, Drach-Zahaay, 2004).  Organisations rely on individual 
who encourage change regardless on their position within the organisation.  Behaviour that exceeds 
the job requirements are crucial to organisational change programme’s success... (Brief and 
Motowildo, 1986; Katz and Kahn, 1966).  
Organisational citizenship behaviour is context-related to our case study in that it affects the 
mechanisms of change in organisation. The attitude towards change affects whether the Lean 
programme would be successful and whether any change in behaviour was learned. “Organisational 
learning as a relative property of organisations that denotes the extent to which an organisation’s 
members actively use data to guide behaviour and promoted ongoing adaptation of the 
organisations (Edmondson & Moignen, 1998, p9). The Organisational learning approach posits both 
contextual, cultural and structural facets.  The structural affects consist of organisational 
mechanisms which are institutionalised procedural arrangements or informal practices that allow 
the organisation to collect, analyse, store and disseminate useful information that is relevant to the 
daily performance or its members (Popper and Lipshitz, 2000).   
Concrete arenas in which experiences of individuals organisation members are first analysed and 
shared by others and then become the property of the entire organisation either through time or 
distribution of lessons to relevant units  or through changes in standard operating procedures 
(Popper and Lipshitz, 2000).  
Below are examples from Field notes that describe how work on core projects in the lean change 
programme were accomplished outside the normal work pattern for the clinical team members.  
Figure 26 is a portion of the minutes from an ACS project team meeting.  Its shows the dates of the 
next meeting.  The meetings were held before work at 8am.  The project members came in before 
their official day started.  This was an extra hour of work for them.  






Below the field notes express the sentiments of the team having these meetings before or after 
work.  
Field notes  
Meetings are not part of business day – seen as good will on part of 
participants but information needs to be used to complete job.  One of 
the matrons recounted: “Meetings are before and after work – it’s not 
part of the normal routine”.  There was an expectation that the project 
group would run itself, with the support of the project manager.  
However, it was the team members who had to organise the printing of 
pro formas, the education of the nurses and SHOs, registrars.  The 
breakdown came when the senior physicians did not want to change 
their work procedures and include this new way of working.  
 
The project team created a shared purpose for themselves.  Their 8am meetings kept them together 
as a tight unit discussing their ideas for their cardiac patients and general working of the hospital.  
Often team members went for coffee afterwards and organised evenings out.  This camaraderie 
translated into knowledge shared outside the normal channels of working around managers.  It was 
also the feedback mechanism that the project group used for progress on achievements and changes 
to the project.  The normal channels of email and minutes were only part of the picture. There was a 
heavy reliance on goodwill.  In other words, the informal shared knowledge and taking on extra 
responsibilities to get the project finished. The information is seen as extra but needed to do the job.  
However important the project seemed to be, the responsibilities for meetings and the project work 
were outside the main work day.  Although many resources such project managers, HR business 
partner, service manager were assigned to the project;  no priority was given to the time it took to 
pass information train staff or devise the plans.   Everything was left to chance and the group's own 
natural ability to communicate and share knowledge.  
 
5.5. Integration of the Myth  
This theme relates how St. Lydda’s used ‘stories’ to great ‘myths’ about Lean and about the hospital.  
St. Lydda’s executives and Projects lead used stories as symbolic objects and action (Burke, 1996).  
Organisational myths and stories are vehicles for communications (Kay, 1993, 1994).  Brown (1992) 
and Boje (1991) have argued that stories and myths are not only important tools for learning but 
also powerful media for bringing about changes in people and culture in the workplace. The telling 
of stories involves heroic archetypes that serve as exemplars or role models for people in systems.  
Myths are ‘inspiring and instructive stories’ (Engleberg, 2013).  The narrative of the stories can 
encourage risk tasking or adherence to rules.  
Stories also help employees make sense (Weick, 1979, Bruner,1992) of the past action of the 
organisation and guide predictions for the future. The Myths in our case study support the ‘Lean 
spell’ of success. The Corporate stories created signposts for vision, values and strategy. Thereafter, 
personal stories help to share knowledge and ideas about Lean and its use. The Myths then develop 
trust and commitment to share tacit knowledge and facilitate both learning and unlearning. Truly, 
136 
 
the essence of knowledge sharing is story making.   “A story is a tiny fuse that detonates in the mind 
of the listener” (Institute for Knowledge Management (1999) as quoted in Soule, 2002).  
Integration of the myth portrays the ideas of the organisation ‘behaving in a defensive way in order 
to promote a specific idea of Lean as the means of success for the hospital.   Deceptive narratives 
were created to encourage employees to think of lean positively  and to downplay any negative 
outcomes of the lean projects.  The dichotomy between the myth and the daily work of employees 
created a barrier to learning are in a number of ways within the organisation.  
Figure28    is from a PowerPoint presentation given to project members and clinicians about 
feedback on a lean project. This is an example where a more balanced view of the positives and 
negatives is given. However,  it is just one example against many of the positive examples given.   
 




5.5.1. Public Belief in Data 
This theme converges on psychological theory of heuristics and adjusts in decision-making in what 
information is taken in to assimilate into new learning. Crossan (1999) & Huber (2991) both describe 
processes by which people acquire information in the first step in embedding new knowledge.   
Cognitive biases in seeking information creates initial dichotomy in evaluation of which information 
is used or not to create new knowledge (Slusher and Anderson, 1996).  Humans need to have a 
plausible cause and effect (Epley and Gilovich, 2006).  People seek to make their judgements are 
certain as possible and therefore needed data to base their decision on representative heuristics 
(Tversky & Kahneman). This theme used the idea of Public record of the truth, i.e. public versus 
private interpretations.  The public story is the accepted story.  
Competing accounts of organisational actions threaten public belief in data (Beech, Macphail and 
Coupland, 2009).  Stories are used to gain legitimacy (Currie and Brown, 2003).  People tell a story to 
make sense of their experience or the organisation and change (Brown and Humphreys, 2003;  
Gabriel 2004).  They also point toward future behaviours ( Ybema, 2009).   
Paradoxes contest the stories of change (Lewis, 2000).  Knowledge of the outcome is inherent in the 
judgment of hindsight. Clinical epidemiological studies have a strong link with relying on backward 
looking reviews of data.  In other words, the story fits the data that has already been presented.  In 
this case study, CG acted in this way to present data that fit the story.  
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Levitt and March (1988) referred to organisational learning as history-dependent.  In this way,  the  
historical data provided by CG became the platform for learning about lean.  Furthermore, in 
Huber’s (1991) notion of information was referring to data in a from that ‘reduced ambiguity and 
uncertainty.  Data supported beliefs that encouraged cause-effect relationship  and those were re-
interpreted as ‘know-how’.  
This example for this theme highlights assumptions being made by the organisation in its use of 
language when presenting data to other executives and  financial decision- makers.  The public story 
was creating a service improvement team to improve patient care. The paradigm of the narrative 
was to present a positive change (Beech, MacPhail & Coupland , 2009 Antocoupoulou, xxx).     
However, the CG use income ranks versus patient care; In selecting the ICP CG  ‘presented an 
analysis of Trust Data to support selection of the pathway and collectively agree the are area for the 
work’.  CG had full access to the trusts SLAM (service level agreement measurement) data.  This data 
is used to determine repayment of Tariffs from the authorising agency, e.g. CCG (Commissioning 
Care Group).  CG would not fully explain how they selected the data.  They did not use all years and 
all patients.  They used selected months from the previous 5 years of data for each morbidity.  For 
example, Congestive Heart Failure, they kept in tight age ranges and time frames without readmits.    
There was a tendency to over-state the successes and ignore any problems.  The consulting group 
did stay  in the hospital very long and therefore did not follow the groups to see if sustainable 
change had been made or if the learning had indeed been embedded in the organisation.  
The Hospital continued its theme of portraying itself as an exemplar for Lean methodology.  The 
hospital ran a ‘Perfect Week’ exercise.  This exercise involves observations on every single ward for 
every single shift for a week.  Various data are collected on discharge times, bed moves, patient wait 
times, patient transport, discharge lounge, communication between department e.g. A&E and 
Wards) etc.   
Figure 28 Below is a photo of part of a form that was used for data collection in the ‘The Perfect 
Week’.  It’s a bit tongue and cheek but it showed hoe as project members, people were seeing he 
ridiculous in the Lean projects.  The staff were asked to note every thing that happened on a ward 
and this person wrote ‘patient died and left’…. We laughed when we saw it thinking maybe the 
person flew away on their wings.  
 








One version of the truth  
 This theme explores the phrase used in the hospital during the Lean programme ‘one version of the 
truth’.  It is in fact a tag line from a national software provider that specialised in medical data.   
In software technology the ‘single version often truth (SVOT) refers to the data storage principle to 
always source a particular piece of information for one place (King, 2003).  In this case study, St. 
Lydda’s had hired a software company to produce an add-on software package to search for HF 
patients.  This list created by this software programme would be considered the definitive ‘truthful’ 
list of patients.   
However, in order to be able to cope with mountains of data facts and lists people rely on narrative 
structure.  The narrative construction and reconstruction (Rhodes and Brown 2005) build a platform 
for management storytelling on which to base future decisions and hierarchies of power.   
Some stories contain facts.  Such facts are not always straightforward (Connell, 2003; Gabriel, 2004) 
and can be influenced by outsiders.  
‘Truth’ becomes based on specific pieces of information that behave been distilled from narrative 
constructions and used as a representation for the whole.  This representativeness heuristics (Epley 
& Gilovich, 2006) skews the tacit knowledge that becomes embedded in the organisation.  
There was cherry picking of data and interpretation of AC patient and CR percentage uptake.  Yet the 
software develop company would report that he had one version of the truth.  This was reported in 
public meetings and presentations.   
The senior maanger felt that the Software company could deliver a ‘one version of the truth’ about 
patient data.  The Software company’s website claimed to be able to do that using the tag line ‘one 
version of the truth’.  
This is a combination of notes from a software meeting and comments made after the meeting.  The 
nurses were annoyed because the focus of the meetings was on the software and not on the original 
intent of the project. 
Field Notes  
From CCG meeting    From Publication material of SoftwareCo EHR  PR  
An extension of the St Lydda’s One Version of the Truth diagnostic work 
had been requested through the System Resilience Group. This phase of 
work would be over a six week period, after which it would be 
embedded as part of the wider system. The request was agreed– 
funding for the work was paid through national penalties applied to the 
SGH contract with the cost split across organisations. 
The focus was lost ‘because some of the consultants used this project to 
further their own ideas’ (HM) “ Every time we meet it seems the project 
shifts to the next flavour of the month” (HM). “We are just trying to our 
jobs as best we can, it doesn’t help the CG comes in and tell us that we 
have to learn to do our jobs differently”(HM). “I’m not really sure the 
point of having CG here, we know all this already but some managers 
139 
 
want to keep control over us and make us do things in a certain way” 
(KK). 
The topics of the meetings changed over time as well as the content. In the beginning the meetings 
were focussed on cardiac rehab and getting more patients into that track. They also focussed on the 
measurements of rehab to gain financial reward from increased numbers of patients going to rehab 
in hospital rather than as just follow up. But as you will see in other examples, The Pro forma were 
not being filled out correctly. The data was often incorrect. The data validity and reliability was 
always in question as an aggregate set of data. Individual decisions about patient treatment were 
maintained through good clinical practice but not as an overall system. 
Public statements became the focus of the project. Any results that differed from the publicly state 
goals were supressed or presented in a way that gave the hospital a more favourable view.  
 
5.5.2. Myths Stories and Lies 
This theme concentrates more fully on the myth itself rather than the integration of the myth into 
routines and work. In theme ‘Integration of the myth’, I explore how the myth influenced beliefs and 
learning.  This theme is about the myths themselves.  
Myths are described as a means through which routine and ritual were understood (O’Gorman, 
Gillepsie, 2010)  stories are used to strengthen and revitalise current norms and methods.   
Storytelling can be powerful persuasion, free to disseminate throughout an organisation and stories 
help employees to make sense of what is happening the organisation (Weick, 1995;  Gabriel,  2004). 
Stories are not merely arguments and counterarguments but a distillation of events or facts that are 
given credibility.  Storytelling translates the dry numbers into something coherent and compelling.  
The Stories encourage people to act in unfamiliar ways. Narratives cope with emergent phenomena 
and phase changes that are by nature unpredictable.  When stories reach an ‘epic’ statu , they 
become myths in the  organisation.  They have even greater influence over the organisation’s 
culture.  Myths then give rise to the archetypes in the organisation and those ideas are reinforced.  
The stories and publicly declared ideas of an organisation help employees to form an idea of how 
they should act and carry out their responsibilities.  
Story telling in organisations is not new (Gabriel, 2004). St. Lydda, in particular, used stories to create 
an image of improvement and efficiency (Gioia & Chttipeddi, 1991; Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007).  They 
wanted to create a sense of excitement and change. Public presentations, posters, plasma screens 
with rolling vignettes about Lean achievements were placed around the hospital. Lean awareness 
became part of the Induction for new employees. Ideas for new projects were solicited form 
employees (Flinchbaugh 2008; Hu, et al 2016 ).  St. Lydda’s relied on the external influencers to 







Figure 29 illustrate ACS financial model as created by CG. The reality is that CG made adjustments to 
data to maximise the producing examples showing that CG had been successful in reducing LoS and 
increasing tariff recovery.  However, it is likely that this was a faulty assumption model.   
Figure 29 are excerpts from the data models used by CG.   
 
 
Conflicting clinical Self Image    
This theme describes the quandary expressed by some of the clinicians in the teams.  the 
phenomenon that they held a role as a clinician and a role as administrator but also a role a change 
champion for the Lean project.  The priorities and outcome for those roles were often at odds with 
each other.  
On an individual level, employees need to see themselves in the narrative of the organisation.  Their 
social identity as part of the myth and the stories of the organisation are as important as their formal 
role.  Schon’s idea of the reflective practitioner that an individual pays attention to their own actions 
which informs behaviours and continuous learning. Clinician’s’ jobs have an inbuilt mechanism for 
reflection in their work and through review of medical charts.  The medical tradition of a Mortality 
and Medical review embeds the idea of reflecting on practice in to the role of clinician. The medical 
profession is highly compelling and constantly developing new starts and about disease and its 
treatment. While they are many instances of positive feedback, the work also involves uncertainty 
and emotional intensity.  
Reflection helps improve practice and identifies opportunities to improve quality and patient safety. 
The GMC education standards advises clinicians to use a simple method of so what (feelings and 
now what (doing).  
Thinking focusses on processes and particular details of the cognitive aspect of learning in medical 
treatment.  The feeling ascribes values and emotion to the experience, in other words the 
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behavioural aspects of the learning. The doing aspect identifies which future action ought to take 
place.  
This is how clinicians produce their claim as a competent medical professional.  Treating patients 
requires more than just tending to the physical aspects of the disease, the appointments, the 
procedures.  It’s about mapping the patient’s progress in every aspect from physical to mental or 
administratively.  
Being part of bureaucratic organisation, the legitimacy of the clinicians does not carry over into their 
administrative duties. Physicians are trained to lead decision making where they understand the 
parameters but very little is done to teach them financial and business acumen.  Medical 
professionals often see administrators as being on the ’other side’ of the equation to treating 
patients. The idea of lean was viewed with scepticism by those who regarded their role to be purely 
medical. 
Figure 30 is part a PowerPoint to show how well the clinicians were doing in t arms of liaising with 
GPs.  It was important to clinicians to show what progress was being Meade medically.   




5.5.3. Fads and fashion  
This theme is related to myths and stories themes but focusses on the notion that Lean was a trendy 
fad.  Myths and stories have long lasting effects on organisations, but fads also influence. Fads 
create excitement and encourage change by creating a buzz around new methods and ideas.    
Fads are attractive to consultants and managers for their simplicity and their energy.   Management 
fashion has usually gained momentum because of a particular problem within an industry and a 
neatly packaged story presented to an organisation’s executive (Miller and Hardwick, 2002).  Fads 
rely in part on storytelling, an essential part of persuading others to change in the organisation, as 
previously mentioned in other themes. Fads tend towards the perspective and universal ‘one size fits 
all’ instructing the organisation in how to solve problems.  Fads also bring high hopes with their 
energetic seemingly easy problem solving. Management Gurus give credibility to fads by 
perpetuating the success stories from other organisations or projects.   
Abrahamson (1991, 1996) and Abrahamson and Fairchild (1999) suggested that organisations follow 
consultants firms and management gurus by adopting their fads & fashions.  Organisations facing 
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uncertainty look to external validators such as management consultants for answers.  Without clear 
direction or strategy, organisation executives follow the fashion.  These decisions can’t be explained 
by rational choice.  There are psycho-social factors that influence when, why and how to adopt new 
management techniques.   
Management fashion is explained as ‘largely cultural phenomenon’, gravitating towards a simplistic 
answer to current organisation problems.  Abrahamson and Fairchild (1999) posit that over time the 
management fashion will decline in use and new fashions will emerge.  The diffusion on the 
innovation introduced by the fashion depends on its fitness for purpose to the organisation.  Some 
fashions are adopted and do change with the organisation but they may change name or focus.   
An important aspect of management fashion raised by Abrahamson & Fairchild) was the idea that 
there is a ‘market for discourse’.  The discourse belonging to the fashion will contain jargon, labels 
and technique s which enable the organisation to meet its goals.  This is progressive and changes 
over time, examples like Quality Circles and TQM.  These labels are metonyms for the actions and 
organisational culture change that takes place.   
St. Lydda’s gravitated toward Lean as a methodology because its popularity had increased among 
Public Sector and NHS facilities (Abrahamson 1991, 1996; Ferlie xxx , Nutley & Daviesxxx)  The ‘lean 
Spell’ (Hyde, McCann et al) was enticing to management team with its promise of efficiencies and 
money savings. The management team of the hospital closely aligned themselves with other 
hospitals who were early adopters (Newell et al 2001). The ideas of lean were promoted as Best 
Practice. Lean was a fad concept that waxed and waned in manufacturing but now had gained 
strength in the public sector, especially healthcare.  Although Management saw Lean as ‘magic key’, 
Employees saw this change fad as a passing fancy.  Employees did their best to 'follow' them with 
the least amount of involvement possible. (Abrahamson, 1991, 1996: Abrahamson and Fairchild, 
1999).  The promotion of the ‘fad’ as a belief was created in part of self-promotion and reporting.   
Figure 31 is a photo of one of the ‘update’ boards’ showing various Lean projects. 
 





 These are the reported projects and their corresponding successes such as: reduced waiting times, 
smoother ward discharges, greater capacity in theatres, more efficient pre op procedures.  The 
work-streams represent different areas of the hospital and meant to portray a widespread effort for 
improvement. Taken at face value, the Lean project seems to a marvellous success but the 
comments from administrative  and clinical staff on the wards reveal 
 
Short term effort   
This theme is used to describe how employee expressed concern that the implementation of lean 
would be short lived.  They had already seen changes to the programmes from its inception in 2013 
to the daily working routines.  Change is difficult to achieve under most circumstance.  Employees 
need a compelling reason to change (Senge, 1990).  The idea that lean was a fad (see fads and 
fashion theme) made sustaining the change an even greater challenge.   
Change, learning and lean initiatives have a lot in common but most organisations, including St. 
Lydda’s,  often see them as distinct initiatives with separate parallel goals (Flinchbaugh, 2008). 
Employees experienced lack of support from managers as well as lack of resources (Kotter, 1996;  
Senge 1990). The Lean movement (McCann, Hyde et al xxxx, Ferlie,  xxxx Nutley and Davies,  xxx) 
lacked the fundamentals to sustain a change as Kotter (1996) set out.  The compelling story was 
compelling to the senior management executives but lacked depth and truth for the rest of the 
clinicians.  Role Modelling was difficult to follow because most of the exemplars were outside the 
hospital or using slightly different methods for their change.  The reinforcing mechanisms of 
paperwork and procedures were onerous for most of the conical staff.  The Capability building to 
learn new methods was hampered by several factors.  Learning, especially under a change 
programme, requires: time for knowledge acquisition (Huber 1991), freedom to confer with 
colleagues and sharing knowledge gained from experiential learning in the new system (Crossan et al 
1999, reference), building a community of practice (Brown and Duguid, 2001).  These things were 
lacking in the implementation of lean at St. Lydda’s.   
One of the presentations given to the hospital staff about the new implementation of lean had the 
quote: "Change is not the goal, the goal is the goal" The goal is this case was efficient working of 
medical procedures. No waste, no rework, no confusion. Patients discharged on time, patients go to 
rehab when appropriate, medical procedures recorded in a way that helped tracked the patient 
population of cardiac patients 
By the February 2014, action logs had completely replaced meeting minutes. The action logs were a 
record of status on individual actions. Each person had the area of responsibility, e.g. IT, 
procurement, continuing cardiac care, admin. Every meeting was an update on what had been 
accomplished since the previous session. ‘Risk Log’ appeared to caution when something was not 
getting done. Frustration was at a very high level. The meetings were not only monthly instead of 
fortnightly. The ‘meeting’ was an information gathering session to find out who needed to ‘trouble 
shoot’ in their area. Many off-line meetings were held to attempt to get the work done. The meeting 
would last an hour and then afterwards people paired up to ‘discuss’ (complain really) about their 
action point. There was no challenge to the chief consultant’s decision. He would not listen to 
objections about timelines or difficulties that individual members were having in convincing staff to 




The action logs were a record of status on individual actions. Each person had the area of 
responsibility, e.g. IT, procurement, continuing cardiac care, admin. Every meeting was an update on 
what had been accomplished since the previous session. ‘Risk Log’ appeared to caution when 
something was not getting done. Frustration was at a very high level. The meetings were not only 
monthly instead of fortnightly. The ‘meeting’ was an information gathering session to find out who 
needed to ‘trouble shoot’ in their area. Many off-line meetings were held to attempt to get the work 
done. The meeting would last an hour and then afterwards people paired up to ‘discuss’ (complain 
really) about their action point. There was no challenge to the chief consultant’s decision. He would 
not listen to objections about timelines or difficulties that individual members were having in 
convincing staff to instate changes. You can see from this example that deadlines are months out of 
date. 
Progress has not been made on the project. In Ref 2 of action log, the action is about coding. This 
relates to pro formas and NSTEMI vs STEMI and the treatments the patient undergoes. This is a 
crucial part of the learning of the new lean method. Even though, this project is deemed nearly 
ready to handover to ‘business as usual’, this item is months out of date. The staff are still being 
circulated memos on how to do the coding. 
Figure 32 is a further action log showing the change in emphasis in the meetings and that things 
were not being record properly here either.  Actions are past due and people are commenting on 
them as if they have already been achieved.  




Crossan Maurer and White (2011) had described as a kind of dialogue that would convey meaning 
and shape action. This disconnect I observed was that the intended shared meaning was the public 
face of the ‘lean’ change and the subversive dialogue that existed between employees created a 
different shared meaning. So again there was surface acceptance and understanding of what was 
acceptable and a suppression of actual application of lea or the discarding of the ‘real way’ of doing 




It turned the application of lean in to a time counting exercise. Nurses filled out forms perfunctorily 
and carried on in their own best wisdom. Senior registrars told junior SHOs to do what they’d always 
done but  would report to  those CG people that change had been made to forms and information 
gathering. There was no true acceptance of new methods and forms. 
Learning and change are linked in definition and in practice.  Learning involves some elements of 
change in behaviour (Elkjaer, 2004) change in cognitive skills (Huber, 1991) or a change in psycho 
social outlook (Anatoncopoulou, 2006).  Management theorists recognise that an organisation’s 
ability to change depends largely on learning and adaptation.  Learning, in this sense, is both 
individual learning and the collective learning that is transferred into the organisation’s practices and 
routines (reference). Becoming a learning organisation involves continuous learning and change 
(Easterby-Smith, 1997).  Organisational learning is an enabler to change as a support for the effects 
of change and as a seeker of new knowledge form new experiences.  
There are many ways in which organisational change can take place through learning. In daily work 
practice, individuals can take note and reflect on success and incorporate ideas into the next 
experience. Furthermore, individuals can share their experience n the group setting and devise new 
home grown methods of work practices.   
In our case study at St. Lydda’s,  there appeared to very little sharing of work experiences making it 
difficult to change an individual experience into a ’collective learning’ for the entire organisations 
(Rampersad, 2004).    The learning process should involve discovery and experimentation in one’s 
own work practices and in new methods being introduced.   The rapid change projects at St. Lydda’s 
were designed to encourage experimentation around the medical procedural work methods.  The 
principles of change and learning were expressed by leaders but the spirit of change and learning 
was not engendered by leaders.  The focus had become on the paperwork,  the forms,  the recording 
of procedures instead of the actual procedures themselves.  
 
5.5.4. Casting lean spell  
The theme examines the phenomenon of lean being hailed as a magic spell. Lean has had a 
groundswell of support in the medical field.  It promises to eliminate waste and streamline process 
that have become burdensome.  Lean is advertised as being able to cope with complex systems and 
restore equilibrium and vitality to operations.  This is how the Senior executives and managers 
described Lean.  
The NHS and US hospitals gravitated toward using lean as a change strategy to increase efficiency 
and raise the standard of performance. Lean offered a means to reduce length of stay, reduce 
waiting times, increase patient satisfaction (Westwood et al, 2006, Nutley and Davies, 2001).  The 
promise of lean was locked into improvement by standardisation.  The essentials components of 
lean were about taking out unnecessary steps seemed ideal to apply to hospitals and GP surgeries.  
Initial change projects saw success where procedures had been established years ago and needed 
refining and revising because volumes of patients had changed dramatically in the intervening years 
since methods were established.    
Hospital and healthcare delivery had traditionally relied on a highly skilled workforce to make in-
action compensation for operational difficulties.  The attraction of lean was to overcome waiting 
times and queues (Womack and Jones, 1996). Lean would provide a focus for patient flow being 
measured, and identifying the touch points from healthcare workers.  Patient movement would be 
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mapped so that each patient would be followed until their ‘illness or problem’ had been resolved.  
Alongside the mapping of patient movement is the recording of the ancillary treatments and 
procedures that accompany particular illness.  For example, our heart failure patients might have co-
morbidities that required contradictory or complementary care.  Patients may require may different 
kinds of treatments in order for them to be ‘processed’.  Modifying the methods and procedure with 
Lean would mean a streamlined process so that the most difficult cases could have greater flexibility 
and time.  It would also mean the clinicians could learn from mistakes by undergoing the process of 
mapping the patient journey.  Improvement in the quality of healthcare was the honey pot for 
introducing such ideas into hospital (Womack and Jones, 1996).   
This was an attempt to create an institutional process of lean efficiency.  It was hoped that 
employees would embed these routines as part of their ongoing daily working routine.  Training was 
given to first impress the ideals of lean upon employees. However, as Lok & de Rond (2013) showed   
learners can ignore the institutional teaching and develop on their own other micro processes 
subversively.  
Figure 33 is part of PPT to show hot the Service Improvement office was set up as a  The 
Improvement Programme or [TiP] as catalyst for change.  The mission of office was to have Project 
managers as internal consultants, clinicians as change agents.   
Figure 33 why does Lean Matter 
 
 
5.5.5. Lean solves all 
This theme follows on form the ‘Cast lean spell’ theme.  It describes the way in which executives and 
Service Improvement project leads would propagate the notion that lean could solve any problem in 
the hospital.  If something was difficult to do just put a lean process on it and that will fix it. Quality , 
efficiency and clarity would all follow if Lean practices were instituted throughout the hospital.  
The Service Improvement department was created at St. Lydda’s to provide guidance and tools for 
the implementation of Lean.  As in in previous incantations of the idea in other hospitals such as the 
Royal Bolton and Virginia Mason in the US, Lean programmes were seen as essential to help embed 
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the ideal and the tools to change systems and procedures (Ben-Tovim et al, 2007;  Fillingham 2007,  
McNulty and Ferlie, 2002, Nutley and Davies, 2000)  
 A lean Programme helped to create a shared language amongst the project managers and members 
as well as a full training programme for using the methodology.  The focus of lean then become part 
of a learning activity and part of the cycle of continuous learning (Fillingham, 2007, Flinchbaugh, 
2008).  In order to be able to improve the process within the system,  people themselves need to 
learn how to improve their own working practices (Furman and Caplan, 2007, Tucker and 
Edmondson, 2003, Flinchbaugh, 2008).  This increased the scope and  the influence that Lean can 
have over the entire process of working within the hospital (McCann et al, 201 ).    
Lean also become part of the social fabric of the hospital. References to the tool and Lean process 
became part of a team’s vocabulary thereby embedding into the community of practice 
(Flinchbaugh, 2003, Fillingham 2007, Brown and Duguid, 2000, Crossan et al 1999).  Mann (2009) 
suggested that the social aspect of lean was necessary for its success in embedding new routines 
through  an organisation.  Lean went beyond patient but straight to the heart of all operations, 
language, perception of employees (Waring and Bishop, 2009; Taylor and Taylor, 2009) ‘Lean solves 
all’ became the watch words Improvement Academy Strategy.   
Figure 34 is a powerpoint slide extolling the virtues of the improvement programme and what it 
could for the organisation and for clinical teams.  
  










System as panacea  
This theme demonstrates how the executives at St. Lydda’s regarded lean and systems thinking as an 
overall solution to the hospital’s problems. The basic tenets of systems thinking are embedded in 
medical practice in terms of checks and balances.   However, every day working in the medical field 
tends to be more linear.  A linear approach requires a step by step assessment of component pieces  
and focus on content and assignment of duties.  All of these things are necessary to engage with 
patients;  eg bed notes, med notes.  On the other hand, systems thinking is charged with looking at 
the overall picture and trying to identify patterns of behaviour and trends in outcomes.  Executives 
would try to explain about systems thinking and its holistic approach but the clinician didn’t have the 
capacity or energy to put into understanding how it applied to their every day work.  
The route to improving patient care was seen as ‘raising performance’ (Gawande, 2007).  While the 
expectation that each individual clinician would come to work wanting to their very best, there were 
times when systems and processes made this difficult (waring and Bishop, 2010).  Ambiguity and 
patient variation often conflicted with known decision making models forcing clinicians to provide 
bespoke solutions.  Over time these ‘workarounds’ became a patchwork of different methods to be 
called upon depending on the clinician and situation. This silo approach to health care positive and 
negative outcome for patients.  In addition there was m no mechanism to reflect on learning form 
one patient to the next.  
 
Below arefield  notes from the Lean Launch Day with an external speaker for National NHS drive for 
Efficiency and Agenda for Change.  Lean was intro introduced as a continuous and systematic 
elimination of waste’ (Waring and Bishop, 2010).  
 
Field Notes  
We’re Part of a challenge……..Tackling quality safety and 
productivity together  
We’ve (oh plueeeze)……..Harnessed the skills working in the 
organisation…..Not twenty people with the word manager in the 
title…. (note in margin  omg she is so ffull of sh** ….. almost 
everyone has manager in their ffs)…..Engage people and provide 
with resources 
……Provide with training 
 
We learned……And made a resources available….(note in margin  - 
HA!  Fat chance of that… giggling with CNZ)….. Showcase is to take 
stock …….Celebrate the work that you have done over last year 
(Note in margin – unbelievable)……But also to challenge you that 
the work needs to continue…. People have embraced the challenge 
(note in margin  - what????)  
Take responsibility and ‘step up to the plate'…. (how about KR and 
MS and AR  take some of the heavy lifting….???)  ……Take on 




Lean was seen as an opportunity to develop every employee into continuously improving their own 
work and methods and applying the tools to all processes (Balle et al, 2006).  Many of the original 
Lean writing emphasise that lean is a system thinking not just a set of tool (Flinchbaugh, 20003).   
Training all staff in some capacity in lean was seen as the answer to spreading lean across the 
hospital.  dissemination of information on lean as part of ‘everyday life’      
 
In this study, the idea that NHS provides evidence based medicine in a positive and secure manner is 
an overwhelming desire. Patients, doctors, suppliers, funding agencies all want to believe that the 
NHS acts on data that is accurate and true. Whilst, I am not claiming that falsehoods and fraud are 
being committed, there is a faulty premise in the decision making (Argyris 1993, Popper and 
Lipschitz, 2000). The public face of data is accuracy. The quotes from interviews and the comparison 
with documentation shows fragmented data. It can be manipulated so that it doesn’t accurately 
represent the original interpretation. Embellishments and over-statements over time cause further 
embellishments until public statements hardly resemble the actual work that is going on. 
 
The consulting group (CG) was brought in as a Proof Of Principle approach for Lean in hospitals. CG 
pledged time and resources to the hospital free of charge for an initial period of time. They were 
given access to data to make a determination for which chronic conditions and departmental areas 
to focus on. There was a vested interest on the part of CG to show that Lean could provide a 
structure to improve efficiency and patient care. 
CG introduced the concept of Kaizen week which was a 'blitz' week that tried to change procedure in 
several areas of the hospital. The idea was to identify 'quick wins' such as clearing Ward stock rooms 
and re-labeling storage containers to be clearer about where materials should be stored so nurses 
could find things in a hurry. CG attempted to show the hospital what was possible in terms of change 
and efficiency that would make a difference to patient outcomes, e.g. lowering length of stay, more 
patients in rehab, longer life span, fewer readmits 
MS, the chief executive of the hospital "We want to see if we can make consistent change". There 
had been other initiatives within the hospital in previous years that had made progress and cost 
efficiencies but these were never sustained. "We want to embed a good clean system into 
healthcare; it’s about patients but also using resources wisely" said an external expert that came to 
speak at the hospital. 
The ethos of CG was to "Get everyone behind the idea to change": their version of change anyway. 
CG had a one way approach to creating efficiency in healthcare. They saw the lean process as wholly 
transferrable from the manufacturing sector. In the way it is taught within the hospital and in the 
shorthand they used to speak about units of measure and movement of goods and services and 
people. When you heard a CG consultant speak, it sounded as though he was describing a car repair 
service rather than a clinical care service. 
Figure 35 below is illustrates how the presentations were set up make staff believe that lean would 
improve.   All Of the language is about how lean will improve the procedures, the processes, the 
daily work. The Project Improvement team was describing Lean: if you just followed this procedure, 









CG peddled the idea that everything in the hospital could be improved with a lean process. With a 
cult like enthusiasm, CG management consultant would explain that Lean was a way of changing 
anything in the hospital. You could take any problem, process or difficulty and get people to learn a 
new way of doing things through Lean methods. Anything could be embedded in an organisation 
through Lean. This kind of belief in Lean made some clinical staff cynical and suspicious. Publicly, 
Senior leaders and executives in the hospital would agree with CG.  
 
Time counting   
This theme highlights the comments from team members as they struggled to understand how form 
filling and bureaucracy were helping to improve patient care.  the clinicians and support staff viewed 
the lean as a burden, something to ‘get through’ just so they could get on and do their ‘real’ work.   
One of the most difficult problems for manager in organisational change is resistance from 
employees.  Resistance can take many forms from slowdowns, work-to-rule, emotional withdrawal, 
silence, hostility, challenging all manager requests not just the change. A popular solution the 
problem of resistance is to engage employees with the ideas of participation.  The Object of 
participation is to encourage employees to look more closely at the work they are currently doing 
and compare with the new method, to ask questions about how the new wok will be done.  In an 
ideal world, there would be feedback loops from management to employee and vice versa.  Lean 
methods and continuous learning theories (Filingham, 2007. Flinchbaugh, 2003; Waring and Bishop, 
2010).) embody these ideals.  However, even if there is participation in meetings or discussion this 
doesn’t always translate into full cognitive and behavioural participation.  Employees may create a 
façade of acceptance to the new organisational values and change (Hewett, 2003).    Previous 
research has concentrated on impression management (Kacmar and Carlson, 1999;  Wayne and 
Ferris, 1990) or surface acting  and emotional labour (Brotheridge and Lee, 2003).   
In this case study, the surface acting manifested itself as surface compliance work, Participating to 
the bare minimum in the Lean activities and resistance to both learning and change.    
Participation in change is only part of a change programme’s success.  Employees need to be 
committed to change before it can have a lasting effect on the organisation. Beyond the financial 
and efficiency reasons, clinicians did not see the purpose of the change.  This I was especially difficult 
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because many of the lean projects introduced more systems checks rather than made differences to 
patient care.  Change and learning both require adaptation to new stimuli and environment (Fiol and 
Lyles, 1985, but in this instance the stimuli, lean principles seemed counter to the core work of 
patient care.  The emotional dissonance (Fineman, 2000) couldn’t be easily reconciled between lean 
systems and patient care.   
Deshler and Hogan (1990) supported the notion of social approaches to learning and change, where 
acceptance of the change was promoted under social conformity.  In this case study at St. Lydda’s,  
the effort to learn something new and change to a different form of working lacked the elements of:  
shared knowledge (Lam, 1998),  a social  learning component (Brown and Duiguid, 199() and a clear 
direction (Fiol and Lyles, 1985).   
The field notes below describe how staff put in the effort to superficially comply with new orders but 
they have not fundamentally changed the way they think or perform their duties. They learned to fill 
in the right boxes. They make an art of appearing to have adhered to the new way of doing things. 
Most of the energy is expended to write on the forms what looks like the appropriate thing. 
 
Field Notes  
 
Matron HM talked about how the care fundamentally hasn’t changed. 
Numbers aren’t different in the uptake of cardiac rehab. The nurses are 
following the same procedures they always have in caring for patients, 
they are just filling in different forms. 
 
Nurses filled out forms perfunctorily and carried on in their own best wisdom. Senior registrars told 
junior SHOs to do what they’d always done but would report to  those CG people that change had 
been made to forms and information gathering. It turned the application of lean in to a time 
counting exercise. There was no true acceptance of new methods and forms. 
 
Process over substance   
This theme explains the complexity of the lean programme that needed both attention to detail and 
creativity in change.  The observation of the clinical team was that the processing of forms and the 
adherence to procedures was more important than the substance of improving patient care.  The 
change was focussed on structural details not the true essence or reasons for improvement.    
Change programmes usually involve strategy from top executives; they set targets and have a plan 
for implementation carried out by middle and junior management and perhaps specialist teams. The 
responsibility for the design and implementation comes from fairly senior employees who have a 
vision of an overall outcome.  The actual implementation relies on project managers, and individual 
contributors in teams to carry out the changes.  The definition of change is seen as a ‘shift n 
behaviour of the whole organisation’ (Kanter, Stein, Jick, 1992).  Organisational change requires 
adaptions of internal process and change in individual and group behaviour (Senge, Kliener, Roberts, 
Ross and Smith, 1999).  Senge in particular emphasises that change must be planned in consultation 
with employees.  Planned changes have a specific purpose to be part of a continuous adaptive 
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learning cycle (Lawrence, Dyck, Maitlis, and Mauws, (2 006).   There has to be a certain amount of 
emotional energy applied to the change otherwise the employees will not focus on change their 
mind-sets to the new direction of the organisation (Lawrence, Dyck, Maitlis and Mauws, 2006).   
Change programmes must monitor two things both the changes to the routines and procedures and 
the ‘response’ from employees about those changes (Nikols, 2004).  Of particular relevance to our 
case study is the idea that individuals ‘unlearn old routines and learn new ones’ (Postrel and Rumelt, 
1992). This can often lead to employee’s resistance, because performing the new routine leads to 
emotional dissonance or role conflict or is seen as a subversion to professional abilities.  Employees 
may engage on defense mechanism (Bovey and Hede, 2001) 
In this case study, the observable outcome of the resistance to change was the superficial adherence 
to the new routines. An illustrative example of our case study was the form filling done by Nurses.  
The pro forma and software ‘boxes’ were completed but the everyday work routines showed little 
actual change. So again there was surface acceptance and understanding of what was acceptable 
and a suppression of actual application of lean or the discarding of the ‘real way’ of doing things in 
favour of an adaptive method. 
Figure 36 Corporate document screen grab from the feedback report to senior executives on how 
successful the form filling was on the ACS proforma.  





CG claimed that getting patients to Cath lab quicker because identification of STEMI and NSTEMI 
patients was much faster with more accurate data. CG listed the ‘problem’ and then ‘what we’ve 
done’, e.g. designing the ACS pro forma. The ‘we’ve done’ portion of the statement was a complete 
lie as the idea of this pro formas had come from the former workplace of one of the cardiology 
consultants. Furthermore, identifying the patient quickly would entirely depend on getting the 
information in a timely manner. Reviewing the forms for St. Lydda’s. The emphasis of the date and 
time stamps were revealed as a source of tension. In a three months review of the pro forma almost 
none of the date and time stamps were used. (see appendix 1 ACS pro forma review p 190) there 
Audit of ACS pro forms 
Summary 
Approximately 50 cases were reviewed for entry into the database.  Only 50% of 
patient records had ACS forms.  Of the remaining 50%,  only one form was 
complete.  The rest of the forms had minimal information, approximately 1% of 
the information filled in. Extraneous information appears frequently on the 
forms, e.g. notes in margins. More encouragingly, Page 13 was always complete.   
 
In the patient records with missing forms, there was no discernible pattern 
between time, day, ward or diagnosis.   
Contradictory Info 
There is information gathered as narrative in the margins that is contradictory to 
the ‘ticked’ boxes, e.g. Premature CAD 
 
Time points 
Onset of symptoms is usually recorded but other time points are left blank.  
 
CATH Lab 
Outcomes only partially filled in 
Vessels section not usually filled in\Time flows hardly ever 
 
On-going Care  
This is rarely filled in 
 
Continuing Cardiac Care (Page 13) 
Always filled in and complete 
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were sections that were completely ignored (GRACE scores, Time points, CATH labs, on-going care). 
The only page on the pro forma (page 13 of Pro Forma) that generally filled in was the one that 
nurses were responsible for. 3 cardiac consultants names keep reappearing as the supervisors to the 
SHOs who were not filling in the forms. These consultants refused to influence their SHOs and 
registrars to use the pro forma and to fill in accurately. 
All of this was disregarded when it meant stating publicly what had been achieved or been changed 
because of lean methodology. It was hard for the nurses to hear the manipulation of the 
organisational narrative. Patient safety and care was still at the forefront of their minds but to their 
own personal cost and not because of a system that had been introduced. Below is an excerpt from 




This theme covers the drive for consistency in maintaining the order in the lean projects.  Any large 
scale project must have governance and reporting documents.  In the medical profession, 
documentation has always been regarded as an important aspect of the job.  Documentation helps 
to review past decision, trace anomalies in care and individual differences in approaches in medical 
professional’s’ standard of care.  Standardised reporting helps to measure progress both in terms of 
patients but also in the change projects.  In this case study,  I observed standardised reporting being 
used as ‘proof of following lean’.  The Clinical members of staff used their seeming ‘compliance’ n 
reporting as their contribution to change. Senior managers were ‘satisfied’ that Lean had been 
accomplished because they could see ‘reports’ of the changes.  
Lean was introduced to help to standardise process around the best practice that already existed 
within the hospital amongst clinicians (Radnor, Waring and Holweg, 2012).  In a medical 
environment where professional require and demand evidence before acting, lean challenges some 
of those assumptions.  Shortell (1998) emphasised the need to link evidence based medicine with 
evidence based management,that is a focus of measurement and continuous improvement to 
routines (Feldman and Pentland, 2008). The routines can evolve over time with continuous cycles of 
reflection and improvement (Mazzacato, Savage and Brommels, 2010). However, standardising 
process can create problems.  Sometimes staff do not see the new processes and routines as being 
‘fit for purpose’ (Radnor, 2010). In this case study, there was only superficial acceptance of the new 
patterns, routines and methods. The cynicism of the employees formed part of the change 
resistance.  It seemed that the ‘record keeping and quantity of work was taking precedence over the 
quality of work.  Employees viewed pervious ways of working as less cumbersome than the new 
form filling and reports.  
Although the discontent with the new lean system started on an individual level it should spread to 
others professional member of the group.  The socialisation of resistance turned to organizational 
defences. E.g. was agreeing the public face of the project. It wasn’t an open sharing of information. 
Staff learned what could be said and what shouldn’t be said in record keeping or externally. 
Record keeping is an integral part of medical care both for fiduciary reasons and for the clinical 
decision making process. Careful consideration is made to maintaining records on patients and 
patient data. This might be individual patient records or the large databases that contain 
information about patients with similar disease conditions. 
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Below are my musing in my field notes about how things had progressed with the Lean project. I 
express concern over the different stories that are told about how successful lean had been for the 
hospital and the patients. The data didn’t seem to be objective and was highly variable.  
Field notes  
The ‘lessons learned’ session and ’60 day report out’ contained many 
claims that efficiencies had been made in ACS: designed and deployed a 
single standardised evidence based pro-forma, formally deployed an 
electronic discharge summary, increase number of patient receiving 
cardiac rehab as inpatients’. Standardisation in the Cath labs for start 
and end times in performing PCI procedures was part of the overall 
lean programme. Timings of each consultant are recorded for 
regulatory monitoring reasons but this data was also used to see if the 
consultants were as efficient as they could be. The Cath labs depend on 
the information from the ‘pro forma’ to decide whether to preform a 
PCI or not. In addition to that, the consultants needs to be as quick as 
possible with the procedure to get blood flow into the damaged heart. 
It is a complicated task to ensure that all the Cath lab beds are used to 
their fullest capacity without having patients waiting for a procedure. A 
kaizen week was used to concentrate on improving start and finish 
times.   
The project manager who had been shepherding the cause of the ACS pathway was assigned to 
another project. So she ‘handed over’ the responsibility of the group to one of the clinicians. A 
decision was promptly made that this meeting would no longer convene and any agenda items 
would be covered in the departmental meeting instead. The group was effectively disbanded. 
Although IT people and e-pathway group still met to continue to work on implementing the 
software. (As a subsequent note- in a follow up interview in 2015 to find out if they’d achieved their 
objectives. It was found that the e-pathway funding had been pulled and the group was back to 
using paper pro formas as much as they could). The BAU was considered an ‘achievement by senior 
managers who declared a positive outcome and praised all the efforts of the individuals involved, 
praise was extended to an external meeting and presentation. 
When you spoke to nurses they explained for them. The work hadn’t changed. They did the same job 
in the same way as they always had. They perhaps changed the way they recorded things or what 
was officially sanctioned but essentially the day to day work remained the same. 
5.6. Chapter Summary 
The chapter set out illustrate the four aggregate dimensions: Discipline and Domination, Barriers (1) 
Organisational, Barriers (2) Employee Expectations and Integration of the Myths.  Each aggregate 
dimension was explored for the relationship to organisational learning and organisational studies 
theories.  Examples from the data for the themes that support and explain the aggregate dimension 
were given to illustrate the meanings of the dimensions.  
I illustrated how over the course of the Lean project, Staff members became disillusioned with the 
Lena projects.  I have used many different kinds of data to show the two different stories of lean.  
There was the perception of the Organisation and its rhetoric and there was the [perception of the 
employees.   
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6. Discussion    
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to elucidate the findings and emergent themes from the two previous qualitative 
analysis chapters (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) relating to the four research questions.  There is some 
overlap in the ideas within the themes with respect to the research questions, therefore themes are 
mentioned more than once.   
First, there is a brief introduction related to the literature review then follows a section for each the 
research questions.  Under each research question there is a broader discussion of the concepts that 
were illustrated in chapter 4 and 5 of the findings. .   
The central questions of this thesis concern how learning and in particular learning Lean is perceived 
by organisation members. In order to address these issues, three complementary practice-based 
conceptualisations of learning phenomena have been reviewed:  Crossan’s (1999) 4I framework 
(thesis sections 2.2.1. and 4.5.1), Lawrence’s (2005) political enhancement to the 4i framework 
(thesis section 4.5.2) and general concepts of learning and lean methodologies (thesis sections 2.2, 
2.4 and 2.5) (Huber, 1991; Fiol & Lyles, 2005; Argyris & Schon, 1978; Flinchbaugh, 2008, Ferlie, xxx).  
The research question focussed on learning in the context of healthcare organisations during a 
period of lean implementation.  It highlighted the issue of the institutionalisation of learning and 
embedding learning in routines.  It also uncovered barriers to learning from the organisational and 
individual influences.  In addition, the two case studies illustrated weaknesses in the using Lean 
Methodology in the learning process in changing hospital procedures.   
Within this empirically-based theoretical approach, previous research has suggested that there are 
organisational barriers of managerial and system control: missing the link between knowledge and 
organisational goal (Popper and Lipshitz, 2000; Zell, 2001; Friedman et al , 2003), hidden values and 
hidden agendas (Sun & Scott, 2005), manager’s desires to retain a positive self-image (Weick, 1995), 
rigid beliefs and assumptions made by consultants  (Beer et al, 2005; Elliot et al, 2000), resource 
allocation (Beer et al, 2005),  lack of consistent norms in the systems  (Huzzard and Osteregten, 
2002),  (Rashman Withers and Hartley, 2009; Schilling and Kluge, 2009) as well as individual level 
barriers to learning from lack of know-how,  mixed messages (Cannon and Edmondson, 2001), 
restrictive information from management (Cannon & Edmondson, 2001).  
 
6.2 Individual Learning Experiences during the Implementation of Lean (RQ1) 
How do individuals, in general, experience learning in a healthcare organisation that is introducing 
Lean processes and methodology? 
The case study organisations in this thesis were undergoing a period of organisational change 
through learning and instituting new routines under Lean methodology.  This set up a unique set of 
circumstances under which it was possible to review both organisational learning and lean 
implementation. The first question in this thesis is concerned with how individual experiences 








6.2.1 Individual perception of Learning 
Individual learning is considered have taken place if there is a permanent change in behaviour, 
cognition or beliefs (Argyris and Schon, 1978).  At an operational level, when individuals describe 
their experience; they describe a difference in their Knowing-how and knowing-why (Nonaka et al, 
1994; Nonaka, 2009). As new knowledge and behaviours are assimilated, individuals changed their 
mental models.   
In Case Study one, individuals distanced themselves from the new routines that were implemented 
by Lean transformation.  They started talking about lean and it accompanying programmes in the 
third person.  This allowed employees to disconnect psychologically (Argyris and Schon, 1978) from 
the principles introduced by Lean. The perception of the individuals was that lean was obstructive at 
worst, and a mild annoyance at best.   
In Case Study Two, the empirical evidence showed individuals going beyond distancing to actually 
withholding knowledge and information that could have been shared in the group.  The employee 
turned ‘silent’ (Blackman and Sadler-Smith, 2009).  The perception of learning lean was to learning 
as little as possible to be able to just continue doing your job in the best way you knew how.   
6.2.2. Employee Expectations and Barriers to Learning  
Learning Barriers experienced by employees  
Organisational learning occurs when employees engage with problems (Argyris & Schon, 1996).  
When the solutions to these difficulties are then embedded into the organisation’s processes, it 
becomes part of the whole organisation’s learning (Glynn et al, 1992).  However, in both the case 
study organisations, there were obstacles to embedding the learning.  In Case Study One, the 
learning was fragmented into small pockets of excellence. On the whole, staff felt fatigued by the all 
the changes.  Staff saw discrepancies in how Lean was applied and lost faith in its value. Learning 
was not shared amongst all of the teams and there was resistance to adhering to Lean methods over 
current customs.  In case study two, there were multiple stresses placed on learning, from multiple 
levels within the organisation.    
Organisational barriers, Situated learning and knowledge sharing 
In keeping with the view of Situated Learning (Lave and Wenger 1991), knowledge is constructed 
through social groups within an organisation.  This was illustrated in the way clinicians shared their 
ideas about cardiac patient procedures but also in the way they shared their experiences of using 
new lean methods.  They were engaging in the ‘practice’ of assessing whether these new methods 
were working and what to discard and what to keep as a new method. It was into a ‘bitch session’ 
social group but purposeful thought and identification as a group was taking place (Gherardi, Nicolini 
2000).  In case study Two there was evidence of the breakdown of the managerial accounts of the 
way work should be performed (Brown and Duguid 1991).  Innovation was generated by the 
clinicians within the Rapid change projects and Integrated Care pathways.    
Employee created narrative (subversive narrative)  
The impact of  Narratives in organisation are well documented (Gabriel, 2000;  Brown and Duguid, 
2001).Likewise, creating stories to affect strategic change is not new to the literature (Sonenshein, 
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2010; Barker and Gower 2010). In case study One, the participants, told stories about a variety 
things both personal and professional.  In that group, the stories created cohesion through narrative 
which is best described as subversive. It was subversive in the sense that comments and stories were 
constructing meaning against Lean.  The clinicians were creating a narrative to suggest that their 
clinical knowledge was superior to the suggestion made by senior management and the CG.   The 
‘narrative’ was lean was a separate issue to the practice of medicine.  Lean was about paperwork 
(see Nurses comment in data analysis about filling out forms).  Clinicians and clinical support workers 
ascribed to the notion that their patient care was entirely separate from any bureaucratic process 
which had to be endured.  Still, knowledge about how to achieve the management standard was 
shred amongst nurses and SHOs, registrars and clinical support workers.   
Knowledge sharing   
Created their own created communities of practice – All three components of Knowledge sharing; 
people, process and technology (Garfield 2006) were evident in Case Study two.  The people 
component consisted of the clinicians attempting to improve their daily practice.  The Process 
element was the establishment of new routines by using Lean Methods.  More specifically by sharing 
approaches through the Lean exercises of value stream mapping and process review.  The 
technology element of the new software programme to identify cardiac patients was a shared 
approach from service improvement department, the cardiology department and software 
company.  Each group had specific knowledge for their area of expertise and shared their idea for 
shaping a new environment for the hospital.  Knowledge sharing was crucial for success in this 
venture for the hospital (Herremans & Issac, 2007).  
Created narratives by the organisation 
Narratives and storytelling have always been part of organisations (Gabriel, 2000).  Narratives are 
intertwined with political agenda, the organisation’s identity and groups within the organisation. 
Snowden (2001) suggests that stories are a powerful tool in organisations to be a convincing ay to 
communicate to employees.  In the Launch day for the organisation in Case Two,  Success stories 
were told about the use of Lean.   Other hospitals’ programmes were given as examples of success 
from an ‘expert’ in the field.  The stories were emotive and inspirational (Gabriel 2000; ) filled with 
anecdotal patient feedback  (Allan, Fairtlough and JHeinzen, 2002) encouraging people to feel 
positive about lean.  In Case Study One, the learning cohort was actively  recording anecdotes in 
their learning journals through the lean process to create positive Lean stories.  The organisation 
manipulating the environment so that learning Lean would be viewed as uplifting and part of ‘good’ 
efficient workforces.  
Promoting fantasy rather than truth 
Most notably, in Case Study Two, the hospital uses the story promotion as ‘currency’ (Boje, 1991) to 
indoctrinate employees to the idea of a successful Lean hospital.  The learning of lean creates a 
whole new stream of decision making.  The organisation was hoping that the  Promotion of the idea 
of lean would lead to ‘enacting’  (Pentland 1999) of lean methods.   This was not ultimately what 
transpired in either of the case study organisations but instead result in a kind of aimless learning.  
The Case Study two organisation, that is to say senior managers, continued to promote lean as a 






6.3 Perceived Process of Learning (RQ2) 
How do employees experiencing Lean Implementation perceive the process of learning as it gets 
embedded into the organisation and into the individual work routines in this type of organisation? 
The first research question focussed on the issues concerning learning in general using Lean 
processes.   This part of the research highlights learning lean methods in healthcare and the process 
of learning itself.  Specifically how does the process of feedback and challenge and the application of 
the lean programmes affect the process of learning.  This is more specific to the workflow in the 
organisation.  This aspect of the research delves into how the individuals involved in learning the 
new practices perceived their outcomes, their learning and their new ways of working.  
Organizational learning has been mapped in many different ways: linearly as the acquisition of 
information becomes part of knowledge, Huber 1991);  learning becomes part of new actions 
through understanding of organisational principles (Fiol-Lyles, 1985); in recurring loops  as problem 
solving becomes more intricate (Argyris & Schon), cyclical  and multileveled (Crossan). These 
different aspects of learning all lead toward the organisation using new knowledge or behaviours or 
actions to change is own processes in some way.  In the two case studies presented in this thesis. 
The project managers attempted to establish new ways of practicing medicine.  Procedures and 
process were modified to include new paperwork or electronic systems. However, the employees 
who needed to enact such change or learning did not actually learn to embrace the new procedures.    
Institutional level learning has concentrated the systemic approach to the formal and informal 
process that enable an organisation to transform knowledge intro learning (Crossan, Huber,  Fiol 
Lyles).  Learning should increase when there is support from management or it is seen as an ‘edict 
from above’.  Even though there was an edict from management, that there should be new 
procedures, the employees id their best to ignore it.   
Learning as it progress across the organisation:  
Learning in organisations often occurs so naturally that it is difficult to take account how it has 
happened until after the learned has taken place.  Changes in procedures or natural ‘work-arounds’ 
become routine within an organisation.  Problems are solved and then the solutions shared amongst 
employees so that a new procedure or process is created.   These ideas get embedded into the 
organisation as part of organisational memory (Wagner, 2003); or organisation routines, (Watkins 
and Marsick , 1992; Feldman and Pentland,  2003).   Much of the previous research on organisational 
learning has concentrated on learning success or failure in terms of outcomes or barriers.  Instead, 
the two case studies presented in this thesis have explored the different perspectives on the process 
of learning.  The goal to uncover how individuals have experienced the process of learning and how 
they’ve described what they believe was learned. These two studies have given some insight into the 
barriers for learning in Healthcare organisations. Using Crossan, Lane and White’s (1999) framework 
to help describe how staff was experiencing learning a new way of working. Crossan (1999) 
envisioned a “sequence and a progression to these processes at different levels” (Crossan et al 1999, 
p 525) but did concede that not all processes would be experienced at all levels. The two studies 
revealed some processes are skipped altogether and this changes the way the learning gets 
embedded. Indeed, it also changes what is learned, who learned it and the final result of the 
learning. Other researchers have also commented on how this process is fragmented (Shilling and 
Kluge, 2009, Jones and Macpherson, 2006). The intersection of individual, group and institutional 
learning has learning flowing from one level to the next and also flowing from individuals to groups 
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and back again by means of feedback. Feedback needs to be studied more closely as we found in 
these studies. 
Feedback can perpetuate propaganda information that seemingly represents real time data coercing 
an individual or group to change actions or behaviours. The absence of feedback focuses our 
attention to the way in which individuals will fill the void with information they’ve gathered or 
information from their peers. This information is not necessarily accurate or helpful to learning and 
change. (Argyris, 2000: Davies and Nutley, 2000, Crossan et al, 1999: Crossan and Bedrow, 2003; 
Sterman, 2001). 
In Crossan’s 1999 article, they proposed that the way in which learning moved across an 
organisation from level to the next was related to the feed forward and feedback processes. Many 
other researchers in this area have expressed same notion that ideas are shared amongst colleagues 
and new actions taken (Daft and Weick, 1984; Huber, 1991). Earlier models of learning included 
single and double loop learning (Argyris and Schon, 1976, Argyris, 1985). These were valuable 
contributions to understand processes behind why an individual might adopt a new strategy once 
having experienced learning. Single loop learning highlighted a straightforward linear approach to 
learning that did not require much feedback. 
Internal cognitive mechanisms form understanding of new information that needs to be learned 
within the organisation. Feedback is an essential part of the learning and the employee experience. 
Analysing failure can help learning if there is an opportunity for safe reflective learning. Lack of 
feedback leads to resentment and assumptions on the part of employees. Not wanting to appear 
incorrect leads to suppression of challenge and creative ideas (Askew and Lodge, 2000; Davies and 
Nutley, 2000; Nystrom and Starbuck 2015). 
The feed forward and feedback process in both Case Study One and Case Study Two were absent. 
The poor administrator in case Study Two does not know where to turn with her problems and 
decided to leave the organisation altogether.  Thus this is organisational knowledge lost because the 
strain of the Lean implementation puts on learning.   
6.3.1. Absence of Feedback 
The principles and goals of learning and lean have some important commonalities especially in a 
medical setting.  Lean embraces the ideals of continuous improvement and feedback into  systems 
just as organisational learning  promotes reflexive learning through feedback.  Moreover Lean and 
organisational learning share the principles of improved competiveness (Dodgson, 1993) and 
integrating and institutionalising learning in teams (Crossan et al, 1999, 2009; Flinchbaugh, 2008).   
The goal of lean in healthcare had been to develop a shared understating amongst healthcare 
professionals how to improve medical practices and procedures.  When process is stable and 
efficient, it is easier to detect deviations in patient outcomes.  Lean impacts work practice and the 
culture of the organisation.  In the ideal state, lean should be able to provide a platform for 
continuously improvement in an organisation. Lean principles use the same scientific principles to 







6.3.2 Failure of Feedback Loops 
Feedback loops:  
Beyond levels of learning, this research also touched on the different types of learning and the 
feedback loops that help employees to understand learning through problem solving. Single-loop 
and double-loop learning (Argyris & Shon, 1978) provide some explanation of what occurs when an 
employee especially a clinical employee gains feedback from the result of an action with a patient.   
In Site 1, learning from feedback occurred as part of the training course ‘leadership Academy’.  
Participants reported in their learning journals that they had gained knowledge from conversation 
with staff or patients about the results of a medical examination or procedure.  Single loop learning 
came in the form of a break down in a process that was fixed more often than not with a work 
around. It was difficult to unearth examples of double loop learning.  Perhaps the examples of the 
software programmes being changed in several iterations was something akin to double loop 
learning. 
 In Crossan’s 1999 article, they proposed that the way in which learning moved across an 
organisation from level to the next was related to the feed forward and feedback processes. Many 
other researchers in this area have expressed same notion that ideas are shared amongst colleagues 
and new actions taken (Daft and Weick, 1984; Huber, 1991). Earlier models of learning included 
single and double loop learning (Argyris and Schon, 1976, Argyris, 1985). These were valuable 
contributions to understand processes behind why an individual might adopt a new strategy once 
having experienced learning. Single loop learning highlighted a straightforward linear approach to 
learning that did not require much feedback. 
Double loop learning refer to more complex problem solving and method of embedding new 
learning into an individuals’ every day work strategy. In our studies feedback was interrupted by 
reasons mentioned previously: political control by managers, hoarding of information, perpetuation 
of the organisational myths and silencing of employee voice. There was an absence of meaningful 
feedback in the projects that hindered the opportunities for learning. 
Double loop learning refer to more complex problem solving and method of embedding new 
learning into an individuals’ every day work strategy. In our studies feedback was interrupted by 
reasons mentioned previously: political control by managers, hoarding of information, perpetuation 
of the organisational myths and silencing of employee voice. There was an absence of meaningful 
feedback in the projects that hindered the opportunities for learning 
6.3.3. System control 
Lean is often presented as a system in which the focus is on targets as was illustrated by the 
emphasis on outcome driven measures such as length of stay and using ACS Pro Forma 
documentation to track a patient’s recovery.  This results in recorded improvement of statistics but 
didn’t necessarily reflect changes in behaviour or change to a clinician’s ways of working.  
There was a lack of focus on people in the implementation (Stanton et al, 2014). This help to identify 
the challenges in trying to implement lean by a forced compliance.  It not only had an impact on how 
Lean was implemented by the whether learning was fully embedded into daily routine.  In order to 
be able to implement Lean as it was envisioned (Dickson et al, 2009) as a part of business process 
reengineering (Womack and Jones, 2014), there is a need to consider the people element.  
Furthermore, a further adaption to the way Lean is helpful to healthcare systems is also necessary 
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(Radnor et al, 2012).  The alignment to clinical staff and the organisational culture of healthcare 
would prove beneficial to lean implementation (Bishop and Waring, 2010).  
At both HealthCo and St. Lydda’s, executives often spoke of ‘systems thinking’ as a problem solving 
method for including individual practices into the whole realm of healthcare system practices.  
Analysis tools of the systems like Lean methodology are applied to reduce waiting times, improve 
screening practices to diagnose patients and access available resources in a public healthcare 
system. A systems thinking approach should create interdependent pathways among health 
professionals to have coordinated care for the patient.  However, the empirical data from case 
studies shows us that often the system is used as a measure of control.   
This paradox of systems thinking is that the tools which the clinical team have at their disposal to 
diagnose are determined by a bureaucratic system designed for machines not people (Shortell and 
Singer, 2008).  The organisational infrastructure influences the successful delivery of healthcare 
through systems thinking both positively and negatively.  For example, the infrastructure can include 
software to track patients as was seen in the case study at St. Lydda’s. the SVOT software system to 
track patients had very little impact on the daily routine of the clinicians at St. Lydda’s.  In some 
ways, the onerous task of filling in the forms on a software system hindered the clinical decision 
making process by taking the clinician away from the physical location of the patient.  The new 
system of tracking patients proved to be more a form of control over how much work was recorded 
by clinicians rather than how much work was actually getting done.   
 
6.3.4. Managerial control 
In bureaucratic models of management, defensive organisational behaviours surface. The 
uncertainty of changing to a new system can result in rigid and controlling behaviour. This leads to 
difficulties for in establishing linkages between the learning of individuals and groups. Since the 
dynamic model of Lean is to provide stability by reducing the complexity of systems,  it is possible to 
suggest that the aim is to be more controlling as a mechanistic part of management.  This is counter 
to the espoused aim of individual discovery and introduction of feedback mechanism so that the 
individual might be able to affect the outcome of a Lean project. Despite the notion of empowering 
clinicians and team members to learn from all members of the organisation.   
Managerial control seemed to inhibit the ability of staff to intuit or interpret contrary to suggestions 
in previous research (Lawrence et al, 2005). Influence and force did not encourage individuals. 
Instead they hoarded information and built barriers to sharing across levels to project leaders and to 
colleague. (Haldin-Herrgard 2000; Holste and Field 2010). 
Managerial control and ownership of knowledge were frequently mentioned as a barrier to learning. 
Manager put up barriers to learning, in every stage of learning Shilling and Kluge, 2009) but 
particularly in integration where shared knowledge is an essential component. Silenced employees 
(Blackman and Sadler-Smith, 2009) did not share information with colleagues or with the project 
managers. No further learning could take place within the organisation. The learning that was 
eventually institutionalised was a diluted version of the original plan. Employees withdrew from the 
politically motivated process. Initial attempts were made to contribute to discussion about the 
project but were soon silenced. A conscious effort on the part of nurses, HCAs and Admin to 
withhold their opinions was evident (Blackman and Sadler-Smith, 2009). Tacit knowledge was 
certainly lost to this void in information sharing. Future projects would not be able to benefit from 
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experiential learning because there was not mechanism for silenced employees to share their 
explicit or tacit knowledge of ways of working.   
In both case studies, Learning was inhibited by managers who used Lean to control the activities of 
their staff. They controlled the learning that might have taken place if information had flown freely 
from individual to group to organisation level. Sharing ideas between team ideas was not 
encouraged. The more junior members of staff did not experience the ideas in the same way. Ideas 
were presented to them in a truncated form. Each ward or department still had their own way of 
doing things even though lean was supposed to eradicate this practice. 
 
6.4 How Learning Moves and is Embedded in Routines (RQ3) 
How is learning perceived to move across the healthcare organisation from individual to the group 
and then embedded into the organisation especially during the implementation of Lean?  
This question concerned not just what was learned but how it moved across the organisation from 
person to person and group to group.  Within the disciplines of both Lean and Organisational 
learning, there are tenets of knowledge  acquisition and sharing knowledge or know –how that in 
principle would make it beneficial to both organisation members and the organisation itself to share 
feedback and learning from all aspects of work. In this section, I discuss how individuals in the two 
case study organisation perceived learning to move across the organisation whilst it was undergoing 
a learn transformation.  
The models of both Lean and Learning in organisations conclude with the goal of having acquired 
new procedure or knowledge acquisition for the purpose of the organisation’s competitive 
advantage.   
Lean literature describes the ‘movement’ of lean as having levels of: tools, patterns, systemic 
structures, and mental models (Flinchbaugh, 2008). Lean is focussed on reviewing and revising 
routines and work methods.  Lean ‘moves’ through an organisation in the observation of how 
individual work is completed.  
Organisational learning research describes ‘movement’ from individual level to group level to 
organisational level.  This literature has been concerned with the assimilation of learning and then 
how it spread across different groups in the organisation.  
 
6.4.1. Learning from Individual to Group 
Learning moves from the individual to the group when shared knowledge is accomplished 
(Yang,2007;  Crossan et al, 1999, 2009).  The problem with transferring knowledge form one person 
to another is that it requires mutual trust and a atmosphere of safety in the organisation (Carroll and 
Edmondson, 2002). One of Crossan’s 91999) fundamental ideas was the knowledge would pass from 
individual to group to eventually be embedded into organisational routines.  Insights are made from 
the interpreting process that are then shared in the integrating process.  Individuals discuss new idea 
with others by actively building a shared understanding  (Senge, 1990; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995).    
However, what happens, as in the case of St. Lydda’s in case study two, when the knowledge gets 
embedded into the routine is a very superficial version of what was intended by the organisation.  
The empirical evidence in chapter 5 illustrated that the clinicians at St. Lydda’s did ‘what they 
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needed to do’ in order just to get along with the system.  The individual interpretations of lean 
implementation diluted what was transferred into the routines.   
6.4.2. Organisational processes 
In the context of the two case studies, I am using processes to express forms of organisational 
decision making (Mazzacatto, Savage and Brommels, 2010; Pettigrew, 2014).   It was starkly clear in 
case study two that organisational processes were influenced by the management consultant s from 
CG. This was a very political process whereby senior ex4ecutives in the hospital used information 
provided by the consultant to make decision (see Findings chapter 5 section 5.3.1 and 5.5.1).  As 
reported in the Findings sections, the consultants put forward their case for trialling specific rapid 
change projects based on their own data.  The ‘bubble chart’ and the tariff data (pages 103-106) 
were concocted by the consultants to persuade the senior executives.  
Lawrence et al (2005) described the strategy of influence and control in organisation as providing a 
force to encourage individuals and groups to learn.  In Case Study Study Two, processes were being 
controlled by external consultants.  Lawrence (2001, 2005) called this ‘legitimate interpretation’ of 
new information. Forming a discipline around new ways of working should give a ‘legitimacy to an 
interpretation of information within the organisation’ (Lawrence et al, 2005). This idea of legitimacy 
is intriguing to be used in this way. Other management research has used legitimacy to describe 
organisational performance (Levitt and March, 1991) and its effect on the positive or negative 
impact on institutionalisation (Weiwel and Hunter 1985). The dynamic factor is the rejecting or 
accepting of an idea due in part to the effects of feedback and the ’concern for legitimacy’ (Levitt 
and March, 1991, p 331).However if we borrow form this idea of success. Legitimacy can take on 
anther meaning. In my studies, ideas were deemed legitimate or not by who proposed them. The 
general rule was that if a project manager proposed an idea then it was legitimate but if just a 
project member proposed it, the idea may nor may not have been officially accepted. 
Legitimacy can be defined as a “a perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
appropriate within a socially constructed system of values and beliefs…legitimacy depends on the 
type and strength of values and beliefs developed by interrelated surrounding actors towards an 
actor.” (Hadjikhani, Lee, & Ghauri, 2008: 914), legitimacy is a seminal construct to account within 
business research (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). If an idea lacks legitimacy, it may be rejected by the 
group (Sahaym, 2013) or can succumb to an identity crisis motivated by external entities (Rodrigues 
& Child, 2008). Groups or projects with high legitimacy have been found to generate positive 
outcomes such, sustainability within the longer organisational change programmes (Bianchi & 
Ostale, 2006). 
Legitimacy research traditionally applies to whole organisations to reveal how firms justify their 
existence to external entities, such as other firms and the marketplace (Kumar & Das, 2007). In this 
context though, it is useful to examine whether the idea of Lean as positioned by the Consulting 
Group were accepted as legitimate (Clark and Salaman 1996; Fincham, 1999; Czarniawska and 
Mazza, 2003., Sturdy, 2004). The acceptance depended on your status within the organisation. The 
more senior clinical staff and the management executives accepted CG’s ideas and version of events. 
CG created an image of themselves as experts in this field (Gill, 2013; Martin, 1978; Massey and 
Walker, 1999).   
The idea emerged that management consultants legitimised the forms of data used to make decision 
and which procedures and protocols would be put forward to be part of a the Lean transformation.  
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The clinician’s ideas about their forms of work were not considered as legitimate as the external 
management consultants.    
 
6.5 Organisational Influence of Lean Implementation on Learning (RQ4) 
How do employees experiencing Lean Implementation describe the aspects of influences of the 
organisation that affect learning which will eventually be embedded into practices? 
The question considers how lean was hailed as a solution to the problems within the two case 
studies.  The message given by senior executives in the case study organisations was Lena would 
serve as tool, technique and overarching philosophy to guide in the actions of organisation 
members.  
The promise of lean was to develop the capabilities of ‘front-line’ workers.  Their dialogue and 
feedback about the way work should be organised was to bring continuous improvement to 
healthcare. Teams can learn from mistakes and create stable processes after a period of reflective 
thinking.  Problem-solving skills learned through daily practice  and sharing knowledge. 
The early articles on lean stressed the importance of people in the lean process (Monden, 1983).  
The human dimensions of motivation, respect for people is seen as crucial (Hines, 2013).  In recent 
healthcare endeavours, including both of the case studies in this research, the criticism of lean can 
levied against whether the role of individual in a work context is appropriately given. The empirical 
evidence in case study two illustrated clinical roles as being Sid lined for senior executives to make 
decagons about procedures and programme strategy.  Clinicians were not seen as ‘competent’ to 
make decisions about the future of procedures and what to include in the lean transformation 
(Petersen, 2009).  There are areas of conflict where people are concerned.  Their own knowledge of 
work processes in not necessarily considered (Pettersen, 2009).    
This study has uncovered a multitude of factors in differing pathways that affecting learning 
including: organisational change, culture, storytelling, management fads, influence of management 
consultants and employee expectations as reported in chapters 4 and 5 of the findings section.   
Progress was episodic and wasn’t sustained in the long term.  Most improvements reverted back to 
the current state before lean had been implemented.  The Management Consultants  influenced the 
implementation of their version of improvements but as soon as  they left, the transformation was 
discarded.  The idea of lean was to create more time for clinicians to be freed of administrative 
burdens or activities that wasted time.   Changes were made so that medical professionals could 
make use of all of their knowledge.   Removing duplication of work and effort should have given 
more time to patients and cooperative work amongst professionals.  However, the examples and 
illustrations form the case studies show that Lean provided a structure which was not helpful to 
learning. 
 
6.5.1. Influence of Lean on Learning 
For all its positivistic measurement, Lean was subjected to the same kind of politicised manoeuvring 
as any other kind of learning or change programme. 
The variation in application of lean methods contributes to the barriers to learning among group 
members and the organisation. This translates into localised practise at the institutional level. 
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Many articles have explored the adoption of Lean for the public sector (Radnor et al, 2006; Radnor 
and Walley, 2006; Bagley and Lewis , 2008, Radnor, 2010).  There have been various articles 
published on the adoption of Lean in Healthcare across the globe but many of these articles 
concentre on the process of operational benefits that Lean derives , and many concentrates on 
specific department or wards (Ben-Tovim, et al, 2007; Dickson et al, 2009; Meyer, 2010; Holden, 
2011).  Many case studies on Lean report the early stage so  implementation and as such do not 
offer a longitudinal view of lean in Healthcare.   
The literature on Lean in Healthcare covers a variety of types of organisation and implementation 
uses.  Many of the examples form previous are form the US  with differences in how procedures are 
applied because of the type of healthcare organisation public or private, insurance funded or as a 
‘closed system’.   Previous research highlights the operational and process improvements but lacks 
significant detail in the affect on employees on which Lean was imposed. Early articles tended to 
report positive Lean outcomes (Ben-Tovim,  et al 2008;  Fillingham, 2007, Graban, 2009; Dickson et 
al, 2009).  However, the more recent articles begin to link the obstacles to full implementation and 
learning (Grove et al, 2010; Waring and Bishop, 2010; Radnor et al, 2012).   
This places the focus of lean as a learning activity in order to improve processes, the  organisation 
has to promote improvement in work practices and self improvement (Balle and Regneir, 2007; Ben-
Tovim, et al 2008, Toiussant, 2009, Touissaint, 2013).  
Ability to Interpret information Organisations are influenced by the external pressures of their 
environment.  Healthcare organisations are under extreme pressure to adopt Lean methods by the 
politics of guiding think-tanks such as the IHI who introduced lean.  Research site 1 was heavily 
influenced by the idea of Don Beriwck and Atul Gawande to introduce lean principles to improve 
patient care.  Study  two, St Lydda’s, had experts from the field presenting good cases from other 
hospitals that had already improved care.  St. Lydda’s also had a highly respected Consulting Group 
(CG)  that also reported on success in other hospitals.  This gave the impression of St. Lydda’s falling 
behind if they did not use Lean as tool for changing the processes within the institution. The 
Consultant’s knowledge and experience was interpreted as the superior way of conducting the 
practice of medicine. This highlights the lack of focus on the people aspect of Lean implementations 
(Stone, 2012;  Taylor et al, 2013) 
Then the power of the Consulting group influence and leverage within the healthcare sector and the 
hospital present another form of power (Fincham, 1999; Czarniawska, and Mazza, 2003).The two 
studies conducted in healthcare organisations revealed an uneven and unpredictable distribution of 
knowledge about projects and new ways of working. 
 
6.5.2 Employee Perception of Organisational Influence 
Employees describes barriers of learning in their experience of learning Lean. There was a mismatch 
between what employee anticipated or hoped would happen in the lean programmes to the actual 
outcome of events.  Employees were often disappointed by the way they were treated by managers.  
Employees withdrew from the politically motivated process. After initial attempts to contribute to 
the lean programmes, employee felt silenced by the absence of feedback.  After that, clicnal staff 
made a deliberate effort to withhold their opinions (Blackman and Sadler-Smith, 2009).  Tacit 
knowledge was certainly lost to this void in information sharing. Future projects would not be able 
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to benefit from experiential learning because there was not mechanism for silenced employees to 
share their explicit or tacit knowledge of ways of working.  
The expectation of employees can be explained by Hopkins (2002) concept of reciprocity. There was 
no perceived reciprocity from the absence of feedback and therefore individuals withheld the kind 
of linked to organisational citizenship behaviour and effort  (Somech, Drach-Zahaay, 2004).  
Behaviour that exceeds the job requirements are crucial to organisational change programme’s 
success (Brief and Motowildo, 1986; Katz and Kahn, 1966).  
The structural affect of lean as an organisational mechanisms did not provide the desired effect of 
institutionalising procedural arrangements (Popper and Lipshitz, 2000).   
6.6. Chapter Summary  
This chapter discussed the theoretical underpinning relating to the four research questions: 
individual perception of learning experiences during lean implementation, the perceived learning 
process with its feedback loops. It considered the perceived process of learning and the impact of 
absence of feedback.  It covered the aspects of managerial and system control.  The chapter then 
further discussed how learning moves from individual to group and final organisational influences of 
Lena. The chapter highlighted the mismatch between the employee perception and the 








The conclusion to this research study is presented in this chapter.  The aim of the chapter is to 
provide a summary theoretical and practical contributions to organisational learning literature and 
research in Lean Methodology.  The contribution to knowledge form this thesis will be articulated.  




This study makes a contribution to scholarship concerning organisational learning and 
implementation of Lean methodology in a healthcare setting.  My primary contribution adds to the 
understanding of how learning is embedded into an organisation and what barriers may exist to 
prevent learning from being embedded.  The barriers are many fold and arise out of different 
theoretical areas of research.  Some of the barriers can be explained by resistance to change while 
others.   
 
I make further empirical contributions to the field of Healthcare Research as an in-depth study of 
how clinicians perceive the implementation of Lean in an organisation.  The context provides a 
critical view of the challenges in healthcare setting for organisational change through Lean 
transformation and for learning.  
 
The thesis offers general practical insights into the methodological tool of Participant Observation.  
The prolonged effort of maintaining contact with the second case study organisation offered many 
insights that would not have ordinarily been available.  The in-depth engagement with participants 
and organisational materials meant that were was a natural triangulation of data and a rich 
understating of the true leaning in the organisation.  If had only interviewed participants in the lean 
implementation, I may have come to a different conclusion of the success of the programme.  If I 
had only looked at corporate archival documents, I may have reached a slightly different conclusion.   
 
7.2.1. Theoretical contributions 
  
My theoretical contribution to the literature  
One area of and level of learning affects another. The final result being the erratic or purposeless 
learning, which I have called ‘Aimless learning’. This new construct of Aimless learning is not an 
absence of learning but a display of learning when no change in cognition or behaviour has taken 
place.  The goal of individual learning is to develop a new mental model for use in future decision 
making.  We assimilate knowledge for future decision making models. The empirical evidence from 
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both case studies leads us to the conclusion that it is possible for individuals to learn something with 
no purpose whatsoever.  
In case Study One, I used the terms unintended learning and arrested learning. I was trying to 
describe how the learning when forced by Lean Methods has been turned into something other than 
was intended originally. However, it didn’t encompass the full meaning of what I was trying to 
convey.  
My argument is that it is important to understand how learning transcends from individual to group 
to organisational level. Clearly, sometimes there are missing steps in the process and individuals do 
not have the opportunity to fully assimilate what should be learned or indeed the learning intended 
by the organisation. In addition, there is a void of information when feedback loops are interrupted 
or when the loops are non existent. The process by which individual fills this void with their own 
interpretation and localised practice is the key to what’s finally embedded in the organisation. 
When Learning was ‘leaned’, aimless learning was achieved.  At face value similar to surface 
learning, employees described using new forms and following new protocols but the fundamental 
way they treated patients was not changed.  Their behaviour did not change, their cognitive 
understanding of patient care did not change.  
Socialization meant supressing information it turned to organizational defences. Interpreting the 
information with others was agreeing the public face of the project. It wasn’t an open sharing of 
information. Staff learned what could be said and what shouldn’t be said in record keeping or 
externally.  Record keeping is an integral part of medical care both for fiduciary reasons and for the 
clinical decision making process. Careful consideration is made to maintaining records on patients 
and patient data. This might be individual patient records or the large databases that contain 
information about patients with similar disease conditions.  The ‘lessons learned’ session and ’60 day 
report out’ contained many claims that efficiencies had been made in ACS but it the success of 
recording and reporting.  Daily work practices had not changed.  Recording it as a success when 
there isn’t a clear improvement. There is some improvement but even in the 60-90 day period we 
see the ‘slipping back’ into old habits. . 
Although using lean to standardise practices was the goal, Each RCP and ICP was run by its own 
clinical director. They used the lean method to introduce their own methods and discarded anything 
that was difficult. They also discarded practices that took too long to see a benefit.  They strategy of 
long term change was lost in favour immediate gains to their own agenda. 
Patients were always getting good care but not necessarily the most efficient care or at the least 
cost. The paediatric project for lean instituted long held plans by the chief clinician.  St Lydda’s used 
lean to implement a plan that had already devised. There was never an opportunity for staff to 
feedback how they saw the project or if they believed it was beneficial to patient care. 
If you asked any of the ward clerks, nurses, or admin staff what was ‘learned’ through the lean 
project it was things like: ‘capturing info’, ‘playing the game’, ‘just doing it’ without understanding 
why, ‘record what needs to be ‘recorded’, doing it the manager’s way’, ‘the ward way’, the CG way’, 
‘Doing part of the process to ‘show it’s being done’, ‘Information gets left out that is not convenient 




What was institutionalised was the habit of non-learning. People actively tried not to learn what was 
offered by the consultants. If they did admit to learning, it was a kind of aimless learning. A way to 
appear to have a learned a new way of doing things. 
They had a new way of filling out forms but this had nothing to do with the way they practised 
medicine or nursed at the bedside. It had everything to do with appearing as though they were 
complying. 
The phenomenon of Aimless Learning is simultaneously passive and active. The learner actively 
appears to engage in the busyness of learning but passively rejects any new ideas. It is different form 
surface learning because there isn’t any learning of new ideas. It could possibly be an additional 
outcome of emotional labour hiding the fact that the daily work is not completed differently but 
appearing to have changed. 
The research study set out to explore how learning took place and was embedded in a healthcare 
organisation. As was mentioned before, it did not set out to prove or disprove whether the Mary 
Crossan’s 1999 4I framework was correct in its assumptions. It has merely used the Crossan 
framework to help describe the phenomenon observed in these studies. However, the current 
studies were broader than just the 4I framework and explored the experiences, perceptions and 
beliefs about learning Lean methodology within an NHS change programme. 
Having already established that there is a body of knowledge on the barriers to learning, the critical 
and new element that these studies bring to the literature is the idea of Aimless learning. A kind of 
learning that has no immediate purpose to the individual or the organisation. This chapter briefly 
summaries the key findings in relation out the literature on both Organisational Learning and Lean 
methodology. 
As was seen in the discussion of empirical evidence, meaningful learning was prevented because 
staff felt they had been left out of the feedback loops. The use of control over information by 
managers is an example of how power and politics can be a detriment to learning (Rashman and 
Hartley, 2006, Schilling and Kluge, 2009; Bunderson and Reagans, 2011, Vince and Saleem, 2004; 
Vince 2001). 
 
Organisational dysfluency  
I have coined this term to represent the specific way in which organisation use storytelling to create 
very specific message.  Propaganda isn’t quite the right word for it and it isn’t outright lying.  The 
truth statements are carefully set side by side in order to produce what seems to be a true story.  
Statements juxtaposed can create a success nararitve of Lean or any other organisational constructs. 
Statements can be essentially true for a specific instance but not necessarily the whole story.   
Corporate media fashions one case of success into the ubiquitous case of success.   
Speech and linguistic researchers use the term disfluency to describe interruptions in speech (Yu, 
Castel and Bjork, 2012).  I have applied this idea to the theories of organisational narrative (Gabriel, 
2000).  Future studies could undertake content and/or discourse analysis to review speech patterns 





7.2.2. Practical contributions  
Embedding learning from new ways of working 
This study addresses these issues in understanding the difficulties and the successes for employees 
in learning new ways of working through Lean methodology in a large healthcare organisation. The 
research extends our understanding of the Organisational learning overall and 4I framework by 
providing further empirical support and deeper examination of its complexities. It also extends 
previous work on learning in healthcare. It has practical implications for training and learning in 
organisations. 
Organisations consume millions of pounds in adopting new policies and procedures and training 
individuals to perform new routines. The healthcare sector is under increasing scrutiny to save 
money, improve efficiency and safety (Rivard, Rosen and Carroll, 2006) and, as a consequence, 
learning is seen as a ‘central theme for the NHS’ (Nutley and Davies, 2001, p 36). As a result of their 
size and complexity, healthcare organisations depend on systems, repetition and routines to aid in 
and reinforce learning (Gawande, 2009; Edmondson, 2002; Stan and Vermeulen, 2012). However, 
such standardisation has not been effective in addressing complex and persistent organisational 
problems and issues.  
Organisations need to address the concerns of aimless learning otherwise they will spend millions of 
pound on teaching a new concept for no reason at all.  Nothing will be achieved if Employees turn 
away from the learning and embrace ‘aimless learning’.   
Two Case studies: One Thesis 
I included two separate case studies in this thesis.  The second being much larger and more complex 
than the first one. I took the decision to leave the explanation of case Study One as it had been 
written up for a conference paper. The reason for including the conference paper in chapter 5 was 
to show how my thinking broadened from the write up of Case Study One to the investigation in 
Case Study Two. Case Study One focussed intensely on the 4I framework, putting each of the 
concepts into the 4 stages of Crossan’s framework.  However, from the discussion in my transfer 
viva, it was clear that I could widen the scope of my ideas and consider Organisational Learning 
theories in general.  Thus, for case study two, I was open to any and all theories that might explain 
organisational learning and explain the phenomenon of the empirical data I gathered.   
The case studies were researched sequentially and not for comparison but to deeper my 
understanding of the phenomenon uncovered.  The thesis was also not a comparative design.  I had 
similar themes in each of the case studies but I did not compare the themes from case one to case 
two.  As Yin (2011) explains, I refined the research tactics and analytical framework. In Case study 
two, I paid closer attention to the surroundings of the organisation and gathered a greater variety of 
data types, e.g. I used photographs of organisational artefacts such as bulletin boards and project 
progress charts.  
Research methodology: the benefits of prolonged engagement  
Participation observation gives a unique insight into an organisation. In Case study two, I had 
sustained contact with the organisation for almost two years.  The follow up opportunities that I had 
with members of the organisation helped me to understand all of its complexities. Participant 
observation offered the scope of rich data from many different sources. However this also proved a 
difficulty in deciding which parts of the data were most important to present and to analyse. The 
length of time in the institution provided incredible insight to the ‘truth’ of the process. If I had not 
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been with the institution for so long I would not have realised that no work habits had actually 
changed and would have been convinced by CG’s view of the data. However, the sheer volume of 
data to discuss presented problems for this researcher. Future papers or publications of this data will 
need to be carefully organised so that the data can be fully discussed. 
 
7.3 Limitations & Future Research  
Participant Observation: How close is too close?     
It is also important to note that prolonged engagement comes with challenges.  The researcher can 
drift into being ‘part of the team’ and therefore perhaps the study almost becomes an ethnographic 
study in which the researcher must be ware of influencing the outcomes.  Sometimes when writing 
up my field notes, memories would come floating to the surface.  It was a difficult balance to 
maintain objectivity in the data analysis.  Yet at the same time, I feel I know this research inside and 
out because I have lived it, experienced it and have been supressed by it.  
Further research 
Future research might concentrate on defining aimless Learning as an operational construct with the 
field organisational learning and lean methodology. In addition stronger links between lean 
methodology and its underpinning philosophies and OL should be explored. The descriptions of the 
two areas of research are so similar that it seems a natural synergy to develop them in combination. 
As healthcare organisations become increasingly enamoured of Lean, this will provide an 
opportunity to study how clinicians find the balance between from standardisation and variation. It 
would be helpful to know if patient outcome are improved by such methods with quantitative 
studies. 
 
7.4 Final Words 
The PhD time frame has not been without its major personal challenges.  It was very difficult for me 
to complete given my circumstances, I was grateful for the opportunity to revise the thesis.  I feel 
this is a much better representation and explanation of the research.  |It is much more focussed.  
Admittedly, this version still very likely needs a few tweaks here and there, but on the whole it has 
all the elements that were required.  
After the completion of the PhD, I hope to return to hospital work in a medical school.  I would like 
to put my knowledge of Lean and learning to good use within medical schools. Sometimes, in a 
professional capacity, I run training sessions for physicians.  This was partly the impetus for me to do 
a PhD to uncover why it is so difficult to get physicians to learn new things.  My new found  
knowledge of hospitals and ways of working would be ideal to instruct new medical students before 
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Appendix 1 Report to the Senior Executives on Improvement  
Summary of Case Review Data Testing of ACS Pathway 
 
This is part of an internal document that provided data analysis of the SHOs and Registrar’s habit of 
filling out the ACs pro forma. It formed part of a report back to senior clinicians and executives to 
explain what new behaviours had been learned as part of the new lean processes. 
Summary 
Approximately 50 cases were reviewed for entry into the database. Only 50% of patient records had 
ACS forms. Of the remaining 50%, only one form was complete. The rest of the forms had minimal 
information, approximately 1% of the information filled in. Extraneous information appears 
frequently on the forms, e.g. notes in margins. More encouragingly, Page 13 was always complete 
(by the nurses). 
In the patient records with missing forms, there was no discernible pattern between time, day, ward 




Many forms had both NSTEMI and STEMI recorded. On some forms the detail, e.g. anterior or 
lateral, was recorded but not the category of STEMI or NSTEMI 
GRACE Score 
Risk score is either not calculated or just ‘ticked’ without a number. 
The most problematic ‘scores’ are the creatinine Enzymes levels. Some of the forms had partial 
calculations and a few had ‘guesses’. 
Additional notation about patient history is made in the margins. 
Patient History 
This section has the most information, usually overflows to other section 
Contradictory Info 
There is information gathered as narrative in the margins that is contradictory to the ‘ticked’ boxes, 
e.g. Premature CAD 
Time points 






Outcomes only partially filled in 
Vessels section not usually filled in\Time flows hardly ever 
On-going Care 
This is rarely filled in 
Continuing Cardiac Care (Page 13) 










Cycle of renewal and reflexivity 
Goodwill 
Nursing Staff in Cardiac care exemplary 
Structure for change 
Feedback Loops for learning 
o Development Areas 
Embedding in BAU 
Linking with HR/L&D/OD 
Training needs for SHOs and consultants 
• Qualitative inquiry and analysis 
• ‘Back to Basics’ education 
Engagement with Consultants 
o Legacy of CG 
Credibility and Trust 
Training skills and knowledge 
Employee ‘Voice’ 
• Quantitative **NB not included in PhD (this was internal only)o Preliminary results 
Small but positive change 
Difference between 12/13 and 13/14 fiscal years in cardiac patients 
Needs further investigation and separation of variables 
Next Steps 
Finish Quantitative analysis 
Plan for meeting with executive sponsors (M*****, R******* and A**********) 
This was part of an internal report to Senior management explain the effect that the CG had on the 
Lean projects and learning in general at the hospital. The Quantitative results refer to internal clinical 
data analysis I completed as part of professional courtesy to the hospital. 
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Appendix 3 Interview Question Protocol (Case Study 1) 
Impact of Training: What were the goals for the training? , How did the training goals relate to 
patient care improvement? What were the stated vision and goals for this training?, For you 
personally? 
Learning and application: What do you think people have learned as a result of the lean 
programme?, How has it changed the procedures or policies?, What could be improved? How are 
you applying what you learned from the leadership and lean training?, What do you think were the 
outcomes of the applied learning?, Did the outcome meet your expectations, if not how did they 
vary? 
Lean: Can you describe the process of going through the lean transformation?, What did you learn 
from the RIE sessions?, What were some of the improvements made?, What were some of the 
reactions from yourself and staff? 
General 
 



















St Interviews Questions (Case Study 2) 
Based on the interview question from Bontis, Crossan and Hollund, (2002) 
 
1. how would describe how were first introduced the to the idea of new pathway? 
 
2. How would you describe your own and other’s mind set about the new pathway? 
3. How do you feel it has improved (or not) individual competence levels? The new process 
4. How has it affected any systems in place that help with patient performance discharge and 
admissions separates 
5. How were conflicts resolved and decisions made? 
 
6. Who was involved at the beginning? 
 
7. Do you think these were the right people? Why? Why not? Who would you have picked? 
Because? 
8. How do you think these  pathways link with St  ’s strategy or Departmental strategy? 
9. How did change the org structure? If it didn’t change the structure, would you have changed 
it and how? It’s a risk to try to change structure, schedule admission coordinator, 
10. How were recommendations from the group adopted by the organisation? IF they weren’t 
adopted, why do you think that was? 
11. How do you feel that learning was embedded into the organisation? 
 
12. How were the new goals communicated to others? , 
 
13. How would you describe the group’s decision process  
 
14. How do you think these new pathway will contribute to the future performance of St  ? If 
what ways will be positive? Any negatives? What are they? 
15. Impact of Training: What were the goals for the training? , How did the training goals relate 
to patient care improvement? What were the stated vision and goals for this training?, For you 
personally? 
16. Learning and application: What do you think people have learned as a result of the lean 
programme?, How has it changed the procedures or policies?, What could be improved? How are 
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you applying what you learned form the leadership and lean training?, What do you think were the 
outcomes of the applied learning? , Did the outcome meet your expectations, if not how did they 
vary? 
17. Lean: Can you describe the process of going through the lean transformation?, What did you 
learn from the RIE sessions?, What were some of the improvements made?, What were some of the 

















Appendix 5   RESEARCH ETHICS: CONSENT FORM 
 
Form RE5 
Research Study: The flow of information and learning in medical teams 
Name, position and contact address of Researcher: 
Margaret Roberts mr441@bath.ac.uk 
Please Initial Box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information   sheet for the above study 
and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I   am free to withdraw at any 
time, without giving reason. I am giving information about my role as a professional and no 
individual patient data will be discussed or disclosed. 
 
3. I  agree  to  take  part  in  the  above study. 
 
4.  The Interviews and conversations with researcher: 
 




6. I agree to the interview being recorded 
 
7. I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in publications 
 
Name of Participant Date Signature 
 





APPENDIX 6  Honorary Contract  
 
 
Honorary Contract with Host Institution in UK Human Resources Directorate 
Room Wing 
 
ST HEALTHCARE NHS TRUST HONORARY LETTER OF ATTACHMENT 
           Direct tel:     
Direct fax 
Email: Nicola.johnson@ 
10th October 2013 
Private and  Confidential Mrs Margaret Shepard Roberts 215 Newbridge Road 




Conditions of Attachment 
 
I am writing to confirm your honorary attachment with Healthcare NHS Trust from 14th October 
2013 – 14th April 2014 
The reason for the attachment is to undertake a placement as a Research Student within the
 Department. During your attachment, you will be accountable to Dr , Consultant 
 
1. You will receive no remuneration from the Trust during this attachment and nothing in this 
agreement confers employment or employment rights either during the term of the attachment or 
at the end of the attachment. Travelling expenses or any other expenses will not be met by the Trust 
unless prior formal approval has been given. 
 
2. The Trust will not be responsible for the reimbursement of course, lecture or examination 






3. Whilst on Healthcare premises you are required to conform with the conditions of the 
Trust, and to the Trust and departmental policies and procedures, including but not limited to Equal 
Opportunities, Health and Safety Regulations, and use of Trust equipment including telephone, 
computer, internet and e-mail. 
 
4. During the course of the attachment any matters of a confidential nature, including in 
particular information relating to the diagnosis and treatment of patients, individual staff records, 
and details of contracts and terms, must under no circumstances be divulged or passed on to any 




5. This honorary attachment is subject to health clearance by our Staff/Student Occupational 
Health Department and DBS clearance where there is contact with patients or working in a clinical 
area. 
 
6. The Trust does not accept any responsibility for articles lost or damaged on Trust property. 
 
7. If you agree to accept this attachment on the Terms and Conditions specified above, please 
sign the formal acceptance at the foot of this letter and return it to me. A copy of this letter is 
enclosed which should be retained by you for future reference. 
 






I hereby accept this honorary attachment on the terms and conditions specified above. 
 
Signed: ................................................................. 
 
 
Date: ......................................................... 
